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Abstract 
 
“Regime change” in the Arab world has attracted strands of literature 
which, especially in the last 20 years, variously tried to explain a general 
“reluctance to democratize” and/or the singular “resilience of 
authoritarianism” that most Arab countries were showing, at times when other 
areas of the world were experiencing wide processes of democratization and 
political/economic liberalization. 
Among them, Morocco has so far been reported as one of the most 
“successful” cases of gradual democratization: partly since its independence in 
1956 but mostly in the last two decades, Morocco has indeed been fairly 
responsive to the mainly external pressures toward political liberalization, 
endorsing a transition path marked by top-down liberalizing reforms on the 
political and economic spheres, along with attempts to improve unsatisfactory 
levels of social indicators and reduce poverty and inequality across the country.  
Though, this path - far from being linear and incremental – hinder tensions 
and contradictions which question the easy hypothesis of a country inscribed 
on a pattern of simultaneous successful democratization and structural change.  
Besides, Morocco also showed somewhat of a “partial” resilience to the 
revolutionary upheaval which has been shaking the Arab World since the eve 
of 2011: mass protests did spread out - leading the King to make concessions in 
terms of the adoption of a new constitution – but were much milder than in the 
neighbouring countries and no “revolution” as such took place.   
This partial resilience represents a further puzzle to explain, in so far as it 
can be read as a natural outcome in either one or the other of the two 
contrasting views presented above.   
By analysing thus the dynamics of political and socio-economic 
transformations occurred in Morocco during the last few decades, this work 
aims at answering to two interrelated questions: 
1) Should Morocco be defined as a country embarked in a comprehensive 
path of democratization (of which the recent adoption of the new 
constitution represent a major significant step), or rather as trapped into a 
stalled democratization, or even as just pursuing a piecemeal strategy of ad 
hoc and often superficial reforms which cannot be described as an overall 
coherent process of transition (in which both cases the new constitution 
would be read as just cosmetic change)? 
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2) Morocco’s partial resilience to the recent revolutionary upheaval in the 
Arab world should be read as the result of a substantial (satisfied) 
acceptance by the population of the country’s socio-economic conditions 
and ongoing path of democratization (with thus protests calling for just 
reforms and not for radical regime change) or it is rather the result of a 
particularly smart and successful “survival strategy” by part of an 
authoritarian monarchy able to suffocate real demands for change coming 
from the masses, even when it appears to respond to them? 
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Introduction 
 
The overall work will consist of six chapters to be organized as follows: 
A first introductory chapter will present and contextualize the topic of the 
work, highlighting the research questions it aims to explore and including a 
summary review of the broad literature on change in Arab countries, aimed at 
framing Morocco’s “transition” as a particular case study in the broader context 
of the Middle East and North African countries (MENA). 
The second chapter will illustrate the non-linear path of liberalizing 
political/constitutional reforms embarked by King Mohammed V (1956 – 1961), 
and subsequently by his successors Hassan II (1961 – 1999) and Mohammed VI 
(1999 – present). 
The third chapter will present the current situation concerning civil rights 
and freedoms in Morocco, assessing its achievements and shortcomings, as well 
as an overview of Moroccan civil society.  
The fourth chapter will rapidly overview the structure and evolution of 
poverty and inequality in the country, before presenting its different phases of 
socio-economic development and economic reforms, with a more detailed 
analysis of the country’s current social policies/development strategies and of 
its key economic shortcomings and challenges ahead.  
The fifth chapter will overview the external pressures toward 
democratization and liberalization variously exerted on the country by some 
relevant external actors, such as the EU, the US, the countries of the MENA 
region, several International Organizations (i.e. the UNs, the WB, the IMF) as 
well as some relevant international NGOs.     
A sixth and final chapter will then sum up the main conclusions emerging 
from the above presented analysis and try to answer to the two questions: “new 
development model, stalled democratization or piecemeal reforms?”, and thus, 
“exemption from revolutionary contagion as a symptom of democracy or of veiled 
authoritarian repression?”   
 
 
1
1. The Theoretical Framework 
 
Between the end of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, a huge number 
of Arab countries have started reforms aimed at adopting some of the basic 
features of what is known as the western-liberal model of democracy, such as 
multi-partitism, more or less free and competitive legislative or administrative 
elections, constitutional reforms, stricter laws for protecting human and civil 
rights, and so on. Moreover, these reforms have generally been accompanied 
on the economic sphere by a widespread endorsement of the mainstream 
Washington Consensus, with the consequent adoption of broad processes of 
economic liberalization (privatizations, deregulation of external trade, etc). 
These liberalization processes undertaken in most Arab countries had 
largely been interpreted – in the academic field and in political contexts as well 
- as the start of a sort of “regional wave of democratization”, connected to the 
broader so-called “third wave of democratization”1 taking place at the global 
level (with the dissolution if the Soviet Union), which was thus supposed to be 
expanding to the Arab world as a contagious force. 
However, these expectations were soon to be reversed, as by the second half 
of the 1990s these measures of political liberalization introduced earlier had 
already been circumvented or watered down in most of the countries, and in 
some cases had even been accompanied by measures of repression of human, 
civil or political rights. 
This until December 2010, when an unprecedented wave of mass protests, 
street demonstrations and global civil uprising invested the MENA region: on 
December 17 the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouaziz in Tunisia drove off 
the “Jasmine Revolution” which, following almost one month of mass street 
demonstrations and civil unrest in the country, led to the ouster of the 24-years 
ruling President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. The 
revolutionary upheaval was soon to spread out in two other long-lasting 
authoritarian neighbouring regimes: on January 25 the “White Revolution” broke 
out in Egypt, leading to the end of the 30-years long semi-dictatorial regime of 
President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011; on February 15 violent protests 
broke out in Libya, leading to a bloody civil war which lasted until 20 October 
2011, when the ruling Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed, 
leaving the UN-officially recognized National Transitional Council at the guide 
                                                                 
1 Huntington S. (1991) 
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of the country. Major protests also spread out in many other countries around 
the region, notably in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen and Syria, in many cases 
pushing the MENA rulers to make minor concessions and reforms in order to 
prevent the protests to turn into a revolutionary upheaval. In the case of Syria, 
violent uprisings against the ruling President Bashar al-Assad kept on steadily 
and increasingly since January 2011, pushing the country into a long-lasting 
and bloody civil war, which is still on-going and worrying the entire 
international community.        
In such a context, the Kingdom of Morocco represents a fairly interesting 
case: on the one hand, it has been one of the Arab countries which embraced 
most rapidly and positively a “democratic discourse”, largely responding to the 
external pressures toward “democratization”, “structural change” and “socio-
economic development” coming from a wide arrow of actors (European Union, 
United States, International Organizations and so on); on the other hand, it did 
only respond in a moderate measure to the contagion of the revolutionary 
movement which spread in the MENA region in December 2010/ January 2011, 
by experiencing mass protests and demonstrations which – even if finally 
leading the King to make concessions in terms of the adoption of a new 
constitution – only asked for democratic reforms and never questioned the 
legitimacy of the Monarchy nor had any revolutionary aspiration whatsoever.   
Indeed, partly since its independence in 1956 but basically in the last two 
decades, Morocco did endorse a path of transition characterized by liberalizing 
reforms both on the political and economic sphere, together with attempts to 
improve its unsatisfactory levels of social indicators and reduce poverty and 
inequality across the country. It thus gave the impression of having found its 
way for a thorough structural change, intended as a comprehensive strategy 
combining continued economic liberalization, increased democratization, 
efforts to reduce poverty and inequality and to promote social and human 
development. 
Though, this trajectory - far from being linear and incremental – presents in 
itself tensions and contradictions which put in discussion the simplistic 
hypothesis of a country inscribed on a pattern of simultaneously successful 
democratization and structural change.  
Indeed, as Willis affirmed in 2009, “Morocco’s programme of reforms 
represents a fascinating case study of a country pushed by both internal and 
external factors to transform significant aspects of its economy, politics and 
society, whilst simultaneously seeking to accommodate certain countervailing 
tendencies in favour of the maintenance of the status quo. Although such a 
description could arguably be applied to any state, in any period, what is 
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remarkable is that these tensions have produced a demonstrable dynamic of 
change in the country, in sharp contrast to the stasis found in virtually all the 
other states of the southern Mediterranean. Although for many critics the pace 
of reform may be far too slow and its achievements too uneven, change is 
clearly occurring and although the long term impact of this change is still 
uncertain it remains the most interesting southern Mediterranean country to 
watch.”2  
Morocco appears thus as an interesting case-study precisely for this reason: 
on the one side, it has been widely assumed and reported – in the political 
discourse as well as in the academic field – as the best “success story” of 
gradual democratization in the Arab world (with the recent adoption of the 
new constitution representing a meaningful step); on the other side, though, a 
wide array of insightful analyses exist raising awareness on the challenges and 
grey zones that these alleged progresses turn out to hinder (with the adoption 
of the new constitution being targeted as simply cosmetic change).  
Plus, its “partial” resilience to the 2010/2011 revolutionary movement do 
undoubtedly offer an interesting puzzle to be explained in this context, in so far 
as it can be read as a natural outcome in either one or the other of the two 
contrasting views.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
2 Willis M.J. (2009) 
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1.1. Morocco: Genuine (Albeit Slow) Democratic Transition 
or Just “Smart Authoritarianism Refined”3? 
 
The aim of my research is thus to focus the complex dynamics of economic, 
social and political transformations occurred in Morocco during the last few 
decades, in order to (try to) answer to two interrelated questions: 
1) To what extent is it possible to give reason to those analyses which see 
Morocco as being endorsing a truly “new development model” on the road to 
a comprehensive path of democratization (of which the recent adoption of 
the new constitution would represent a major significant step), and to 
what extent are rather more truthful those who see the country as being 
trapped into a “stalled democratization”, or even as just being adopting a 
“piecemeal strategy” of ad hoc, selective and often superficial reforms which 
cannot be described as an overall and coherent process of transition (in 
which both cases the new constitution would be read as just cosmetic 
change)? 
2) Having answered to this, how Morocco’s partial resilience to the recent 
revolutionary upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa should be 
interpreted? Is it the result of a substantial satisfied acceptance by the 
population of the country’s socio-economic conditions and the allegedly 
ongoing path of democratization, or is it rather the result of a particularly 
smart and successful “survival strategy” by part of an authoritarian 
Monarchy which – by either suffocating or supposedly responding to 
them - is able to smartly handle, before they explode, the demands for 
change coming from the masses?    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
3 The definition comes from Kausch K. (2009a) 
 
 
5
1.2. A Summary Review of the Literature on Change in Arab 
Countries 
 
The debate about liberalization and democratization processes in Arab 
countries, in its complexity and multi-layered nature, has nourished a huge and 
variegated literature, mostly beginning with the end of the Cold war era.  
Broadly speaking, the variety of approaches to the study of democratization 
processes in the field of political science can be resumed in three principal 
general theories: the modernization theory, the transition theory and the 
structural theory.4 
The modernization theory is a structure-based approach - born at the end of 
the ‘50s - which sees the socio-economic development of a country as the 
essential condition for the sustainability of democracy, even postulating a 
positive correlation between levels of socio-economic development and levels 
of democracy.5  
The transition theory is an agency-based approach - born at the end of the 
‘70s - which focuses on the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, 
identifying in the elites’ behaviour the key factor for the success or failure of the 
transition itself and of its consolidation.6  
Lastly, the structural theory – born contemporaneously to the transition 
theory - identifies as the determinant variables in democratization processes 
the developments of capitalism with respect to the social classes, the state 
structure and the international power equilibriums.7  
Within this broad literature on democratization - oriented towards one or 
the other of the over-mentioned theories – the interest for middle-eastern 
countries has been fairly modest up until the late ‘80s.  
Since the end of the Cold war – with the adoption by many Arab countries 
of some basic features of electoral democracy such as multi-partitism and free 
elections - the issue of democracy in the Arab world has become more and 
more relevant in the political science debate, passing through different 
historical phases: an initial phase of pessimism regarding the structural 
obstacles to democracy diffusion in the region (mid and late ‘80s) has been 
followed by a widespread optimistic belief in a regional wave of 
                                                                 
4 Guazzone L. (2004); Guazzone L. and Bicchi F. (2004) 
5 Lipset S. (1960) 
6 Rustow D. (1970); O’Donnel G. et al. (1986); Mainwaring S. et al. (1992) 
7 Moore B. (1966) 
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democratization (first half of the ‘90s) and again by a renewed caution in the 
last years, eventually overcome by a new wind of optimistic appraisal – though 
not widely concern-exempt - in the wake of the 2011/2012 Arab Spring. 
Though, the debate upon the democratization in the Arab-Muslim world 
has been qualified, rather than by the general theoretical approaches adopted, 
by the positions shown on three/four dominant themes: (a) the socio-economic 
pre-conditions necessary to the introduction of democracy; (b) the role of the 
specific political culture; (c) the role of international factors; and finally (d) a 
methodological debate about the definition of democracy adopted to judge the 
presence/absence of democracy in the region.   
a) The socio-economic pre-conditions 
Many authors have adopted a functional/instrumental perspective which 
stresses the importance of some socio-economic and political pre-conditions, 
mainly the role of civil society, the economic system, and the pressures from 
the masses. 
As concerns the role of civil society, two opponents views can be outlined: 
the optimistic vision of Norton8 - which recognizes the presence of a noticeably 
liberal civil society impulse, even if coming from a small minority – and the 
more pessimistic approach of Gellner9 - which emphasizes the distinctiveness 
of the Muslim social context, whose kind of associative life is unpropitious to 
the emergence of a genuine liberal democracy. Actually, there are many 
scholars who take a position which is half way among these two, recognizing 
the democratic potential of Muslim civil societies but at the same time 
emphasizing the actual difficulties in making this potential effective.10  
Many others studies have indeed stressed the political structural 
impediments which can explain the extraordinary resilience of authoritarian 
ruling elites in Arab countries, analyzing in particular: the peculiar 
organization of state power;11 the strength of coercive apparatuses;12 the notion 
of asabiyya (the particular Islamic social solidarity and sense of community);13 
the ability of ruling elites in co-opting their opponents and in exploiting and 
manipulating the splits between opposition groups, in order to weaken 
opponent political parties and neutralize demands for democracy coming from 
                                                                 
8 Norton A. (1995) 
9 Gellner E. (1994)  
10 Al Sayyid M. K. (1995); Catusse M. (2004); Desmeres M. (2004); Korany B. and Amrani S. (1995); 
Yom S.L (2005); Zoubir Y.H. (1999) 
11 Guazzone and Pioppi (2004a, 2004b, 2007); Korany B. (1995) 
12 Bellin E. (2004); Propstein Posusney M. (2004); Sorenson D.S. (2007) 
13 Volpi F. (2009) 
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the masses;14  the kind of social pacts15 and the survival strategies16 that Arab 
authoritarian elites have been able to build and carry on. 
Analyses have also been focused on the role of the economic system and 
economic change in fostering or preventing democratization pressures, 
emphasizing in particular the linkages between economic systems/economic 
reforms and regime types,17 the delicate dialectic between continuity and 
change,18 and the role of particular social classes.19  
Recently, a growing number of area specialists have been joining 
Heydemann’s call for a “post-democratization” era in Middle-Eastern studies,20 
namely the necessity to go beyond the democratization paradigm, transcending 
the optimist/pessimist divide of this strand of the literature and thus trying to 
interpret the dynamics of authoritarianism focusing just on the analysis of how 
political rule in Arab countries is effectuated, organized and executed, leaving 
apart questions such as when democratization might occur or what the Middle-
East lacks.21 
b) The political culture  
A very important strand of the literature on the Middle-East has been 
stressing the role of the specific political culture which is said to characterize 
Arab polities. Bringing on the legacy of the orientalist  approach to Islam - that 
tries to build a comprehensive and systematic picture of an Islamic civilization, 
with its own logic and system of values – these authors (called neo-orientalist) 
propose a set of culturalist/essentialist assumptions (generally supported by 
tenuous historical correlations) which argue for an Arab exceptionalism in 
politics, basically asserting the intrinsic incompatibility between Islam and 
democracy, as the “fundamentals” of Islam are the reason for the systemic 
clashes with western notions of democracy.22  
On the opposite side, many authors criticize this political culture approach, 
opting rather for a contingentist approach, which argues that Islam, just like any 
other religious doctrine, is malleable enough to be conceptually and practically 
                                                                 
14 Langhor V. (2004); Lust Okar E. (2004); Perthes V. (2004) 
15 Heydemann S. (2007) 
16 Brumberg D. (1995 and 2003); Kausch K. (2009a) 
17 Colton N.A. (1999); Erdle S. (2004); Farsoun S. and Zacharia C. (1995); King R. J. (1999); Layachi A. 
(1999); Luciani C. (1987); Pioppi D. (2004); RichardsA. and Waterbury J. (2008) 
18 Spencer C. (1999); Zerhouni S. (2004); Werenfels I. (2004) 
19 Luciani G. (2007) 
20 Heydemann S. (2002) 
21 Schlumberger O. (2007) 
22 For a review: Guazzone L. (2004) 
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interpreted in such a way to reduce the areas of friction with liberal notions of 
democracy.23  
Partially mid-way approaches also exist between the two extremes, such as 
those authors who see the political culture approach as an useful tool of 
analysis, if used with the necessary caution,24 or those others arguing that the 
peculiar state-society relations characteristic of Arab polities is not to be 
ascribed to the Islamic culture but rather to the predominance of the neo-
patrimonial system, which, by creating a social structure based on personal 
affiliations, impedes the creation of class interests and thus prevents the 
emergence of an opposition strong enough to challenge the policies of the 
regime.25 
Strongly connected to the issue of the Islamic political culture, is the 
literature stressing the increasingly important role which Political Islam can 
play in fostering or preventing democratization, with a huge amount of 
analyses focusing on the dynamics of Islamist moderation and on the politics of 
Islamist inclusion in the political game.26  
c) The international factors 
Another strand of the literature has indeed tried to outline the role played 
by international factors and actors in shaping democratization attempts and 
authoritarian responses in Middle-Eastern countries, either focusing on a global 
level of analysis27 or on more specific sub-levels, such as the European Union 
(mostly showing a certain scepticism on the EU capacity/willingness to foster 
democratic paths in this region),28 the United States29 and regional influences.30 
d) The definition of democracy 
Finally, a more properly methodological debate has to be added to the 
above-mentioned predominant themes, the one upon the definition of 
democracy which is adopted in referring to development in the Middle-East 
and North African (MENA) region.  
                                                                 
23 Anderson L (1995); Esposito, Kramer, Piscatori, reviewed in: Guazzone L. (2004) 
24 Hudson M.C. (1995) 
25 Brynen R. et al. (1995); Schlumberger O. (2000) 
26 Amghar S. (2007); Boubekeur A. and Amghar S. (2006); El Din Shahin E. (2005); Langhor V. (2002); 
Ottaway M. and Hamzawy A. (2008); Wegner  E. and Pellicer M. (2009); Willis M.J. (2006) 
27 Cavatorta F. (2004 and 2005); Ben-Dor G. (1995) 
28 Boubekeur A. and Amghar S. (2006); Dillman B. (2003); Haddadi (2002); Joffé G. (1999); Pace M. 
(2009); Pace M. et al. (2009); Powel B.T. (2009) 
29 Zoubir Y.H. and Zunes S. (1999) 
30 Gause III F.G. (1995); Mortimer R. A. (1999). 
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Indeed, the region has seen in the past years the widespread emergence of 
forms of democracy which couldn’t actually be identified with the traditional 
western model of liberal democracy, but which can nonetheless be theoretically 
placed somewhere within a sort of continuum between the two extremes of 
democracy on the one side and authoritarianism on the other.  
This evidence has nourished a rich literature which calls for the need to 
better “qualify” and “connote” the term democracy in order to take account of 
these different ambiguous realities. Indeed, a full array of labels has been 
coined over time to designate these extremely broad and variegated set of 
regimes all over the world, among which: façade democracies, semi-democracies, 
partial democracies, exclusionary democracies, pseudo-democracies, electoral 
democracies, illiberal democracies, defective democracies, competitive 
authoritarianisms, semi-authoritarianisms, mixed regimes and hybrid regimes.31 
 
                                                                 
31 More specifically: façade democracies (Finer S.E., 1970), semi-democracies (Diamond L et. al, 1989), 
partial democracies (Epstein D.L. et al., 2006), exclusionary democracies (Remmer K., 1985), pseudo-
democracies (Volpi F., 2004 and 2006), electoral democracies (Diamond L., 1999), illiberal democracies 
(Zakaria F.,1997), defective democracies (Merkel W., 2004), competitive authoritarianisms (Levitsky S. and 
Way L.A., 2002), semi-authoritarianisms (Ottaway M., 2003), mixed regimes (Bunce V. and Wolchik S., 
2008) and hybrid regimes (Karl T., 1995; Diamond L., 2002; Morlino L., 2011) . For a comprehensive 
review and bibliography of the abovementioned literature, as well as for a more detailed and deeper 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the phenomenon of the hybrid regimes, see Morlino L. (2011), 
specifically Chapt. 3. 
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2. Political System and Reforms  
 
2.1. Morocco’s Political Institutions 
 
Morocco - as is stated in the Constitution - is a parliamentary constitutional 
monarchy with a multi-party system and a formally granted separation of 
powers: an executive power exercised by both the government (headed by the 
Prime Minister) and by the King as Head of State; a legislative power vested in 
both the government and the two chambers-Parliament, and an independent 
judiciary branch. 
The last constitutional revision - endorsed in July 2011 following the spread 
of the Arab’s spring’s mass protests – brought some changes in the balance of 
powers which was enshrined in the previous 1996 Constitution.1 Though, it 
actually still provides for a strong monarchy but weak Parliament and 
Judiciary. 
The king is constitutionally empowered of extremely extensive powers: he 
is the secular political leader as Head of State; he presides over the Council of 
Ministers, appoints the Head of Government following legislative elections and 
- upon this latter’s recommendations - all members of the cabinet, and may as 
well terminate the tenure of any minister at his discretion; he can dissolve the 
Parliament, call for new elections and rule by decree; he is the Commander in 
Chief of the Army and - as a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed - 
holds the country’s religious leadership with the title of Commander of the 
Faithful (Amir al-Mou’minin). 
The Parliament – since the 1996 constitutional revision - consists of two 
chambers: the Chamber of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwab/Assemblée des 
Représentants), or lower house, with 395 members elected for a five-year term 
through direct universal suffrage with a party-list proportional representation 
system (305 elected in multi-seat constituencies and 60 from women-only 
national lists); and the Chamber of Councillors (Majlis al-Mustasharin/Chambre 
des Conseillers), or upper house, with 270 members elected for a nine-year term 
                                                                 
1 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, July 1, 2001. French version: 
http://www.parlement.ma/fe/images/CONST/constitution%20du%201er%20juillet%202011.pdf 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, September 13, 1996. French version:  
http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96fr.htm  
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through indirect vote by local councils (162 seats), professional organizations 
(91 seats) and labour union (27 seats). 
Its powers were expanded with the 1992 and 1996 constitutional revisions 
and further more in the 2011 text, but still remain limited, and include: 
legislative competence on individual freedoms and rights, on civil procedure, 
on local electoral systems, on budgetary matters; approving bills; questioning 
ministers; establishing ad hoc commissions of inquiry to investigate the 
government's actions; power to dissolve the government through a majority 
vote of no confidence (only for the lower house). 
The Judiciary relies upon a dual legal system consisting of secular courts 
based on French legal tradition on the one side, and on courts based on Jewish 
and Islamic traditions on the other side, and it’s constitutionally recognized as 
independent from the other constitutional powers (art. 107). 
The secular system consists of: First Instance Courts, Trade Courts, 
Communal and District Courts (first degree jurisdiction); Courts of Appeal 
(second degree jurisdiction); Administrative Courts; a Supreme Court; a Special 
Court of Justice (competent for cases involving magistrates or government 
employees); a High Court of Justice (competent for offences or crimes 
committed by government members during the discharge of their function); a 
Standing Tribunal of the Royal Armed Forces (for cases involving military 
personnel and occasionally matters pertaining to state security); an Audit Court 
(responsible for supervising the implementation of the budget); a 
Constitutional Council (which supervises the constitutionality of the approved 
laws, with six members appointed by the King, three by the Head of the Lower 
House and three by the Head of the Upper House); and a Supreme Council of 
the Judiciary (which is presided by the King and upon whose advice 
magistrates are appointed by royal decree).   
The non-secular system, instead, consists of 27 Sadad Courts, which are First 
Instance Courts for Muslim and Jewish personal law and are divided into 6 
sections (Shari'ah, Rabbinical, Civil, Commercial, Administrative and 
Criminal).2 
A key role in Morocco’s political system is held by the Makhzen, the 
traditional Moroccan royal governing apparatus, a network of patronage and 
arbitration centered around the King and not accountable to the parties, the 
legislature or the judiciary. It is basically comprised of an extra-constitutional 
council of royal advisors (notables and bureaucrats forming a sort of “shadow 
                                                                 
2 Touchent D. (2006) 
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government”), the “Sovereignty Ministers” (Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Islamic Affairs, plus the Prime Minister), high military and 
security service personnel, key economic players (such as rich landowners and 
or businessmen), plus the structure of regional and sub-regional leaders 
centered around the Walis and the Governors (directly appointed by the King) 
as well as the Caids and the Pashas (appointed through the Minister of Interior).3 
As regards the country’s administrative organization, Morocco is divided 
into 16 administrative Regions, subdivided in 61 second-level sub-divisions (13 
Prefectures and 48 Provinces). Each Prefecture and Province is divided into 
Districts (Cercles), Municipalities (Communes) and Urban Municipalities 
(Communes Urbaines). The Districts are further sub-divided in Rural 
Municipalities and the Urban Municipalities are in some cases further sub-
divided in Arrondissements. In 1981 a new mid-level administrative division 
was created, the Wilaya, which groups together different Prefectures or 
Provinces or both at the same time. 
Each District is under the supervision of a Caid, each Prefecture and 
Province is under the authority of a Governor, while each Region is 
administered by a Wali, appointed by the King.4 
 
 
                                                                 
3 Dillman B. (2003) 
4 US Department of State (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm); Cherkaoui M. and Ben Ali D. 
(2007); 
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2.2. Political Development: Five Phases of Institutional 
Reforms 
 
In contrast to most of its Arab neighbours in North Africa, Morocco did not 
embark on a thoroughgoing reform program as a way of securing its 
independence from European colonial rule, obtained in 1956. This was largely 
due to the fact that the main actor promoting such reforms in other states, the 
nationalist party which had led the struggle for independence, did not emerge 
as the dominant political force in the aftermath of independence in Morocco.  
The Moroccan nationalist party, the Istiqlal, was in fact sidelined in the 
post-independence power struggles by the monarchy, which, after the leave of 
the French, aimed at reasserting its political supremacy as a restoration of pre-
colonial traditional structures of power. In the decades following the 
independence, most of the monarchy’s efforts were thus spent on entrenching 
and protecting its own position rather than on public policy, and on recruiting 
allies similarly interested in the maintenance of the status quo rather than 
radical reform.  
As a result, large-scale, all-encompassing, revolutionary reform 
programmes on the line of those witnessed in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt were 
not introduced in Morocco, where the regime rather opted for a more technical, 
small-scale and case-by-case approach to the problem of development. 
Thus, the start of a more comprehensive and thorough reform programme 
in Morocco did not happened until several decades after independence, most 
dating its commencement to the late 1990s, namely in the closing years of King 
Hassan II reign (1961 – 1999).5   
Taking into consideration the entire post-independence period, however, 
Moroccan political developments and its process of supposedly progressive 
political liberalization - intended as the expansion of public space and the 
recognition and protection of civil and political liberties - can be described into 
six different phases.6  
 
2.2.1. The First Phase (1956 – 1961): the Reign of King Mohammed V 
The first period (1956 – 1961) begins with the conquering of Morocco’s 
independence from French colonial rule in 1956 and coincides with the brief 
reign of King Mohammed V. The basic 1955 Franco-Moroccan Agreement was 
                                                                 
5 Willis M. J. (2009) 
6 Baracani E. (2005); Korany B. (1995); Zerhouni S. (2004) 
 
 
14
in principle to be the first step toward the birth of the country’s democratic 
statehood on the basis of constitutional democracy: in practice, however, 
Mohammed V’s consultative monarchy left little place for effective 
democratization.  
At the institutional level, the process started with the setting up of a 
Consultative National Assembly composed of various political tendencies and 
representing different religious, socio-professional and trade union settings. 
Though, the democratic value of this Council was more in appearance than in 
substance, since first, it was only a consultative body, and second, its members 
were chosen by the monarch rather than elected by universal suffrage.  
At the doctrinal level, the 1958 Royal Charter proclaimed the monarch’s 
desire to respect and reinforce individual and collective liberties, with the aim 
to consolidating the multiparty system within the framework of constitutional 
monarchy.  In reality, however, the monarch played a strategy of fragmenting 
the political forces rather than one of good-faith multi-partytism, by constantly 
intervening among the political parties, and even by establishing new political 
organizations.  
Indeed, after the initial phase of national front politics that united all 
Moroccan political parties around the monarch and against French occupation, 
divisions were soon to emerge for the effective exercise of political authority. 
The contenders were the monarch versus the political parties, principally the 
Independence Party (Al-Istiqlal / Parti de l’Independence, PI) - the oldest 
Moroccan opposition party, created in 1943, incarnation of the anti-colonial and 
independence movement, claiming its right to share power with the King in 
virtue of its strength as the main representative of civil society in country. 
Alongside the Istiqlal, other minor parties were the Moroccan Communist 
Party (Parti Communiste Marocaine, PCM), the Democratic Independence Party 
(Parti Démocratique de l’Independence, PDI) and the Popular Movement 
(Mouvement Populaire, MP). 
Despite its apparent strength, however, Istiqlal failed to represent a serious 
challenge for the monarchy’s power, because of its intrinsic weaknesses: a too 
much heterogeneous base of support (rural and urban bourgeoisie, liberal 
professionals, members of the middle-class, workers, small land owners and 
peasants, merchants), and internal ideological divisions concerning the basic 
orientations of strategy and tactics to adopt toward the monarchy and the other 
political forces. Indeed, soon two sides were to emerge within the party: a 
conservative wing (lead by the historical chief Allal Al-Fassi), accepting the 
democratization process as presented by the King, and a more progressive one 
(headed by younger leaders as Mohamed Basri, Mehdi Ben Baraka, Mhajoub 
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Ben Siddiq), calling for a limitation of the monarchical power as a first step 
toward more radical political and institutional reform. This latter group 
eventually quit and, in 1959, founded its own party, the National Union of 
Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, UNFP). 
By the end of the 1950s, thus, Morocco showed a political landscape 
characterized by a weak and fragmented multi-party system and very fragile 
parliamentary politics (the Consultative Assembly was indeed dissolved in 
1959), which allowed for further consolidation of the monarchy’s power 
monopoly, with the king holding its control over the principal bases of political 
power: the legislature (although), the executive (including the Army and the 
Police) and the local and regional administrative apparatus.7 
 
2.2.2. The Second Phase (1962 – 1974): King Hassan II between 
Liberalization and Authoritarianism  
The second period (1962 – 1974) follows the death of King Mohammed V in 
1961 and the accession to the throne of his son Hassan II in 1962. The new 
King’s reign was characterized by cycles of liberalization and authoritarianism, 
depending on the way the King chose to react to repeated regime crises. On the 
whole, however, he managed to preserve the monarchy’s central role in the 
political system and marginalize the opposition political parties by adopting an 
undoubtedly authoritarian approach, while at the same time demonstrating a 
certain willingness to modernize the regime.8  
This attitude clearly emerged since the beginning when, taking on the 
constitutional process initiated by his father in 1960 with the creation of an ad-
hoc constitutional council charged to draft the first Moroccan constitution, he 
decided to bypass this body and ask French constitutional jurists to carry on 
this task. The new text - boycotted by the UNFP, the PCM and the Moroccan 
Workers Union (Union Marocaine du Travail, UMT), while supported by Istiqlal, 
the MP and several liberal independents – was submitted to national 
referendum in 1962 and eventually adopted by a majority of 85% of the 
population.9 
 
                                                                 
7 Korany B. (1995) 
8 Meaningfully, his 30-years long reign (1962 – 1999) are widely known as les années de plomb (“the 
years of lead”), being engraved into Moroccans’ collective memory as a period of dictatorship, violent 
repression and torture.     
9 Korany B. (1995) 
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The 1962 constitution was modelled after the 1958 French constitution, 
though granting even greater powers to the head of state.  It instituted a 
hereditary monarchy (art. 20) and prohibited any constitutional revision 
regarding the monarchical nature of the state and the Islam religion (art. 108). 
The king was acknowledged as both secular and religious leader: his person 
being declared sacred and inviolable, symbol of national unity and guarantee 
of the State’s continuity, the respect of Islam and the Constitution, as well as of 
national boundaries, territorial integrity and country’s independence (art. 19); 
he was Head of the Royal Army and of the Supreme Judiciary Court (art. 33); 
he presided over the Council of Ministers and had the powers to promulgate 
the laws and to submit them to referendum, to appoint the ambassadors, to 
sign and ratify the treaties (art. 31), to nominate and dismiss the Prime Minister 
and the Ministers (art. 24) as well as to declare the state of emergency in case of 
danger for national integrity or national institutions (art. 35). 
The constitution created a bicameral parliament consisting of a Chamber of 
Representatives (two-thirds of which were directly elected) and a Chamber of 
Councillors nominated through electoral colleges. Theoretically, this 
parliament was relatively strong since both chambers were to be consulted 
prior to the implementation of any royal legislative decree (art. 72) but 
practically its powers were limited by the King’s capacity to dissolve the 
Chamber of Representatives (art. 27). 10 
In reality, thus, the constitution maintained the traditional nature of 
Morocco’s political structure and processes, with the government and the 
legislature being kept subordinate to the palace.11 
The first legislative elections in Morocco were held in 1963 and represented 
fairly well the weaknesses of this alleged democratization process. While 
formally all opposition forces were allowed to participate and campaign, the 
monarchy worked to offset their impact, by setting up a pro-palace coalition of 
loyalist parties - the Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions (Front 
pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles, FDIC), grouping together the 
Constitutional Democratic Party (Parti Constitutionnel Démocratique, PCD), the 
Independent Liberals (Parti des Liberals Independents, PLI) and the MP.  
Though the FDIC didn’t manage to get the majority necessary to govern 
(winning 69 seats, while other parties getting 75), they were nonetheless asked 
to form the government. Soon a legislative impasse was created, with the 
opposition parties – namely Istiqlal and the UNFP, which together held 69 seats 
                                                                 
10 Leveau R. (2000) 
11 Korany B. (1995) 
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– systematically opposing the government policy. This difficult situation was 
compounded by the ongoing economic turndown which finally led to the 
Casablanca riots in March 1965.  
The King reacted by suspending parliamentary politics and declaring the 
state of emergency on the basis of art. 35, in June 1965.12 
This stalemate political situation lasted from 1965 to 1970, with Hassan II 
practically re-establishing absolute monarchy: he actually governed with the 
help of his own cabinet and close advisers, reducing the government to a pure 
administrative body, formed by non political personalities and civil servants 
loyal to him. Limits to the freedom of expressions for political parties were 
imposed; the Army was given accrued authority. 
In 1970, in order to revive the constitutional legitimacy of the kingdom 
against the wave of student strikes and protests that was shaking the country, 
Hassan II urged for the promulgation of a new constitution, emerging as an 
authoritarian compromise. The new text endorsed a significant reduction of the 
Parliament’s powers: the bicameral system was abandoned and replaced by the 
creation of a single Chamber of Representatives whose composition was left 
unspecified (art. 43)13; the deadline for the establishment of the Chamber was 
also left undetermined, so that elections could be postponed indefinitely; the 
king no longer needed to obtain the approval of the Chamber before issuing 
royal legislative decrees and became the sole person capable of initiating 
constitutional revisions (while previously sharing this power with the Prime 
Minister and the Parliament). The new constitution was submitted to national 
referendum and, despite being boycotted by both the Istiqlal and the UNFP, 
was eventually approved by 98.7% of the population, a plebiscite which was 
most likely the result of extensive vote manipulation. 14 
The following period saw a continuing political stalemate and a worsening 
of the economic conditions which fostered general discontent with royal policy, 
eventually culminating in two attempted coups to the life of Hassan II (in July 
1971 and in August 1972), both of which failed. 
On the wake of these events, the King tried to reassert his image as a 
democratizer by proposing a new constitution in 1972. It was less authoritarian 
than the second one, but failed to affect in any way the monarch’s basic 
supremacy. Both the Chamber and the Prime Minister were granted more 
powers in the economic, social, and cultural realms; the Council of Ministers 
                                                                 
12 Korany B. (1995) 
13 Actually, only one-third of this new Chamber would be directly elected by universal suffrage. 
14 Leveau R. (2000) 
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was now to be consulted on key issues such as declaration of war, state of 
emergency and constitutional revision (art. 65); it was reintroduced the 
universal suffrage for two-thirds of the Chamber, as it was in 1962.  
Despite the call for boycott by the main opposition parties, the proposed 
constitutional reform was approved in a national referendum by 98.1% of the 
voters. 
Yet, following this supposedly consensual approval, the political stalemate 
still continued: the elections expected for 1973 were delayed until 1977 and no 
representative government was established. 
In such a context, social and political crises intensified and strikes 
multiplied. The monarchy reacted by increasing its authoritarian rule to defend 
the “threatened national security”, by increasing restrictive measures against 
opposition parties, repressing civil society associations and even revising the 
code if individual liberties in a restrictive sense.   
 
2.2.3. The Third Phase (1975 – 1992): the Western Sahara War and the 
1992 Constitution  
The third period (1975 – 1992) was mainly characterized by the attempt of 
Hassan II to restore his authority after such a critical period, by trying to forge 
national consensus through the Western Sahara campaign.15 His mobilization 
of Moroccans behind a national cause – with the 1975 “Green March” which led 
to the occupation of 80% of the Western Sahara territory - contributed to restore 
the centrality of the monarchy and to build a consensus between the monarchy 
and the main opposition parties. 
                                                                 
15 The Western Sahara is a disputed territory, bordered by Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the 
Atlantic Ocean. Formerly a Spanish colony since the late XIX, it was decolonized in 1966 upon UN 
demand. Since then, the control of the territory has been disputed between Morocco, claiming its 
sovereignty in virtue of the historical traditional loyalty of tribal Saharawi leaders to the Moroccan 
Sultan, and the Saharawi national liberation movement POLISARIO Front (Frente Popular de Liberación 
de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), supported by Algeria and - until 1984 - Libya. In November 1975, 
King Hassan II ordered the massive, non-violent “Green March” (consiating of roughly 350 000 
unarmed Moroccans) to assert the country’s claim on Werstern Sahara, occuping almost 80% of the 
territory. In response, in 1976 the POLISARIO Front, controlling the remaining 20% of the area, 
proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) - claimeing its sovereignity upon the 
whole territory as representative of Saharawi people – which has been recognized until now by  81 
states wolrd-wide. In 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed on a UN settlement proposal for a 
referendum, which yet never took place due to disagreements between the two parts on many issues. 
In 1991, a cease-fire and a settlement plan were established by the 690 UN Resolution, with the setting 
up of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which 
deployed a roughly 200-person monitoring force to the territory.  
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The June 1977 elections, indeed, took place in a consensual climate, where 
the opposition forces resulted quite domesticated and fragmented16, and were 
thus won by the pro-palace MP and the independents.17. 
Following the elections, no major political changes occurred until the early 
1990s. It was only then that Hassan II, subject to increasing criticism from the 
lower classes and from Moroccan politicians for his incapacity to face the 
negative economic situation and for his foreign policy orientations18, as well as 
from many European human-rights activists for cases of human right 
violations,19 decided to undertook a process of political liberalization. 
Among the most relevant palace’s initiatives in this sense, there was the 
setting up in May 1990 of a Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights 
(Conseil Consultatif des droits de l’homme, CCDH) to resolve cases of 
disappearance and compensate victims of human rights violations, and the 
June 1991 political amnesty, which released 300 political prisoners.  
The most important one, however, was the proposal for a new 
constitutional revision in 1992.  
Besides some minor administrative rather than structural amendments 
voted in 198020, Morocco’s constitution had experienced no major changes 
during all the ‘80s decade.  
In 1992 the major opposition parties - grouped in a united front known as 
the Koutla Bloc21 - drafted a memorandum to the King requesting direct 
universal suffrage in parliamentary elections. Hassan II reacted by stating his 
intention to revise the constitution and hold free elections.  
The constitutional revision proposed by the King in 1992 - the fourth one 
since Moroccan independence - was due to address some of the opposition's 
                                                                 
16 In 1975 the Casablanca section of the UNFP had split, forming the Socialist Union of Popular Forces 
(Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, USFP). 
17 The following year the King managed to push the independents to institutionalize and form their 
own party, the National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement Nationale des Indépendents, RNI) 
18 In December 1990, several manifestations developed in almost every city in the country, to protest 
against the corrupted religious values of Hassan II’s government, his rapprochement to the US and his 
decision to take part to the II Gulf War (by sending a 1200-persons military force in Saudi Arabia in 
support of the multi-national force due to free the Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s occupation).  
19 As for instance, the severe armed repression of the 1981 Casablanca riots, which caused between 600 
and 1000 victims (66 for the official sources) among the demonstrators (i.e. mainly the lower classes 
affected by the economic downturn).  
20 For instance: voting age reduced from 18 to 16 years; establishment of a Regency Council under the 
Presidency of the Head of the Supreme Court; parliamentary term extended from 4 to 6 years.   
21 The Koutla was composed of four parties: the Istiqlal, the USFP, the PPS and the Organization of 
Democratic and Popular Action (Organization de l’Action Démocratique et Populaire, OADP)   
 
 
20
demands in matters of human rights protection and monarchy’s powers’ 
reduction, and represented the first time in Moroccan history in which the 
opposition parties were consulted and involved in revising the constitution.   
Indeed, the new text endorsed some minor signs of political openness in 
this sense: the preamble emphasized the “kingdom's commitment to human 
rights as universally recognized”; a Constitutional Council was created to 
replace the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in supervising the 
constitutionality of Moroccan politics and elections (art. 76 and art. 79)22; the 
Parliament’s powers were enhanced with the right to set up temporary 
committees of inquiry, after majority vote, for gathering information on specific 
facts (art. 40) as well as with the power to debate and vote the government's 
platform; a new consultative Social and Economic Council was set up to help 
the Government and the Parliament in drawing up social and economic 
orientation plans; finally, the King could no more nominate the ministers and 
held no more responsibility over the cabinet (powers which were now 
transferred to the Prime Minister) and, also, a more restrictive interpretation of 
art. 35 prevented him from dissolving the Parliament during states of 
emergency. As usual, also this new constitution was approved by an almost 
plebiscitary majority in a national popular referendum.23 
 
2.2.4. The Fourth Phase (1993 – 1999): the Late King Hassan II and the 
1996 Constitution 
The fourth period (1993 – 1999) signs the last years of King Hassan II reign, 
with two parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1997 and one important 
constitutional revision in 1996. 
The 1993 legislative elections raise serious concerns about their fairness, 
nourishing beliefs of huge vote manipulation and opening a deep political 
crisis. In these two-round elections in fact, the opposition parties, which had 
obtained very good results in the first round of June 1993, received a 
disproportionate and insignificant number of seats in the second round of 
November 1993: indeed, the opposition parties grouped in the Koutla Bloc 
obtained 99 seats out of 222 on the first ballot and only 15 seats out of 111 in the 
second one, whereas the previous pro-government majority24 received 116 seats 
                                                                 
22 According to these articles, the President and half the members of this Council are appointed by the 
King, while the other half by the Head of Parliament after consultation with different parliamentary 
groups. 
23 Korany B. (1995); Leveau R. (2000) 
24 Grouping the MP, the RNI, the PDI, the Constitutional Union (Union Constitutionale, UC) and the 
National Democratic Party (Parti National Démocrate, PND). 
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in the first round and 79 in the second one.25 The opposition parties claimed 
this disproportion as resulting from direct vote manipulation by the state 
bureaucracy and asked the King to cancel the elections. Upon his refusal, they   
protested by refusing to participate in forming the government, which led the 
King to appoint a technocratic composed of his loyal supporters and headed by 
Mohamed Lamrani. 
It is out of this context – in which Hassan was seeking compromises 
intended to convince the opposition parties to participate in the government – 
that in 1996 a new constitutional revision was proposed and consensually 
accepted by all the opposition forces.26 
The new constitution was essentially based on the previous ones, leaving 
almost unchanged the King’s prerogatives, but introducing a relevant 
constitutional change: the restoring of the 1962 parliamentary bicameralism, 
with a slightly different system of representation.   
The new Parliament was now consisting of two chamber: the Chamber of 
Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwab/Assemblée des Représentants), or lower house, 
with all its 325 members elected for a five-year term through direct universal 
suffrage with a party-list proportional representation system (295 elected in 
multi-seat constituencies and 30 from women-only national lists); and the 
Chamber of Councillors27 (Majlis al-Mustasharin/Chambre des Conseillers), or 
upper house, with 270 members elected for a nine-year term through indirect 
vote by local councils (162 seats), professional organizations (91 seats) and 
labour union (27 seats). 
Both chambers were now empowered with the right to express their vote of 
no-confidence to the government, able to cause the cabinet’s collective 
resignations (with the requirement of an absolute majority in the lower house 
and of a 2/3 majority in the upper house). 
Another important constitutional change was the affirmation that 
sovereignty belonged to the nation, rather than to the King (art. 2).  
The 1997 elections represented an important turning point in Moroccan 
political history: for the first time all political parties could use radio and TV for 
their election campaigns; for the first time computers were used; for the first 
time an Islamist party – the People’s Democratic and Constitutional Movement 
                                                                 
25 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)  http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2221_93.htm 
26 Kingdom of Morocco, Constitution of 1996: http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm 
27 The Chamber of Counsellors was modelled after the German system of Länders, with its members 
supposed to represent the country’s various regions and its most important socioeconomic groups. 
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(Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel, MPDC), then renamed 
Party of Justice and Development (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD)28 - 
was allowed to compete in the race, even gaining some relevant success (9 
seats); for the first time, finally, the historical opposition forces got access to the 
government, giving birth to the first Moroccan coalition government 
(gouvernment de l’alternance). 
In these elections, indeed, three major coalitions, the Koutla Bloc (the 
opposition), the Wifaq Bloc (pro-government right) and the Center Bloc received 
an almost equal number of seats (102, 100 and 97, respectively). The USFP won 
the larger number of seats (57) but not the majority.29However, the King 
appointed this party’s leader, Abderrahman Youssoufi, as Prime Minister and 
asked him to form a coalition government. Almost all the members of the 
cabinet came from the USFP and the Istiqlal, but significantly the five most 
important ministers, the so-called “Sovereignty Ministers” (Justice, Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Islamic Affairs), were still kept under the direct 
supervision of the King, who personally chose the ministers in charge of them. 
Thus, if the government was in charge of the economic situation, the state’s 
internal and external security kept remaining an exclusive prerogative of the 
monarchy.  
 
2.2.5. The Fifth Phase (1999 – 2011): the Reign of King Mohammed VI  
The fifth period (1999 – 2011) started with the death of Hassan II in July 
1999 and the assumption to the throne of the new king Mohammed VI. 
If politically liberalization was to some extent already on the agendas of his 
predecessors, the new king presented himself since the very beginning as an 
enlightened moderniser, starting putting in place a fairly broader set of reforms 
                                                                 
28 The PJD was created in 1998 from the merger of two movements. One was the pro-monarchy 
People’s Democratic and Constitutional Movement (Mouvement Populaire Democratique et 
Constitutionnel, MPDC), created by Abdelkrim Khatib in 1957. The other was the Islamic Group 
Association, founded in 1981 by Abdelillah Ben Kirane, who formerly belonged to the jihadist social 
revolutionary Islamic Youth mouvement (Shabiba Islamiyya): when the Islamic Youth was banned in 
1976, Kirane decided to work through legal political channels by setting up the Islamic Group 
Association, which in 1992 changed its name in Islah wa Tajdid (Reform and Renewal) and applied for 
legalization as a political party. Following the authorities’ refusal, in 1996 Kirane decided to join the 
MPDC (already existing as a recognized party), bringing with him the new born League for an Islamic 
Future, a grouping of almost 200 Islamist associations, which was led by Ahmed Raïssouni and later 
renamed as the Unity and Reform Movement (Mouvement pour l’Unité et la Réforme, MUR). Kirane was 
then elected Deputy-Secretary of the MPDC, becoming Khatib’s right-hand man. In 1998, the party 
renamed itself as the Party of Justice and Development (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD). 
(Boubekeur A. and Amghar S., 2006) 
29 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2221_97.htm 
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across a wide range of sectors as well as more specific initiatives in the fields of 
family law, civil and human rights and poverty alleviation (respectively, a 
comprehensive revision of the family code, the Moudawana; the establishment 
of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, Instance d’Equité et de 
Réconciliation, IER; the launch of the National Human Development Initiative, 
Initiative Nationale pour le Développent Humaine, INDH).30  
In the political sphere, the parliamentary elections which took place in 
September 2002 signed a turning point in Moroccan elections history for their 
transparency and fairness, and also for the 10% quota of seats (i.e. 30 seats) 
reserved to women. Though, they did show a critically high abstensionism rate 
(the voter turnout was only at 52%)31 and cases of independent journalists and 
other critics of the king being harassed and detained were reported.32   
Of the 26 parties listed, no one obtained an absolute majority. The best 
performing parties were the USFP (with 15.38% of the votes and 50 seats) and 
the Istiqlal (with 14.77% of the votes and 48 seats), followed by the surprisingly 
striking affirmation of the PJD as the third political force in country (winning 
12.99% of the votes and 42 seats), while the conservative RNI and MP gained 
respectively 41 and 27 seats.  
The King appointed his loyal outgoing Interior Minister Driss Jettou as the 
new Prime Minister, leaving him the task to form an ideologically all-including 
coalition government with the USFP, the Istiqlal, the RNI, the MP, and the PPS.   
The following parliamentary elections in Morocco were held in September 
2007 and were hailed by both local and international observers and political 
leaders as the most fair and transparent in Moroccan history.33Nonetheless, a 
remarkable number of violations involving vote buying was reported in both 
                                                                 
30 The revision of the Moudawana and the IER will be analysed in details in the chapters III, the INDH 
in chapter IV. 
31 Among the possible reasons behind this low turnout there is certainly the abstensionism of most of 
the Berbère population, to protest against the government’s disregard of their demands for the 
teaching of the amazigh language in schools and for a stronger recognition of their culture.  
32 Freedom House (2010) “Freedom in the World 2010 – Morocco” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/morocco  
33 For the first time, an international electoral observer mission as well as the involvement of domestic 
NGO electoral observers was accepted, and the government-sponsored Human Rights Advisory 
Council (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme, CCDH) was officially charged with overseeing 
monitoring efforts. The international mission was led by the National Democratic Institute, while the 
local NGOs were mostly grouped into the Network of Elections Monitoring Organizations (a coalition 
of around 350 associations across the country). Other major local NGOs among the electoral observers 
were the Moroccan Association for Human rights (AMDH), the Moroccan Centre for Human Rights 
(CMDH), and the Moroccan Democratic Civil Forum (FCDM). 
(http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2007/09/18/feature-01) 
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rural and urban areas, and besides, the voter turnout shrunk dramatically, 
reaching an historical low of 37% (down from 52% in 2002 and 58% in 1997).34 
The number of contesting forces was quite extensive, with candidates from 
33 political parties and 13 groups of independents running for the elections and 
most of the electoral programs were promising solutions to the country’s 
various social problems, such as unemployment, housing, education, and 
infrastructure. The results indeed were quite unexpected to many observers: 
the Istiqlal got the leading position (with 10.7% of the votes and 52 seats), 
followed by the PJD which performed worse than opinion polls had predicted 
(winning 10.9% of the votes and 48 seats).  The pro-monarchy MP and RNI 
gained 41 and 39 seats respectively, while the USFP registered an incredible 
decline with respect to the previous elections, winning only the 8.9% of the 
votes and 38 seats. The King appointed as Prime Minister the Istiqlal leader, 
Abbas El Fassi, who put up a cabinet composed of 33 ministers, including 7 
women. Four parties were included in the government: the Istiqlal, the RNI, the 
USFP and the PPS, while surprisingly the well performing PJD failed to secure 
any participation in it. 
By 2009, prime Minister El-Fassi appeared to have fallen out of favour, as 
Fouad Aliel-Himma, former Deputy Interior Minister and a close associate of 
the king, organized the pro-palace Modernity and Authenticity Party (Parti 
Authenticité et Modernité, PAM) to contest local elections in June. The new party 
led the voting with more than 20% of local council seats, followed by Istiqlal 
with about 19%. The PJD placed only sixth with less than 6% of votes, though it 
reportedly did well in urban areas.  
The general assessment from international and local observers was that the 
elections took place in good circumstances and without significant 
irregularities, although widespread vote buying, bribery, intimidation, and 
other forms of manipulation were still reported, and analysts regarded the 
official turnout figure of 52% with some scepticism.35 
 
 
 
                                                                 
34 Freedom House (2010) “Freedom in the World 2010 – Morocco” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/morocco 
35 Freedom House (2010) “Freedom in the World 2010 – Morocco” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/morocco;   
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Tab. 2.1 Results of the 2007 Legislative Elections, Lower House 
Name Acron. Founded in Vote% Seats 
Political 
ideology 
Independence Party (Parti de 
l’Independence / Al- Istiqlal) PI 1943 10.7% 52 
Right 
Nationalism 
Monarchism 
Justice and Development Party (Parti de 
la Justice et du Développement) PJD 1998 10.9% 46 
Right 
Islamism 
Conservatism 
Popular Movement (Mouvement 
Populaire) MP 1957 9.3% 41 
Centre-right 
Liberalism 
Nationalism 
National Rally of Independents 
(Rassemblement National des Indépendants) RNI 1978 9.7% 39 Right 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires)* USFP 1975 8.9% 38 
Centre-left 
Socialism 
Constitutional Union (Union 
Constitutionnelle) UC 1983 7.3% 27 
Right 
Liberalism 
Monarchism 
Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du 
Progrès et du Socialisme) PPS 1974 5.4% 17 
Left 
Socialism 
National Democratic Party (Parti 
National-Démocrate) PND 1981 
5.5% 14 
Centre-right 
Covenant Party (Parti de l’Alléance / 
Parti Al Ahd)  2002 Centre-right 
Front of Democratic Forces (Front des 
Forces Démocratiques) FFD 1997 4.5% 9 
Centre 
Liberalism 
Democratic and Social Movement 
(Mouvement Démocratique et Sociale) MDS 1996 3.7% 9 
Left 
Socialism 
National Congress Party (Parti du 
Congrès National Ittihadi) CNI 2001 
3.2% 6 
Left 
Socialism 
Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party 
(Parti de l'Avant-garde Démocratique 
Socialiste) 
PADS 1992 Left Socialism 
Unified Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste 
Unifié) PSU 2005 
Left 
Socialism 
Labour Party (Parti Travailliste) PT 2005 3.0% 5 Left Socialism 
Environment and Development Party 
(Parti de l’Environment et du 
Développement) 
PED 2002 2.9% 5 Left 
Party of Renewal and Equity (Parti de 
Renouveau et de l'Équité) PRE 2002 1.8% 4 Centre 
Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) PS 2006 1.5% 2 Centre-left Socialism 
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Moroccan Union for Democracy (Union 
Marocaine pour la Démocratie) 
 
UMD 
 
2006 
 
1.7% 
 
2 
Right 
Monarchism 
Citizens' Forces (Forces Citoyennes) FC 2001 0.7% 1 Liberalism 
Alliance of Liberties (Alliance des 
Libertés) ADL 2002 0.8% 1 
Centre 
Liberalism 
 
Citizenship and Development Initiative 
(Initiative Citoyenneté et Développement) ICD 2002 1.1% 1 Centre 
Party of Renaissance and Virtue (Parti de 
la Renaissance et de la Vertu) PRV 2005 0.8% 1 
Centre-right 
Islamism 
Sources:http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/m/morocco/morocco20071.txt;www.ArabParliaments.org  
* Formerly part of the National Union of Popular Forces, UNFP, founded in 1959 
Note: Besides the parties reported in the table, two other political forces – not legally 
recognized and thus not appearing from the elections results - need to be mentioned as relevant 
to the Moroccan political landscape: 
? The Amazigh Moroccan Democratic Party (Parti Démocratique Marocain Amazigh, 
PDMA), of centrist orientation, founded in 2005 by Berbers activists with the aim of 
promoting the Moroccan Amazigh/Berber identity and language. In April 2008 the party 
has been considered illegal and banned by a Moroccan Court of Justice’s verdict 
pronounced after a law suit filed by the Moroccan Interior Minister. 
? The Islamist movement Justice and Charity (Al Adl wa Al Ishane, JC), created by 
Abdessalam Yassine in 1988. Due to its extremist positions, the association was officially 
outlawed in 1990 and never got official recognition as a legal political party by the 
government, thus remaining illegal, albeit generally tolerated by the authorities. 
Tab. 2.2 Other Minor Moroccan Political Parties 
Name Acron. Founded in 
Political 
ideology 
Reform and Development Party (Parti Réforme et Développement) PRD 2001 Liberalism 
Moroccan Liberal Party (Parti Marocain Libéral) PML 2002 Centre 
Liberalism 
Democratic Independence Party (Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance) PDI 1946 Center 
Action Party (Parti de l’Action)  PA 1974 Left 
Socialism 
Social Centre Party (Parti du Centre Social) PCS 1982 Left 
Socialism 
Party of Hope (Parti de l'Espoir) PE 1999 Left 
Progressism 
Party of Civilizasing Alternative (Parti de l’Alternative Civilizationnelle) PAC 2002 Socialism 
Democratic Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Démocratique) PSD 2007 Centre-left 
Socialism 
Renaissance Party (Parti de la Renaissance – Annahda) PR 2003 Liberalism 
Liberty and Social Justice Party (Parti de la Liberté et de la Justice Sociale) PLJS 2004 Centre 
Source: www.ArabParliaments.org 
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2.3. A Sixth Phase? The Moroccan Arab Spring, the 2011 New 
Constitution and the 2011 Parliamentary Elections 
 
2.3.1. The Moroccan Arab Spring 
In early 2011, starting with the Tunisia’s revolutionary upheaval on 17 
December 2010, a wave of mass protests invested the whole North African 
region. Revolutionary upheavals took place in Egypt and Libya, but major 
protests spread out also in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen and Syria (this 
latter to fall later on in a bloody and still on-going civil war). 
Morocco was not exempted from the protests: on 20 February 2011, 
thousands of Moroccans rallied in Rabat, asking for democratic constitutional 
reforms.36 They were mainly questioning the excessive concentration of powers 
in the hand of the King and asking for reforms aimed at forcing the King to 
give up some of his powers and strengthening Parliament’s and Prime 
Minister’s powers instead.37 Major protests and disorders invested also 
Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier and several minor Moroccan cities such as Fez, 
Al Hoceima, Tétuan and others, for an estimated total number of protesters put 
at 37,000, according to the Interior Ministry. Other protests which followed on 
late February and early March saw the violet intervention and repression by 
part of the Police. 
    Main coordinator of these protests was the “20 February” youth 
movement – the origin of whose name is fairly obvious. Like protests 
movements in other Arab countries, the February 20 movement is a leader-less 
and structure-less amalgam of young people, holding monthly general 
assemblies - in the towns where it exists – which are open to the public and 
autonomous one from each other. Coordination among the different groups 
takes place, to the extent it does, via Facebook. The movement is looked at with 
suspicion by the mainstream political parties, although, the young wing of 
many parties have joined in without official blessing. It appears to have broad 
demands—essentially for democracy and jobs—but any such a real “program”. 
Parallel to it, a number of leftist political parties, independent labor unions, left-
leaning human rights organizations, and Islamist movements set up a Council 
to Support the February 20 movement.38 Anyway, notwithstanding its ability of 
                                                                 
36 The Associated Press estimated the turnout in Rabat at 4,000 while organizers put the crowd outside 
the Parliament at 20,000. 
37 Among the most common slogans: "Down with autocracy" and "The people want to change the 
constitution"(Champion M., 2011) 
38 The most important among them are the Islamist movement al-Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity), 
the United Socialist Party (PSU), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH). Given the 
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mobilizing huge crowds of Moroccans all across the country, protests in 
Morocco never reached the extent of those of many of its neighbouring 
countries. 
On 9 March, the King made a televised speech announcing his decision to 
undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform aimed at improving 
democracy and the rule of law, underlining his “firm commitment to giving 
strong impetus to the dynamics of the reforms taking place”. 39 He announced 
the formation of a Royal Commission appointed by him, with the task of 
drafting a new constitution by June, to be submitted to national referendum by 
next July. On 14 April, he even granted a partial amnesty, releasing or reducing 
the sentences of 190 prisoners, including Islamists and Saharawi activists.  
Though, such moves did not suffice protesters’ demands, so that 
gatherings, demonstrations and protests continued to be held almost on a daily 
basis through the following months, most of the time ending up in riots and 
clashes with the Police intervened to repress them.  
 
2.3.2. The 2011 Constitutional Revision: Process and Content of the 
Reforms 
a) The drafting of the new Constitution 
Besides the content of the reforms itself – which will be shown in details in 
the following paragraph - what has legitimately raised suspicions and critics 
among activists as well as among most external commentators is the way the 
revision was conducted, basically due to the non-consultative nature of the 
drafting process, to the excessive speediness in the pace of approval imposed 
by the palace and to the unbalanced referendum campaign. 
Indeed, the task of drafting the new charter was assigned not to an elected 
constituent body – as requested by the 20 February movement – but instead to 
an Advisory Royal Commission, composed of 20 members all appointed by the 
King and chaired by the constitutional law professor Abdellatiff Mennouni, 
himself a close advisor to the King. The guidelines for the draft were outlined 
                                                                                                                                             
array and the ideological diversity of parties and organizations that belong to it, the support council is 
deeply divided with members forming alliances against each other. More structured than the 
movement itself, it holds meetings and issues communiqués, but it is not clear whether or not the 
February 20 members themselves agree with its positions. 
39 Text of the King’s speech addressed to the Nation, 09 March 2011: 
http://www.maroc.ma/NR/rdonlyres/00002015/pisgmllvmaxpxxqbirtpudaflwnownkc/Texteint%C3%A9graldu
discoursadress%C3%A9parSMleRoi%C3%A0laNationmercredi09mars.pdf 
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in a speech given by the King on 9 March, and the work and discussions of the 
commission were not made public. As a sort of counterbalance, the palace also 
set up a consultative body (an “accompanying mechanism”) to function as 
liaison between the Commission and political parties, labour unions 
businessmen associations, human rights organizations, and other interested 
parts; though, its contribution was grossly limited by the fact that it also was 
headed by an advisor to the king, Mohammed Moatassim, and that the 
organizations were not shown a written draft of the new charter before 16 June. 
Finally, after three months of deliberations, a written draft of the 
Constitution was submitted to the “mechanism” on 16 June, only 24 hours 
before it was presented by the King in a nation-wide televised speech.40 The 
Council of Ministers was asked to vote on it on the same day of the 
announcement, and Moroccans were called to vote on it on national 
referendum in less than two weeks, on 1 July. It was quite evident the Palace’s 
willing to pass the reform quickly in order to leave the opposition no time 
enough to organize.  
The official referendum campaign was also grossly unbalanced, with the 
Palace variously trying to influence public opinion through mass manipulation 
and intimidation: the appeal for an equal share of airtime on TV and radio 
(coming from the Mamfakinch! group41 along with a collective of NGOs) was 
ignored by the government, which instead instructed private radio stations not 
to invite journalists or activists known for their opposition to the draft or those 
calling for boycott; imams received written instructions by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to urge a yes vote during their Friday sermons; in his speech in 
favour of the constitution’s approval the King even cited a passage from the 
Qur’an enjoining the public to follow his “way”, thus linking the vote to a 
religious duty; physical attacks on members of the “February 20” movement 
were also raised.42 
The protest movement leaders opposed the reforms envisaged in the King’ 
speech as being only a half-measure, heavy on inclusive rhetoric and light on 
actual reform, and actually representing nothing more than a top-down 
Monarchical concession - the reason why they call for boycott the referendum. 
Among the political parties, only four minor far leftist ones joined the call for 
                                                                 
40 Text of the King’s speech, 17 June 2011: http://www.maroc.ma/NR/rdonlyres/099EE393-85FA-4F31-AC73-
4D923D8E5215/0/Texteint%C3%A9graldudiscoursadress%C3%A9parSMleRoi%C3%A0laNation.pdf 
41 The Mamfakinch! Group (We won't give up! in Moroccan dialect) is a group of web activists -
representing the Internet extension of the "February 20" movement - which vehemently denounced 
the irregularities and the undemocratic pattern of the constitutional “debate”. 
42 Aalmirat H. (2011) 
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boycott, while all the others – including the PJD – embraced the reforms and 
campaigned for a “yes” vote.  
The new constitution was finally approved on national referendum on 1 
July 2011, by a striking 98.50% of the voters with a remarkable turnout of 
76.45% (according to the official data released), and promulgated on 19 July 
2011.43 
Referendum results were highly contested by dissenters, which widely 
documented incidents of voters being transported to polling stations by local 
officials, stations not carrying no-vote slips and electoral officials not verifying 
identification or requiring voter signatures, as well as reports of Moroccan 
residents abroad reporting looser identification requirements and consular 
officials’ supervising voting in mosques. It was not the 98.5% approval result to 
be contested by protesters (blamed on a poor, under-educated and intimidated 
electorate) but rather the 72.45% turnout claimed by the Interior Minister, as 
earlier Ministry statements, media polls and anecdotal reports had put the 
figure at no more than 50-60%. 
b) The content of the reforms 
If not revolutionary, the constitutional revisions were certainly radical, 
responding directly to many of the protesters’ demands. The new text 
expanded from 108 to 180 the number of articles, and very few of the older 
articles have remained unchanged. The main reforms enshrined in the new text 
can be resumed in the following set of points: 
? The new Preamble defines Morocco as a “modern State”, founded on the 
“principles of participation, pluralism and good governance”, aiming at 
constructing a “democratic State of Law” together with a “solidarity 
society where all enjoy security, liberty, equality of opportunity, respect, 
dignity and social justice.” This paragraph precedes the stating of Morocco 
as an “Islamic sovereign State”, the first line of all previous constitutions.  
? The country is redefined as a culturally and linguistically plural state. The 
Preamble, after stating the Kingdom’s attachment to the principles of 
national unity, territorial integrity and national identity (“one and 
indivisible”), clearly specifies that “its unity is forged by the convergence 
of its Arab-Islamist, Berber and Saharan-Hassanic components, nourished 
and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean 
influences”. Indeed, while in the previous constitution the official status of 
                                                                 
43 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, July 1, 2001. French version: 
http://www.parlement.ma/fe/images/CONST/constitution%20du%201er%20juillet%202011.pdf 
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Arabic was inscribed in the first line of the Preamble, in the new one it 
only appears later in art. 5, stating that “Arabic remains the official 
language of the state”. Remarkably, the same article recognizes the 
Amazigh (Berber) language, common patrimony of all Moroccans, as an 
official state language along with Arabic. The implementation of its official 
character and the modalities of its integration into teaching and into main 
domains of public life are defined by organic law. The Hassani language 
as well, as an integral component of Moroccan cultural unity, is granted 
preservation - and protection of its speakers – by part of the State. A 
National Council of Language and of Moroccan Culture is created, 
charged with protecting and developing the Arabic and Berber languages, 
as well as all the diverse Moroccan cultural expressions (art.5).44 
? A whole new section - Title II (art. 19 to art. 40) - granting the 
Fundamental Freedoms and Rights of the individuals, is introduced, 
remarkably extending the sets of liberties constitutionally protected. 
Indeed, in the 1996 text these were limited to: the granting of political 
equality to man and women (former art. 8); the freedoms of movement, 
opinion, expression, public gathering and association (former art. 9); the 
right not to be arbitrarily arrested or put into custody (former art.10); the 
right to the secrecy of personal correspondence (former art. 11); the 
guarantee of equal opportunities to all for employment in public offices 
(art. 12) and in seeking education and employment (former art. 13); the 
right to strike (former art.14); and the right of private property and free 
enterprise (former art. 15). In the 2011 text, they are extended as such: 
equality for man and women with respect to all the rights/freedoms in the 
civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental domains, with 
the state charged with working for the realization of this parity (art.19); 
right to life (art. 20); right to security (art. 21); right to physical or moral 
integrity and prohibition of torture (art. 22); reinforced prohibition of 
arbitrary arrest, detention, prosecution or condemn, and racism (art. 23); 
granted protection of private life, inviolability of the domicile and secrecy 
of private communication (art. 24);  freedom of thought, opinion and 
expression (art. 25); freedom of the press (art. 28); rights to health care, 
social protection, quality education, decent housing, water, clean 
environment and durable development (art. 31); special safeguard of the 
rights of women, children, elderly persons and the disabled (art. 32 and 
                                                                 
44 Some Amazigh activists continue to worry that the distinction between “the” and “an” will 
perpetuate Amazigh’s secondary status, and also remain skeptical over the effectiveness of the future 
law that will regulate its introduction into the education and media systems. Nonethless, the change 
does put Morocco ahead of its North African neighbours in respect for indigenous rights. 
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art. 34); special provisions in support of the youth, such as the state 
investment in the arts, scientific research and sports (art. 26) and the 
creation of a Consultative Council on Youth and Associative Action aimed 
at boosting youth’s participation in the economic, cultural and political life 
of the country (art. 33)    
? Also the forms of collective aggregation and representation of citizens 
received much more extended guarantees. While in the 1996 text they 
were only covered by art. 3 - stating that “political parties, unions, district 
councils and trade chambers shall participate in the organization and 
representation of the citizens” - and art. 9 - granting the freedom of 
association and of belonging to any or political group - the 2011 text 
reserve them a full sets of articles granting constitutional protection to 
each one of the following: political parties (art. 7); union organizations 
(art. 8); parliamentary opposition (art. 10); civil society associations and 
NGOs (art 12); free, honest and transparent elections (art. 11).   
? The Judiciary is declared as an independent power vis-à-vis the legislative 
and executive powers, with the King placed as a guarantee of such 
independence (art. 107), and with the explicit prohibition of “any 
intervention in the matter submitted to justice”(art. 109). The previous 
constitution was only affirming the independence of the “judicial 
authority” (art. 82), implying that the judiciary was an authority rather 
than a separate and independent power. Significantly, the name of the 
section itself (Title VII) is changed from a simple “The Judiciary” to a more 
explicit “The Judicial Power”, sub-headed by “The Independence of Justice”. 
Yet, though declared in name, such a full independence appears 
problematic in so far as the King’s powers in this matter remain 
unchanged from the previous text: he keeps, indeed, presiding the 
Superior Council of the Judiciary 45 (art. 56 and art. 115) as well as 
approving the appointment of the judges by part of this latter (art. 57). On 
the other part, the new constitution adds to this section a new sub-section 
“on the rights of the persons amenable to justice and on the rule of 
functioning of justice” (arts. 117-128), granting the principles of due, fair, 
public and speedy process, presumption of innocence and state-provided 
justice, as well as providing checks on judges’ partiality and on outside 
influence on the judicial process. Finally, an entire new section (Title  XII, 
arts. 154-167) on “good governance” is added, which, among the others, 
                                                                 
45 The Superior Council of the Judiciary is the body superseding the application of the guarantees 
accorded to the magistrates concerning their independence, appointment, advancement, retirement 
and discipline (art. 113) 
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outlines guarantees against the corruption or non-compliance of civil 
servants, and establishes a National Council on Human Rights (art. 161) 
and a national Ombudsman representing complaints of citizens regarding 
the public administration (art. 162). 
? The new charter also allows for significantly more territorial pluralism, 
describing Morocco’s territorial organization as “decentralized, founded 
on an advanced regionalization” (art. 1) and including a set of new articles 
(Title IX) which, among the others, recommend state efforts to foster local 
citizenship and human development across the regions (arts. 136-139), 
outline a limited degree of local financial independence (art. 141) as well 
as the creation of an inter-regional solidarity fund, aimed at reducing the  
disparities between regions through an equitable allocation of resources” 
(art. 142). 46 
? Security issues also received renewed attention, mainly through the 
inclusion of security at the head of the list of basic rights in the preamble, 
and through the creation of a High Security Council presided by the King, 
with the charge of coordinating strategies of internal and external security 
and managing crisis situations (art. 54).47 
Top importance is also enshrined it the following set of reforms aimed at 
reshuffling the balance of power between the King, the executive and the 
legislative power, partly reducing the King’s prerogatives while increasing 
those pertaining to the Prime Minister (now “Head of Government”) and to the 
Parliament:   
? The former art. 19, which stated together the King supremacy as political 
and spiritual leader, is now split in two separated articles (art. 41 and art. 
42) affirming each one the supremacy in one realm, thus putting a sort of 
divide between the two spheres. He is thus recognized - on the one side - 
as the Commander of the Faithful (Amir Al Mominine), guarantor of the 
respect of Islam as well as the free exercise of beliefs, and Chair of the 
Superior Council of the Ulemas (art 41), and on the other side as the Head 
and Supreme Representative of the State, Symbol of National Unity, 
Supreme Arbiter between the Institutions, Guarantor of the Constitution, 
                                                                 
46 The practical details of the decentralization program - like so many of the constitution’s reforms - 
await a set of laws yet to be written, the reason why many activists  either remain skeptical and on a 
wait-and-see approach, or (such as the February 20 movement) even oppose the reforms as 
insufficient and ultimately undemocratic. (Silverstein P., 2011) 
47 Especially following the April 28 bombing of the Argana tourist café in Marrakesh, Morocco’s has 
worked hard to shed its reputation as a breeding ground for terrorists, and these reforms are key part 
of this strategy. 
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of the rights and freedoms of the citizens and social groups, of the 
permanence and continuity of the State and of the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Kingdom (art. 42). 
? The King is not anymore recognized as “sacred” – as it was in the previous 
text – even if still recognized as “inviolable”, with the additional clause 
that “respect is due to Him” (art. 46, 2011 Constitution; former art. 23, 1996 
Constitution). 
? The King must appoint the Head of Government from within the party 
arriving ahead in the elections of the chambers of Representatives and 
considering their results, while previously he could appoint the Prime 
Minister on his own autonomous will. As in the previous text, he is still in 
charge of appointing the members of the cabinet, upon the Head of 
Government’s proposal, and can still terminate the mandate of one or 
more of them upon his own initiative, but for this latter prerogative he is 
now required to preliminarily consult with the Head of Government (art. 
47, 2011 Constitution; former art. 24, 1996 Constitution). Also he is still 
charge of presiding the Council of Ministers (composed by the Head of 
Government and the ministers), but – differently from the previous text – 
he can now delegate this power to the Head of Government (art. 48, 2011 
Constitution; former art. 25, 1996 Constitution).   
? The powers pertaining to the Head of Government result slightly 
enhanced with the following new prerogatives: he can demand the King to 
terminate the functions of one or more of the members of the government 
(upon his own initiative or following their individual or collective 
resignation) and, in case of his own resignation, the King must terminate 
the functions of the whole government (art. 47); he can be delegated the 
presidency of a Council of Ministers by the King (art. 48);  he presides over 
the Council of Government, which prepares the general policy of the state 
(art. 92) – a position previously held by the King; he can dissolve the 
Lower House - after having consulted the King and the Presidents of that 
Chamber and of the Constitutional Court (art. 104) – a power which was 
previously exclusive prerogative of the King; he makes appointments to 
the civil offices in the public administrations and to the high functions of 
the public establishments and enterprises (art. 91), besides making the 
proposals to the Council of Ministers for the appointment of other major 
civil offices such as the Governor of the Bank of the Maghreb, 
ambassadors, Walis and Governors, and the responsible persons of the 
administrations charged with internal security as well as of the public 
strategic establishments and enterprises (art. 49) – all appointments 
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previously pertaining to the King (former art. 30, stating that “the King 
shall make civil and military appointments”). This set of new prerogatives 
appears to be – at least on paper – a meaningful change, as in the previous 
Constitution the Prime Minister’s powers were virtually limited to the 
exercise of the regulatory power (former art. 63) and the coordination of 
the different Ministers’ activities (former art. 65). 
? The prerogatives of the Parliament have also been expanded. Most 
prominently: a) Morocco is now recognized as a “constitutional, 
democratic, parliamentary and social Monarchy” (art. 1), whereby the 
previous text only stated “democratic, social and constitutional 
Monarchy”; b) The areas of competence of the Legislative Power have 
been expanded. If the previous text (former art. 46)  only listed 9 areas as 
explicit domain of the law (namely: the individual and collective 
constitutional rights; the penal and civil procedure; the statute of 
magistrates; the general statute of public offices; the fundamental 
guarantees of civil and military personnel; the electoral system of local 
assemblies and councils; the regulation of civil and commercial liabilities; 
the establishment of new public agencies; and the nationalisation or 
privatization of enterprises), the new art. 71 expands them to 29 (most 
remarkable new ones being: the statute of the family and the civil estate; 
the status of foreigners; the regimes of broadcast media, press, 
technologies of information and communication; the power of granting 
amnesty; the statute of the central bank and the regime of banks and 
insurance companies; the regimes of public, private and collective real 
public property; the labour and social security relations;  urbanism, land 
management, protection of the natural resources and lasting development; 
the orientations and the general organization of teaching, scientific 
research and vocational instruction); c) The requirements for proposing a 
motion of censure over the government by part of the Parliament have 
been reduced: if previously the signing by 1/4 of the members for the 
Lower House and by 1/3  for the Upper House was needed for the 
proposal to be acceptable (former art. 76 and art. 77), a lower 1/5 for both 
Chamber is now required with the new text (new art. 105 and art. 106). 
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2.3.3. The November 2011 Parliamentary Elections   
In a televised speech on 30 July, the King urged the constitutional change to 
be implemented rapidly, starting with parliamentary elections. These were thus 
brought forward – from the scheduled date of September 2012 - to October 2011 
and finally slightly postponed to 25 November 2011.  
Thirty-one parties participated, contesting the 395 seats of the House of 
Representatives (with 60 seats reserved for women and 30 for under-40 years-
old candidates); 18 of them gained seats.48 The official turnout was reported at 
45.4%, but doubts have been raised on the validity of such figure, suggesting it 
was much lower. Anyway, they have largely been reported as to be the fairest 
elections in Morocco’s history. 
The vast majority of seats were won by three groups: the PJD, which gained 
alone 107 seats; the newly founded eight-party “Coalition for Democracy” 
(grouping RNI, MP, UC, PAM and four other minor parties), which totalled 159 
seats; and the ruling “Koutla Coalition” (grouping Istiqlal, USFP and PPS), 
which gained 117 (see Tab. 2.3). The PJD was the party winning alone the 
largest parliamentary representation – although not a majority – which, 
according to the new Constitution, made his leader, Abdelillah Benkirane, the 
new Prime Minister. The affirmation of a moderate Islamist party as the first 
political force at the national level certainly represents a remarkable turning 
point for Morocco, which can easily be read as an outcome of the Arab Spring. 
Though, absent a voting majority, the PJD electoral victory was constrained by 
the need to negotiate with other parties in order to form a coalition 
government: after relatively swift and short negotiations, a heterogeneous four-
party coalition government was finally announced on 3 January 2012, including 
the leading PJD, Istiqlal, the MP and the PPS. 49 
If the newly empowered PJD-led government will concretely be able to 
bring winds of change to Morocco’s political scene - managing to enact the 
dozens of organic laws required by the new constitution, to introduce measures 
to tackle the cost of living, unemployment and welfare tasks at large, as well as 
problems of corruption and accountability – will to a large degree depend on 
how cooperative the other coalition parties will be and to which extent the 
Palace will be willing to relinquish some of its powers. The supposed gains the 
Arab Spring brought to Morocco’s politics is thus an open question to be 
appraised in the near future.  
                                                                 
48 As a protest against the Monarchy’s handling of the situation, the 20 February movement along with 
the Islamist organization Al Adl and three minor far-leftist parties call for boycott the elections.  
49 El Katiri M. (2012)  
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Tab. 2.3 Results of the 2011 Legislative Elections, Lower House 
Name Acron. Vote% Seats Seat change Political ideology 
Justice and Development Party (Parti de 
la Justice et du Développement) PJD 22.8% 107 ∧  61 
Right 
Islamism 
Conservatism 
Independence Party (Parti de 
l’Independence / Al- Istiqlal) PI 11.9% 60 ∧  8 
Right  
Nationalism 
Monarchism 
National Rally of Independents 
(Rassemblement National des Indépendants) RNI 11.3% 52 ∧  13 Right 
Authenticity and Modernity Party* 
(Parti Authenticité et Modernité) PAM 11.1% 47 ∧  47 Monarchism 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires) USFP 8.6% 39 ∧  1 
Centre-left 
Socialism 
Popular Movement (Mouvement 
Populaire) MP 7.5% 32 ∨  9 
Centre-right 
Liberalism 
Nationalism 
Constitutional Union (Union 
Constitutionnelle) UC 5.8% 23 ∨  4 
Right 
Liberalism 
Monarchism 
Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du 
Progrès et du Socialisme) PPS 5.7% 18 ∧  1 
Left 
Socialism 
Labour Party (Parti Travailliste) PT 2.3% 4 ∨  1 Left Socialism 
Environment and Development Party 
(Parti de l’Environment et du 
Développement) 
PED 2.3% 2 ∨  3 Left 
Democratic and Social Movement 
(Mouvement Démocratique et Sociale) MDS 1.7% 2 ∨  7 
Left 
Socialism 
Party of Renewal and Equity (Parti de 
Renouveau et de l'Équité) PRE X 2 ∨  2 Centre 
Democratic Oath Party SD X 2 ∧  2  
Front of Democratic Forces (Front des 
Forces Démocratiques) FFD 2.8% 1 ∨  8 
Centre 
Liberalism 
Green Left Party   0.7% 1 ∧  1 Left 
Action Party (Parti de l’Action) PA 0.3% 1 ∧  1 Left 
Union and Democracy Party (Parti de 
l’Union et de la Démocratie) PUD X 1 ∧  1 Conservatism 
Party of Liberty and Social Justice (Parti 
de la Liberté et de la Justice Sociale) PLJS X 1 ∧  1 Nationalism 
Sources: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/m/morocco/morocco2011.txt; www.ArabParliaments.org 
 
* The Authenticity and Modernity Party (Parti Authenticité et Modernité, PAM) is a pro-palace 
party founded in February 2009 by the former Deputy Interior Minister Fouad Ali El Himma, 
with the merging of several parties: Al Ahd, the PED, the Alliance of Liberties and the Civic 
Initiative for Development. 
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2.4. Substantial or Façade Reforms? The Grey Zones of 
Morocco’s Political Development 
 
As it clearly emerges from the above analysis, Morocco has gradually build 
up a political system which – at a first look – is characterized by the existence 
and functioning of the basic democratic institutions: a vibrant multiparty 
system, regular and largely free and fair elections both at the national and local 
level, a constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers, a bi-cameral 
parliament representative of the various social and geographical strands of the 
population.   
Though, the establishing of democratic institutions and procedures is not 
itself a guarantee of democratisation, as far as these democratic mechanisms 
existing in name can actually be partially or totally flawed and biased and 
simply mask authoritarian rule behind a democratic façade.  
Indeed, at a deeper look, Morocco’s allegedly democratic achievements turn 
out to hinder several shortcomings and “grey zones” which undoubtedly 
question the existence of a truly democratic substance behind the country’s 
democratic institutions.  
The most relevant critical aspects of Morocco’s political democratization can 
be resumed in the following points - which will be analyzed one by one in the 
next sub-paragraphs: 
 
1. Concentration of power in the hands of the Monarchy 
2. Absence of a credible system of check and balances 
3. Lack of meaningful elite change 
4. Corruption and nepotism 
5. Low turnout and popular depoliticization 
6. Weakness of political parties and co-optation of political opposition by 
the Monarchy 
 
2.4.1. Concentration of Power in the Hands of the Monarchy 
Nearly all analysts of Morocco’s politics agree that Morocco’s major 
obstacle to a genuine democratization resides in the overwhelming supremacy 
of the Monarchy vis-à-vis any other institution in the country’s political system.  
Indeed, if in theory the Constitution provides for the separation of powers 
between a legislative, an executive and an independent judiciary branch, in 
practice there has so far never been neither separation let alone balance of 
 
 
39
powers, with virtually all decision-making power being concentrated in the 
hands of a Monarchy constitutionally entrusted of extremely extensive powers, 
and a palace-led executive leading influence over the legislative and the 
judiciary.  
The Constitution in fact – even after its 2011 revision – still grants the 
Monarchy an absolutely unique position in the political system, by stating its 
role as supreme religious authority and symbol of national identity and 
historical continuity, on the one side, and by conferring him such extensive 
prerogatives that make him a supreme arbiter and mediator above the other 
constitutional powers, on the other side.  
As a result, the Government and the Parliament has so far turned out to 
hold no real power, consequently suffering a serious lack of credibility among 
the electorate.    
To be precise, if the 1992 and 1996 constitutional amendments were truly 
intended to and actually did improve the powers of the Parliament and the 
independence of the Government vis-à-vis the palace, they nonetheless only 
slightly reduced the powers of the King, substantially maintaining its position 
as ultimate referee both for legislative and executive powers. And a similar 
statement could hold true also for the recent 2011 amendment, presented as a 
meaningful rebalancing of the King’s powers, although in this case it is way too 
early to assess the concrete implementation of the potential enshrined in these 
changes.  
Indeed - resuming the analysis presented in the previous section - the 1992 and 
1996 amendments slightly changed the balance of powers in the following 
points: 50 
? The authority over the cabinet and the choice of the ministers were 
granted to the Prime Minister, while previously pertained to the King (art. 
24, 1996 Constitution - now art. 47, 2011 Constitution). 
? A time limit of 30 days was imposed to the possibility of the King to act on 
a law passed by the Parliament, starting from the moment when the law is 
forwarded by the Parliament to the Government (art.26, 1996 Constitution 
– now art. 50, 2011 Constitution).  
? Although the King retained the power to dismiss the Parliament (art. 27, 
1996 Constitution - now art. 51, 2011 Constitution), his declaring the state 
of emergency no longer automatically entailed the dissolution of the 
                                                                 
50 Denoueux G. and Magrahoui A. (1998); Kingdom of Morocco, Constitution of 1996, http://www.al-
bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm 
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legislature (art. 35, 1996 Constitution - now art. 59, 2011 Constitution), as it 
was previously the case. This has been further strengthened with the 2011 
revision, which in art. 59 clearly states that the “Parliament may not be 
dissolved during the exercise of exceptional powers” and that “the 
fundamental rights and freedoms provided by this Constitution remain 
guaranteed”. 
? The oversight powers of the Parliament upon the Government were 
enhanced with the right to create temporary commissions of investigations 
upon request of the majority of one of the Houses (art. 42, 1996 
Constitution – now art. 67, 2011 Constitution) and with the requirement 
that one meeting per week in each House has to be reserved for the 
questions of the members of the House and the Government's responses, 
which are due within twenty days after their receipt of the question (art. 
56, 1996 Constitution – now art. 100, 2011 Constitution). The 2011 revision 
goes also little further regarding the inquiry commissions’, by reducing 
the requirement for their creation from the majority of the members to 1/3 
of the members.  
 
Though, the King still maintains extraordinary extensive prerogatives:  
? He is the Commander of the Faithful, Guarantor of the respect of Islam 
and of the free exercise of beliefs, and Chair of the Superior Council of the 
Ulemas (art 41); Head and Supreme Representative of the State, Symbol of 
National Unity, Supreme Arbiter between the Institutions, Guarantor of 
the Constitution, of the rights and freedoms of the citizens and social 
groups, as well as of the permanence and continuity of the State and of the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Kingdom (art. 42). 
? His constitutional rights are hereditary (art. 43, 2011 Constitution; former 
art. 20, 1996 Constitution).  
? His person is inviolable and respect is due to him (art. 46). The sacredness 
of his person was taken off with the 2011 revision.  
? He appoints the Head of Government and, upon this latter’s 
recommendation, the others Cabinet members, whose services he can 
terminate upon his own initiative, after consultation with the Head of 
Government (art. 47).51 Further, he traditionally holds complete autonomy 
over the choice of the five so-called “Sovereignty Ministers” (Justice, 
                                                                 
51 Thus, although the authority over the cabinet and the choice of the ministers are granted to the 
Prime Minister, the King remains the only one who can appoint them, therefore having the possibility 
to veto the Prime Minister’s choice. 
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Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Islamic Affairs). He presides over 
the Council of Ministers and can delegate to the Head of Government the 
presidency of a Council (art. 48) 
? He is the Commander-in-chief of the Royal Armed Forces, and has the 
right to make civil and military appointments as well as to delegate such 
power (art. 53); he presides over the newly created Superior Council of 
Security (art. 54); he can address messages to the Nation and to the 
Parliament (art. 52); he can accredit ambassadors to foreign nations and 
international organisations and sign and ratify treaties (art. 55); he 
presides over the Supreme Council of the Judicial Power (art. 56) and 
approves the appointment of magistrates by part of this latter (art. 57); he 
can exercise the right of pardon (art. 58). 
? A law adopted by the Parliament does not take effect until it has been 
officially promulgated by the Royal Decree (dahir) within 30 days 
following its receipt by the Government (art. 50), and the King can request 
a second reading by the two Houses of any draft bill or proposed law, 
which reading the Parliament cannot refuse (art. 95).52  
? Further, while the Parliament has always been entitled to legislate in a 
well delimited set of areas (formerly specified in art. 46 of the old 
constitution and then slightly expanded in art. 71 of the new one), the 
King has actually always been able to legislate in any area he deemed 
appropriate, as allowed to him by a non-restrictive interpretation of 
former art. 29 (“the King shall, by Royal Decrees, exercise the statutory powers 
explicitly conferred upon him by the Constitution”), which actually became the 
preferred instrument of the “executive monarchy” to circumvent, under 
the Constitution’s blessing, the prerogatives of the Parliament and the 
Government.53In the new text, art. 29 ha been taken off and the provision 
has been incorporated in the art. 42 stating that “the King exercises these 
missions by Dahirs by virtue of the power that are expressly devolved to him by 
the Constitution”, which is likely not to bring any major change to the 
above-depicted situation.  
? After consulting with the Presidents of the two Houses and the Chairman 
of the Constitutional Council (art. 96, 2011 Constitution; former art. 71, 
1996 Constitution), he can dissolve one or both of the Houses of 
                                                                 
52 In the previous Constitution the King was also empowered to submit to national referendum any 
draft or proposed bill after the second reading, unless it was accepted/rejected by a 2/3 majority in 
both chambers (former art. 69) - a provision which was taken off with the last revision.      
53 Bencheikh S. (2008) 
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Parliament (art. 51, 2011 Constitution; former art. 27, 1996 Constitution) 
and - should the integrity of the national territory or the regular course of 
action of the constitutional institutions ever be threatened - he can declare 
the State of Emergency by royal decree, which, though, doesn’t entails the 
dissolution of the legislature (art. 59, 2011 Constitution; former art. 35, 
1996 Constitution). 
Moreover, not only the King was –and keeps being - formally empowered 
by the constitution of such extensive powers, but he has also traditionally being 
informally ruling the country through the shadow governance structure of the 
Makhzen, the Moroccan traditional governing elite loyal to him, which dictate 
the main lines of policy and act as a gatekeeper for any kind of political 
reform.54 He has regularly being interfering with parliamentary affairs and the 
constitution of the executive, often resorting to the creation of widespread royal 
commissions with more power than the ministers.55 
His unique position in the political system has always granted him the 
possibility to act as an arbiter within the Moroccan political landscape, by co-
opting those opposition forces which are willing to play the political game 
under the Monarchy’s rules and marginalizing those who refuse. In this sense, 
it is possible to agree with those analysts who claim that pluralism in Morocco 
is more cooptation of the opposition than true political power transition (as will 
be shown better in the sub-paragraph 2.3.6).56 
 
2.4.2. Absence of a Credible System of Checks and Balances  
A natural corollary of this systemic fault of Moroccan institutional setting is 
the absence of a true and credible system of checks and balances, either as 
concerns the Parliamentary control over the executive or the judiciary’s control 
over the system as a whole. 
As already mentioned, the King supervises the work of the cabinet, the 
legislature and the judiciary. The executive power is utterly biased towards the 
King, as the powerful sovereign Ministries of Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, 
Religious Affairs, and the Secretary General of the Government are directly 
accountable to him instead than the Prime Minister and lack any accountability 
to the Parliament. The Interior in particular has always been holding an 
overarching strength and authority which allowed him to play a leading role as 
the gatekeeper for the political sphere accessible via democratic mechanisms. 
                                                                 
54 Kausch K. (2009b) 
55 Bertelsmann Foundation (2010) 
56 Kausch K. (2009b); Denoueux G. and Magrahoui A. (1998) 
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Though, it is true that some actions have been taken in order to loosen the 
excessive governmental centralization, through a two-pronged approach: first, 
opening up greater political space from the bottom up through elected councils 
- although with limited powers and responsibility accorded to them – and 
second, reducing direct ministerial control through the creation of more 
intermediate entities at a regional level.   
As concerns the supervisory powers of the Parliament over the executive, 
they still remain fairly limited, despite the 1996 and 2011 constitutional 
revisions which aimed at slightly expend them.  
Indeed, the Title VI of the constitution (former Title V in the 1996 text), 
regulating the relations (a) between the Parliament and the King (art. 95 to 99, 
2011 Constitution – former art. 67 to 74, 1996 Constitution) and (b) between the 
Parliament and the Executive (art. 100 to 106, 2011 Constitution - former art. 75 
to 77, 1996 Constitution) allows for a wide control power of the King over the 
Parliament against a restricted space for supervisory checks of the Parliament 
over the Executive:  
a) The King may request a second reading by the two Houses of any draft 
bill or proposed law, which shall not be refused (art. 67 and art. 68, 1996 
Constitution - now art. 95, 2011 Constitution)57; he may decree the 
dissolution of one or both of the two Houses (art. 71, 1996 Constitution - 
now art. 96, 2011 Constitution).  
b) Upon the Prime Minister’s demand, the Lower House can express a vote 
of confidence on the Government (regarding a general policy or a 
proposal), to be held 3 days after the matter has been raised and requiring 
an absolute majority for the confidence to be withdrawn (art. 103, 2011 
Constitution, former art. 75, 1996 Constitution). Both the Lower and the 
Upper Houses may vote a censure motion against the Government, if 
signed by 1/5 of the members and approved by absolute majority, which 
will result in the collective resignation of the Government (art. 105 and art. 
106, 2011 Constitution; former art. 76 and art. 77, 1996 Constitution).58 
                                                                 
57 In the 1996 text, he was also empowered to submit to referendum any draft bill or proposed law - 
except those submitted for a new reading - which should have been adopted/rejected by a 2/3 majority 
of each one of the two Houses, with the results to be binding upon all (former art.69 and art. 70, 1996 
Constitution); such a provision was cancelled with the 2011 revision, leaving him the right to submit 
to referendum only the bill of revision of the Constitution of which he may have taken the initiative 
(art. 172, 2011 Constitution – former art. 103, 1996 Constitution). 
58 For the Lower House, should the Government be censured, no other censure motion is acceptable 
before a year has elapsed. 
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The system of proportional representation combined with the large number 
of parties has led to difficulty within the Parliament in forming effective 
coalitions able to implement a reform program and, although the committee 
structure has improved, its ability to present amendments and build consensus 
among the various political parties still needs considerable improvement.  
Also, Parliament provides very limited oversight over the implementation 
of laws: the executive holds substantial authority over initiating new laws and 
proposing changes to existing laws as most laws are drafted by ministries and 
then forwarded to the legislative branch; laws tend to be amended or enacted 
with little or no consultation from the public and the publication of laws takes 
place through a subscription-based Official Gazette that is not widely available. 
Major changes have been introduced in the past few years - often with the 
support from external donor programs - aimed at strengthening Parliament’s 
supervisory powers. Recent improvements in this sense include the adoption of 
money laundering legislation, the development of a code of ethics and the 
ability of Parliament to produce verbatim transcripts of proceeding within 48 
hours (as opposed to the three years previously required).59 
The third branch of government, the judiciary, also lacks sufficient capacity 
to fully perform its functions and - most prominently – it lacks judicial 
independence from the other branches. 
Indeed, the 1996 Constitution (Title VII) formally guaranteed the 
independence of the judiciary, but failing to establish the judiciary as an 
autonomous entity, as former art. 82 clearly stated that “the judicial authority is 
independent from the legislative and executive powers”, implying that the 
judiciary was an authority rather than a separate and independent power. As 
we saw, this has been changed with the 2011 revision, with the new art. 107 
affirming that “the judicial power is independent of the legislative power and of 
the executive power”.    
The organization of the judiciary is regulated under Law No. 1-74-338 of July 
15, 1974. The current judicial system is easily permeable to political influence: 
administrative control upon it pertains to the Minister of Justice, with 
managerial and financial infrastructures integrated into the Ministry; the 
mechanism for the appointment, promotion, sanctioning, transfer and 
dismissal of judges is significantly lacking in transparency and thus vulnerable 
to political remuneration and especially subject to the Justice Minister’s 
influence. 60 
                                                                 
59 USAID (2010) 
60 Transparency International “National Integrity System – Morocco Report 2009”, pages 57-64 
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Judicial independence is further complicated by the King’s role, as he 
presides over the Supreme Council of Magistracy (art. 56 and art. 115) – the 
body responsible for the appointment, discipline and promotion of judges 
(art.113) - and approves by Dahir the appointment of magistrates by this latter 
(art. 57).61 Moreover, since the Islamic law requires judges to be impartial and 
the King is constitutionally charged with protecting the principles of Islam (art. 
41), the judiciary is left with very little protection against the King’s potential 
influence, both directly and both indirectly through the appointment of the 
Minister of Justice (vice-president of the Supreme Council of Magistracy).62  
No surprise then that justice in Morocco is generally perceived by the 
public less the function of an independent and impartial rule of law system 
than a matter of access to power, plagued with corruption, lacking 
independence, accountability and real mechanisms for enforcement, and 
encumbered by delays.63   
Finally, a further potential window on the check and balances of the 
government and the judiciary in particular is constituted by civil society 
organizations which play an important role in monitoring and advocating for 
reform. Among the various NGOs active in Morocco, Transparency Maroc, the 
Moroccan Bar Association, the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights 
(OMDH) and the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) are the 
ones at the forefront in calling for judicial reform.   
Indeed, in the spring of 2009, a coalition of ten NGOs organized to respond 
to the plan for judicial reform proposed by the then Minister of Justice, 
Abdelouahid Radi. Following a first ministerial meeting, they released a 
memorandum evaluating the current judiciary and voicing the organizations’ 
concerns about the Moroccan Judiciary and the suggested desirable reforms.64 
                                                                 
61 The previous constitution was also including the provision that “all judgments are rendered in the 
name of the King” (former art. 83), which was then took off in the 2011 text. 
62 USAID (2010) 
63 According to the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2010/2011, the extent to 
which the judiciary is perceived as corrupted by Moroccans is fairly high, showing an average score of 
3.5 (on a scale ranging from 1, not at all corrupt, to 5, extremely corrupt). 
http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/results/ 
64 The document was fairly critical of the current system, particularly regarding the lack of 
constitutional guarantees for judicial independence and explicitly called for the guarantee of the right 
of union for judges (prohibited by the 1974 law), the restructuring of the Supreme Council of 
Magistracy (especially to make it independent from the Justice Minister) and a general reform of 
hierarchy and appointment of judges. (USAID, 2010)  
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However, while the coalition’s efforts did play an important role in 
advocating for the reform in specific areas, they were then left fairly outside the 
reform discussion and policy decision-making taking place within the Minister.  
Up to now, no judicial reform has yet been approved, though the issue is 
always on the agenda of the rulers. Such reluctance is most likely due to a 
general reluctance in embracing the required constitutional reform which 
would be necessary to change the Supreme Council’s powers, which are 
definitely at the heart of most of the problems related to judicial independence: 
constitutional reform surely represent a major challenge which it’s not apparent 
there is political will for. 
 
2.4.3. Lack of Meaningful Elite Change 
Another point which is often critically remarked is the absence of a genuine 
transformation in the elite attitudes and behaviour alongside the apparent 
changes in elites’ composition witnessed during Mohammed VI’s reign. 
An insightful analysis on this point has been held by Zerhouni65, focusing 
on the concept of politically relevant elite (PRE), which are, in Perthes’ words, 
“people in a given country that held political influence and power in that they 
make strategic decisions or participate in decision making at the national level, 
contribute to defining political norms and values and directly influence 
political discourse on strategic issues”.66  
In applying this category to the Moroccan case Zerhouni claims that, if basic 
changes in the composition of the politically relevant elite have actually being 
occurring under Mohammed VI’s rule, they have not been accompanied by 
changes in elites’ attitude and behaviour, which in turn prevented them from 
having any substantial impact on liberalization. 
In Morocco, the appointment of the members of the PRE and the 
advancement of individual careers has traditionally been regulated at the level 
of central power, with the King holding an almost complete discretionary 
power on it, playing thus a strong role in the perpetuation of elite immobilisme 
during time.  
Such a feature indeed still holds true under Mohammed VI, although the 
new king has operated some remarkable changes in the composition of the core 
elite, by replacing most of his father “old guard” appointees with a new 
                                                                 
65 Zerhouni S. (2004) 
66 Perthes V. (2004) 
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generation of elites composed mainly of people from his close circle of friends 
and technocrats. 
What is relevant in this context is thus to appraise whether the extent of 
these new appointments is wide enough to represent a true “elite renewal” or is 
rather just a simple “elite recycling”, and also whether these changes are 
confined to the composition of the PRE or whether they go beyond that into the 
realm of their attitudes and behaviour. 
Following Perthes’ PRE model structured on three concentric circles67, 
Zerhouni identifies for the case of Morocco: a first circle comprising, apart from 
the king, counsellors and members of the royal cabinet; a second circle 
including senior army officers, representatives of the official Islam or Islamic 
institutions, important government ministers, public officials from various 
public institutions, the business elite, leaders of the two traditionally most 
important political parties (i.e. the Istiqlal and the USFP); and finally a third 
circle including regional governors and walis, influential members of 
parliament, representatives of important NGOs, leaders of the other main 
political parties and some new actors such as entrepreneurs, Islamists and 
journalists. 
Although elite changes operated by Mohammed VI regarded all three 
circles, is the third circle the one who witnessed the most substantial 
transformation. 
The major change concerning the PRE as a whole consisted in a general 
broadening of the elite with the inclusion of new actors from civil society and 
political parties, such as Islamists, entrepreneurs, businesspeople, and 
especially bureaucrats and technocrats, which testifies the king’s strategy of 
directing attention to economic issues and away from political matters and 
resolves in an overall depoliticization and technocratisation of its entourage.       
If the strategy of elite co-optation has always been a tool for system 
maintenance in Morocco, what is new under Mohammed VI is that, as opposed 
to Hassan II, he is co-opting an elite which have emerged from the ongoing 
process of political liberalization and which is thus drawn more and more from 
a dynamic civil society.  
                                                                 
67 Perthes’ model conceptualize the PRE as composed of three concentric circles: the first circle 
comprises a core elite of those who make decisions on strategic issues; the second circle is the 
intermediate elite, comprising those groups and individuals who exert considerable influence on or 
make decisions of minor importance, without the power to make decisions on strategic issues unless 
they are delegated to; the third circle comprises a sub-elite of less influential groups and individuals 
capable of indirectly influencing strategic decisions or contributing to national agenda setting through 
their position in the government or administration, lobbies, media and other means.  
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Nonetheless, the three circles experienced very different degrees of change: 
if the third circle truly witnessed a renewal and broadening of its composition 
with the access of more liberal components from within civil society, left-wing 
parties and media, which are willing to play an active role in politics and in the 
process of liberalization, the other two circles actually showed much more a 
kind of reshuffling than a true renewal, with the widespread recycling of 
members from the Hassan II’s entourage, the predominance of conservative 
social groups oriented towards economic reform instead than political change, 
and an overwhelming loyalty to the king that makes them more likely to act as 
advisors and executors of decisions taken above than as real decision makers. 
Thus, Zerhouni’s analysis reveals that there are elements of both continuity 
and change in Morocco’s elites transformation, although continuity seems 
largely to prevail. Indeed, not only the extent of the access of new actors is 
fairly limited when considering the first two circles - where it is more the case 
of elite recycling than elite renewal - but also the mode of elite recruitment has 
totally remained unchanged, relying solely on the king’s discretionary willing, 
so that the informal system of personal and clientelistic network based on the 
Makhzen has remained untouched. Moreover, elite’s awareness of their active 
role in the process of political change remains confined to small segments, with 
the great majority of them considering themselves as mere executors of the will 
of the king. 
The modernization of the monarchical institution – Zerhouni concludes - is 
indeed leading towards a hybrid system of monarchical control and elite 
integration into the political system, which is still far from being likely to exert 
indigenous pressures toward a more systemic process of regime renewal and 
political democratic change.  
 
2.4.4. Corruption and Nepotism 
Among the number of socio-political challenges which Morocco has to face, 
corruption - both financial and misuse of authority and power - is largely 
recognized, from foreign and domestic analysts as well, to play a leading role.    
Corruption in Morocco is present, both petty and grand, in virtually all 
sectors: an anti-corruption campaign carried out in 2001 revealed corruption 
and embezzlement in banking, social security, agricultural credits, public 
housing, state contracts, public companies, municipal councils and even 
international aid projects. Transparency International ranks Morocco as the 80th 
nation in the world (out of 183 countries) in terms of perceived corruption 
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(with the Corruption Perception Index scoring 3.4, on a scale ranging from 1- 
most corrupt to 10- least corrupt).68 
Corruption in the political system in Morocco can be seen as almost 
endemic, due to the kind of elite-driven, clientelistic way the power is exercised 
between a small circle of privileged centered around the monarchy, with 
decision-making authority, and a slightly larger network of patronage, with 
executive tasks. 
Apart from such a culturalist explanation based on Moroccan political 
mentality, other key drivers for such a high level of corruption are likely to be 
the existence of a large informal sector (estimated around 40% of the economy), 
the several failures in the justice system, and the presence of a significant drug 
trafficking in the northern part of the country (Morocco is the world's largest 
producer and exporter of cannabis).69 
The country's media and civil society have long been strongly publicising 
the issue and calling for the government to take a firm commitment upon the 
fight against corruption. Actually, Mohammed VI and the successive 
governments under his rule have publicly made the cause one of the 
cornerstones of their policy programs. 
This has resulted in a series of public anti-corruption initiatives, among 
whose:70 
a) The draft of a national cross-sector anti-corruption action plan, under the 
direction of the Minister for Public Sector Modernisation, in 2005. The 
action plan - incorporating many demands from civil society (notably 
from Transparency Morocco) - outlined 6 focus areas of intervention: the 
anchoring of anti-corruption values and norms in society; the 
institutionalisation of the strategy of prevention; strengthening 
transparency in public procurement; strengthening of control and auditing 
mechanisms; simplifying the administrative procedures; awareness 
raising. Apart from administrative procedures - which have been in many 
cases simplified - the implementation of the action plan is still lagging 
behind in many other areas. A second two-year anti-corruption plan was 
launched by the government in October 2010, including over 40 new anti-
graft measures, such as asset declarations for top state officials, 
                                                                 
68 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2011 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results#CountryResults 
69 Bertelsmann Foundation (2012) 
70 Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Morocco Country Profile 2011 
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/morocco/ 
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government protection of whistle-blowers, anti-corruption classes in 
schools and channels for the public to report graft and extortion by 
government officials. 
b) The ratification of the UNs’ Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 
May 2007 – although being the only one country not to have signed the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
c) The criminalisation of money laundering, under AML Law No. 43-05 of 
May 2007, which also provided for the creations of a Processing Unit of 
Financial Data (Unité de Traitement du Renseignement Financier, UTRF), 
established in April 2009, entitled to collect financial information, 
coordinate the means of action of investigating authorities and public 
agencies, and advising the government about desirable anti-money 
laundering reforms. 
d) The creation of the Central Commission for the Prevention of Corruption 
(Instance Central pour la Prévention de la Corruption, ICPC) in December 
2008. The Commission has received many criticisms concerning his 
mandate (which is limited to investigative powers and corruption 
prevention, thus excluding the possibility of receiving or acting on 
complaints), to his lack of independence from political influence (as the 
Chairman is appointed by the King and the agency itself belongs to the 
Prime Minister), to its too small budget (further decreased of 5% in 2011) 
and lack of human resources as well. 71 
e) The set up of an Ombudsman Institution (Diwan Al Madhalim) in 
December 2001, entitled to oversee the actions of the Moroccan 
administration with regard to the respect of the rule of law.72  
f) The establishment of the Ethical Customs Observatory on Private Sector, 
in January 2010, as a public-private cooperation between the customs 
administration, the ICPC, the General Confederation of Moroccan 
Enterprises (Confédération General des Entreprises Marocaines, CGEM) and 
Transparency Maroc, with the aim of analysing the compliance of the 
customs and private enterprises with ethical principles and presenting 
                                                                 
71 Transparency International, National Integrity System, Morocco Report 2009; Global Integrity 
Report, Morocco 2010. Due to these pitfalls, the ICPC is stated by Transparency International as a 
merely consultative institution with just an awareness-raising and information-gathering 
responsibility. (Transparency International, 2009) 
72 The Transparency International National Integrity System - Morocco Report 2009 assesses that the 
institution has a certain impact on the fight against corruption with regard to identifying corruption 
risks and proposing measures for improvement. (Transparency International, 2009) 
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proposals for reforms that will enhance transparency and help to fight 
corruption within the customs.  
g) The approval of the Decree on Public Procurement (Decree No. 2-06-388) 
in February 2007, aiming at establishing transparency in the procurement 
system and introducing measures to reduce fraud and corruption. 
Indeed, while the government has truly carried out several prosecutions 
against officials - many of them resulting in convictions – both the prosecutions 
and the other anti-corruption measures taken have nevertheless been accused 
of targeting only petty corruption: high profile cases and cases where the 
government's style of governance was involved have been promptly closed 
down in order to avoid political embarrassment.73 Also - apart from occasional 
campaigns - the problems of the huge informal sector have been largely left 
unaddressed by the authorities as the underground economy is largely 
tolerated for the sake of internal stability.  
Besides, public perceptions upon corruption in the country and upon 
government’s anti-corruption measures are fairly negative. Data from the 
Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010/2011 reveal 
that: the police, the public official/civil servants and the judiciary are 
considered the most corrupt sectors in the country, followed by the political 
parties, the parliament and the educational system, and in a minor measure the 
private sector, the media, the NGOs, the military and the religious bodies;74only 
11% of the respondents in Morocco believe the level of corruption in the 
country has decreased (while 77% believe it has stayed the same, and 13% it has 
increased); only 18% of respondents consider government's efforts in fighting 
corruption as ineffective (while 17% as effective, and 65% as neither of the two); 
finally a high 35% of the respondents confirmed that they had to pay a bribe in 
2008, while only 1% said that they did not.75 
 
2.4.5. Low Turnout and Popular De-politicization  
Another remarkable problematic feature is the apparent “depoliticization” 
of Moroccans, strikingly emerged in the 2007 Parliamentary Elections, which 
                                                                 
73 Moreover, the country has no law regulating conflict of interests between a minister's official 
functions and his private activities. Ministers and parliamentarians are obliged to declare their assets, 
but declarations are not publicly available. (Transparency International, 2009) 
74 On a scale from 1, not at all corrupt to 5, extremely corrupt, their average score is as follows: police 
3.3; public official/civil servants 3.5; judiciary 3.5; political parties 2; the parliament 2;  educational 
system 2; private sector 1.6;  media 1.3; NGOs 1.4; military 1.1; religious bodies 1.    
75 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2010/2011. (NB. The last data are taken 
from the GCB 2009 as data for Morocco were not available in the GCB 2010/11). 
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registered an historically low voter turnout of 37%, plunged down from an 
already low 51% in 2002 and 58% in 1997, and sidelined by a stunningly high 
number of invalid or spoiled ballots casts – 19% of the votes, amounting to a 
over a million ballots paper.76 The November 2011 elections saw a slight 
recover, with a turnout of 45%. 
Although, by definition, there was no hard evidence to indicate the reasons 
behind such extreme figures, substantial anecdotal evidence from those who 
chose not to vote indicated that such a low level of participation was a result of 
dissatisfaction with the choice of parties and candidates on offer. This was 
further supported by election observers reporting about significant numbers of 
spoiled ballot papers featuring complaints and abuse against the political 
parties and candidates.77 
As it has already been argued for the previous elections, this discontent 
against the running parties could also have been favoured by the new electoral 
code (voted in 2003)78 based on a party list system which had encouraged the 
proliferation of political parties, causing an high degree of party fragmentation 
and thus reducing the cohesiveness of any grouping able to form a 
government.79 
Though, anecdotal evidence from surveys testify that voter’s dissatisfaction 
has probably not to be confined to the choice of parties and candidates running 
in these elections, but has to be extended to the broader political system. 
Indeed, analysts have largely interpreted these figures as the sign of a 
diffuse popular apathy, disenchantment, and lack of enthusiasm due to a 
widespread perception that elections are meaningless in so far as the real 
decision making power resides elsewhere than the elected Parliament.80   
Besides, what was even more striking in this context was the profile of the 
people who didn’t vote or casted blank ballots: the urban middle-class mostly 
comprised of educated and unemployed young people.  
The fact that the lowest turnout rates were registered among the richest, 
youngest and most educated segments of the population, could suggest that 
abstensionism was more an act of passive protest intended to penalize the 
regime than just simply a passive act of renounce and apathy.  
                                                                 
76 Willis M. J. (2008) 
77 Willis M. J. (2008) 
78 Dahir 1-03-83 of March 24, 2003; http://www.parlement.ma/fe/images/textes_de_base/code_electoral.pdf 
79 Dillmann B. (2003) 
80 Hamzawy A. (2007) 
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However, the fact that disillusionment with the whole political system was 
not confined to the poor disempowered and rural segments of the population 
but rather emerged largely among the “empowered” middle-class is all the 
more worrying about the actual significance of the electoral process in 
Morocco.81  
Mention apart must be made for the referendum on the approval of the new 
constitution held on 1 July 2011, which showed a striking figure of a 74.46% 
turnout. Indeed, such a figure could not be considered an inversion of the trend 
but rather a sole case exception due to the particularly relevant issue at stake, 
and - most of all – to the official referendum campaign conducted by the 
monarchy, which openly called for Moroccan voters’ participation and against 
the boycott of the vote, by influencing public opinion through various means 
(from the media to the imams). Beside these considerations, it should also be 
noted that the figure itself has highly been contested by many dissenters as to 
have been manipulated and not responding to the real participation (as well as 
it is the case of the striking figure of the 98.5% yes vote, which easily raised up 
suspicions of manipulation).82       
 
2.4.6. Weakness of Political Parties and Co-optation of Political 
Oppositions by the Monarchy 
Although multi-partitism has a long story in Morocco, having been 
formally introduced in the aftermath of its independence in 1962, the effective 
role that political parties have been playing in the country’s political decision-
making has been fairly marginal and political parties – both secular and 
Islamist ones - still remain fragile and weak. Such a weakness is mainly a 
consequence of their extremely high fragmentation (there are currently more 
than 30 registered parties in Morocco), which creates an easy way for the 
Monarchy to play a divide-et-impera game turning out in his only advantage.  
On the one hand, all Moroccan secular parties – both opposition and pro-
government ones – recognize the legitimacy of the Monarch as both the secular 
and religious leader (recognition which is condition for registration), thus 
basically not asking for any complete separation between state and religion. 
Also, they are all strongly reluctant to impose their programs whenever they go 
against the King’s will.  
                                                                 
81 Ben Layashi S. (2007)   
82 “Morocco: Referendum Results, July 3, 2011”, Morocco Board News Service, 
http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/5339-morocco-refrerendum-results; Almiraat H. (2011) 
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The historical opposition parties (USFP, Istiqlal) have solid bases of support 
and well established party structures, but they also have very generic and 
almost indistinguishable political platforms (unemployment’s reduction, 
development of key economic sectors, improvement of education and housing 
support) and, while proclaiming the need for constitutional reforms to enhance 
parliament’s powers and judiciary’s independence, they nonetheless never 
challenge the monarch’s authority, by making clear that reforms can only go as 
far as the king allows.    
Secular parties also include those traditionally allied with the Monarchy 
(MP, RNI, UC) which also have their strong bases of support, and which 
evidently never constitute any challenge to the King’s authority, only searching 
for participation in the circles of power close to him. 83 
On the other hand, Islamist parties and organizations are fairly less 
fragmented and more tightly organized than secular ones, as well as more 
ideological, more vigorous and often younger. But they are also untried: the 
PJD has been for long the only legally recognized political party in Morocco – 
albeit one of the major political forces - until the recent formation of two new 
small parties, the Renaissance and Virtue Party (PRV) – which managed to get 
one seat in the last 2007 elections - and the Civilized Alternative Party – which 
on the contrary did not manage to get any seat. 
In addition, there’s a full panoply of non-violent Islamist movements and 
organizations, including the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) – the 
religious movement associated with the PJD - and the militant (although 
nonviolent) and openly anti-monarchist, pro-republican and socially 
revolutionary Justice and Charity, which, in virtue of its clandestine nature, 
shall be considered the most important Islamist group in Morocco.    
Islamist parties and organizations are likely the only potential serious 
challenge to the monarchy in the country, a potential which is indeed strictly 
restrained by the monarchy, through both the severe requirements imposed for 
obtaining official recognition and the co-optation of registered parties (i.e. 
basically the PJD).84   
Stating at the Constitution, no parties may be founded on the basis of 
religion, race or ethnicity and they are all subject to judicial supervision. Such a 
requirement, supposedly aimed at safeguarding basic citizen rights, actually 
turns out to play the game of the palace, in so far as it has the power to allow or 
refuse legal recognition to parties on the ground of constitution-based 
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prohibitions. For instances, in 2007 the government banned the Moroccan 
Amazigh (Berber) Democratic Party as an ethnic-based party, and the Islamic 
fundamentalist Justice and Charity never managed to obtain official 
recognition due to its religious fundamentalism.85 
Finally, in addition to the already weak position of parties in Moroccan 
political game, several restrictions on parties’ life have been introduced from 
above in recent years: the two-tiered proportional representation system settled 
down by the 2002 electoral code’s reform makes it virtually impossible for any 
one party to win a majority of seats in parliament, and prevents parties failing 
to win at least 3% of the vote in the previous election to field candidates in the 
following legislative elections; moreover, the 2005 reform of the Parties’ Law 
allows government funding to parties that garner more than 5% of votes in 
legislative elections, mandates the monitoring of the parties’ budgets by the 
Supreme Court, and prohibits any candidate from switching parties after 
winning a seat in Parliament.86 
                             ---------------------- 
Hence, what do all these critical remarks tell us about political development 
in Morocco? Is it reasonable to talk of a “genuine democratization” for what 
concerns the political-institutional reforms carried on during the post-colonial 
period, in particular in the last decade under Mohammed VI’s rule? And what 
about the allegedly “Copernican revolution”87 brought on by the 2011 
Constitutional revision? Will it concretely make Morocco a real Parliamentary 
Monarchy, as it was supposed to? 
Indeed, what seems to emerge from the above analyses, is a much more 
controversial state of affairs than that often depicted by large part of the 
political discourse of major Moroccan donor countries (i.e. the EU and the 
USA), let alone the image portrayed by Moroccan official sources.  
Indeed, despite the numerous liberalizing measures taken under 
Mohammed VI’s rule, authoritarianism in Morocco has nonetheless continued 
to be a reality: “consensus under royal hegemony” has kept being the guiding 
principle in the country. 88  
                                                                 
85 It was not till 1996 that an Islamist party was allowed to participate in elections: the newly created 
Islamist PJD did manage to obtain legal recognition, soon becoming one of the major players of 
Moroccan politics, while the more fundamentalist Justice and Charity party was and still remained 
banned. 
86 Ibn Khaldun Center (2010) 
87 Le Matin, 18 June 2011 
88 Joffé G. (2009)  
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Some critics have defined Morocco as a reluctant democratizer, taking 
significant steps to liberalizing politics but failing to adopt the key institutional 
and electoral changes that would allow for a full democratic transition. 89  
Others have called it a kind of upgraded authoritarianism: “the monarchy is 
indeed consolidating its authoritarianism through soft power, by substantially 
liberalizing in politically non-threatening areas while keeping tight control over 
those policy areas and political opponents with the potential to meaningfully 
challenge the current distribution of power. The endorsement of a piecemeal 
approach to the liberalisation of legislation has made possible the adoption of 
laws that are broadly permissive but lack effective safeguards against arbitrary 
application of the law, leaving broad scope to the monarchy for sidelining 
opponents in political parties, civil society, the media and the business sector, 
through the co-optation of political elites.” 90 
Basically, the positive liberalizing developments gone ahead at least up 
until the 2011 events did not suffice to seriously challenge the undemocratic 
distribution of powers. Moreover, the fact that under a comparative regional 
perspective Morocco’s has long appeared as may have helped stalling the 
domestic political reform process, by reducing foreign pressure on the 
Moroccan government to consolidate initial steps toward genuine 
democratization.91 As some critics has pointed out, in order to really capture 
what was happening in the country, it should have been way more appropriate 
to go beyond the authoritarian state model and the democratic transition 
paradigm and just talk about “reforms”.92  
This holds true at least up until the 2011 events, which undoubtedly 
represented a turning point in Morocco’s institutional history. The 2011 
constitutional reforms - à la carte – did inject in the system significant 
democratic developments, and do enshrine a potential for meaningful 
democratic change. But if this potential will concretely be realized - so that 
these reforms will not represent just “survival” cosmetic changes – depends on 
the way the new Constitution will be implemented and the Parliament will 
adopt the necessary legislation and make sure that it provides maximum space 
                                                                 
89 Dillman B. (2003). As the author adds: “Morocco’s case fails to be properly explained by either the 
standard internalist or externalist arguments which are often used to account for the reluctance to 
democratize of many Arab countries in the MENA region: Moroccan “exceptionalism” (lack of 
democratic transition but significant political liberalization) can only be understood if looking at the 
interaction and mutually causal role of internal and external influences, rather than relying either on 
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for the political forces.93 It is thus a question which cannot be answered at this 
stage and will require at least some time to see how concrete developments will 
look like. 
Indeed, the words used by Denoeux and Maghraoui to depict the situation 
under Hassan II may still seem appropriate to describe the actual situation: 
“[...] one of Morocco most striking features today is the survival of the 
monarchy not merely as a ceremonial institution, but as a governing body, 
despite major socio-economic mutations which, according to development 
theory, should have undermined the king’s position. [...] Ironically, therefore, 
further democratization in Morocco may depend, for a while at least, on the 
occasional resort to nondemocratic ways of exercising authority. Conversely, 
[...] the monarchy may have realized that it can remain the dominant political 
actor only if it carries out genuine democratic reforms. In short, royal 
arbitration and other practices that are designed to assert the monarchy’s 
political supremacy have paradoxical effects on prospects of democratization in 
Morocco”.94 
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3. Civil Rights and Society  
 
Following the analysis of Morocco’s political institutional setting presented 
in the previous chapter, this section will illustrate the country’s institutional 
setting concerning civil rights and freedoms, trying to outline its achievements 
and shortcomings, with a view on both the legal framework and its actual 
implementation. Also, a short overview of Morocco’s civil society will be 
outlined, in virtue of its being the immediate realm where these developments 
on the civil rights side are enshrined and concretely expressed and actuated.         
 
3.1. Freedom of Association, Assembly and Movement  
 
3.1.1. Freedom of Association 
The legal framework governing the freedom of association in Morocco 
mainly consists of three major legal grounds: art. 29 of the Constitution; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by 
Morocco in 19791; and the 1958 Law on Association (Royal Dahir 1-58-376), as 
amended in 2002 and 2006.2 
Art. 29 of the Moroccan Constitution guarantees the freedom of reunion, 
assembly, peaceful demonstration, association, any trade-union and political 
membership and strike.  
The ICCPR (art. 22) guarantees that “everyone shall have the right to freely 
associate with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests” and sets narrow and specific conditions for the state 
to restrict this right, stating that “no restrictions may be placed […] other than 
those which are prescribed by law and  necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others“. 
The Royal Dhahir 1-58-376 regulates the establishment and functioning of 
associations in Morocco. In theory, it affirms a declarative instead than a prior-
authorization regime, meaning that associations – in order to be legal - need 
only to declare their creation to authorities and do not need to obtain any prior 
authorization.  
                                                                 
1 United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by Resolution 
2200A-XXI of the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966, ratified by Morocco on 3 May 1979. 
2 Dhahir 1-58-376 of 15 November 1958 (as amended by law 75.00 in 2002 and law 36.04 in 2006)  
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Its main provisions are stated in the following points:  
? No association can be legally recognized if its cause or objective is illegal, 
contrary to good morals, harmful to the Islamic religion, the integrity of 
national territory or the monarchical regime, or calls for discrimination (art.3);  
? Any association must declare itself to local authorities in the jurisdiction 
where its headquarters are located, and – for its declared status to be 
maintained - must notify authorities in writing of specific internal 
developments. The procedure for declaration requires that: the 
representative of the association must furnish the authorities a list of 
specified documents about the association and then wait up to 60 days; 
upon receiving the documents, the local administrative authority has to issue a 
provisional receipt, and it holds no discretion to refuse to accept the documents or 
to refuse to issue the receipt (art. 5). 
? Once an association has been legally declared, only the courts of first 
instance have the power to dissolve it (art. 7).  
? Associations can be dissolved – and its leaders be subject to fines – if 
conducting activities other than those foreseen in their statutes (art. 36). 
Indeed, if on paper Moroccan associations enjoy such a progressive legal 
framework for a declarative regime, the reality is much different, as local 
authorities regularly fail to implement many of these provisions.  
The administrations responsible for handling the declarations do in fact 
routinely and freely disregard the procedures laid out in the law, opposing an 
administrative obstruction to the declaration process. The most common ways 
by which they enact such obstruction is either through: a) refusing to receive the 
association’s founding documents (or the other documents required at later 
stages during specified moments of the association’s life); or b) accepting these 
documents but refusing to issue the provisional receipt confirming the place and 
date of their submission. Further, no justification or motivation is usually 
provided by authorities in support of such refusals.  
The widespread occurrence of these practices, as well as their similarity 
across the country, indicates that such interference with associational life is not 
the result of isolated initiatives, but rather part of a high level-decided 
nationwide policy, aimed at weakening certain categories of associations whose 
methods or objectives disturb the authorities. A strategy which does not thus 
consists in crushing outright such associations but rather in leaving them in a 
legal limbo whereby they are kept legally vulnerable, deprived of the legal 
protections that would allow them to operate freely.  
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Indeed, an association which is legally declared is entitled, according to 
art.6 of the law, to file actions in courts, make purchases, acquire and 
administer public subsidies, private donations and foreign grants as well as 
offices and material needed for its activities. All these prerogatives lose their 
legal guarantee when associations are left in the legal limbo.  
In practice, the most common and relevant practical consequences for 
associations of not being declared consist in: difficulty of renting offices or 
booking halls; ineligibility to organize gatherings in public thoroughfares and 
difficulty on posting public announcements; exclusion from official events and 
consultations; obstacles to opening bank accounts; ineligibility for subsidies; 
risk of prosecution for membership; dissuasion of potential members to join. 
Indeed, while the targeted associations have for the most part continued to 
operate, these obstacles have nonetheless undercut and weakened them. 
Besides, if it’s true that Moroccan law specifies remedies available to an 
association when local officials do not fulfil their obligations, it is also a matter 
of fact that associations have variously tried these remedies but held no 
satisfactory results overall. 
The number of associations which have been affected by such kind of “legal 
harassment” is pretty wide and its range include for the most: several working 
to defend human rights of the Saharawi and Amazigh populations; others 
promoting the rights of unemployed persons and of immigrants in Morocco 
from sub-Saharan Africa; and others whose leaders are affiliated to the (not 
legally recognized) Islamist movement al-Adl wa’l-Ihsan (Justice and 
Spirituality).   
As reported by Human Rights Watch, the following rank among the most 
prominent examples: 3 
? The Moroccan National Association of Unemployed University Graduates 
(Association Nationale des Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc, ANDCM), a large 
nationwide umbrella group of local associations composed of unemployed 
Moroccans holding university degrees, which seek to promote state’s 
commitment to provide work opportunities to young graduates. The 
ANDCM presented its founding papers to the local governorate in 1991, 
but was refused, without explanation, to be provided with the receipt - a 
refusal which has further kept occurring each time the association has 
tried to inform the authorities of its internal developments such as 
congresses results and elections. 
                                                                 
3 Human Rights Watch (2009) “Freedom to Create Associations - A Declarative Regime in Name Only”  
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? The Amazigh Network for Citizenship (Réseau Amazighe pour la 
Citoyenneté), advocating for the cultural, political, and civil rights of 
Morocco’s Amazigh population. Both the association’s national bureau 
based in Rabat and its four other local branches submitted founding 
papers to local administration in 2000 and repeatedly in the following 
years in occasion of each congress, but they always were refused to be 
provided with the provisional receipt, except for the national bureau who 
only got its receipt after a long delay, in 2009. 
? The Aguelmam Association for Development and Culture (Association 
Aguelmam pour le Développement), a small Amazigh organization located in 
the commune of Dayet Aoua, near Ifrane. Though formally recognized in 
2005, it was unable to obtain a receipt for filing the papers informing the 
authorities of the results of its internal elections held in 2007. The same 
thing happened to the similar Thawiza Association for Culture and 
Development, which was recognized in 2005 but was refused to be 
provided the receipt in occasion of its internal elections in 2009.  
? Two of the largest Saharawi human rights associations, based in in El-
Ayoun, - the Saharawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights 
Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (Association Sahraouie des 
Victimes de Violations Graves des Droits de l’Homme Commises par l’Etat 
Marocain, ASVDH) and the Collective of Saharawi Human Rights 
Defenders (Collectif des Défenseurs Sahraouis des Droits de l’Homme, 
CODESA) were openly refused legal recognition in virtue of their political 
views pro-Western Sahara’s independence, which violates Moroccan 
Constitution. The ASVDH was never accepted the submission of its 
founding documents since 2005, while the CODESA encountered obstacles 
even before that, as the authorities stepped in to prevent it from holding 
its constitutive assembly, set in 2008.4   
? The Union of the Promotion Nationale Workers in al-Ayoun. The Promotion 
Nationale is a national public-sector program, with a particularly large 
presence in Western Sahara, aiming to provide work for underemployed 
adults in labour-intensive activities. In 2007 a group of workers under this 
program in Western Sahara decided to form a union in al-Ayoun, but the 
submission of their founding documents was never accepted by the 
authorities on the ground that the Promotion workers have no right to form 
a union. 
                                                                 
4 See also: Human Rights Watch (2008) “Human Rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf Refugee Camps” 
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? The National Commission for the Protection of Public Property in 
Morocco (l’Instance Nationale pour la Protection des Biens Publics au Maroc, 
INPBPM), a Rabat-based organization dedicated to safeguarding 
Morocco’s land resources and heritage from corruption and 
misappropriation, which was refused to be provided the provisional 
receipt after it submitted its founding papers in 2006.  
? Various associations led by al-Ad wa’l-Ihsan members. A large number of 
associations exist in Morocco that are not formally affiliated with al-Adl 
but whose leadership includes members of that movement, and which are 
thus subjected to the same regime of restriction and harassment that al-Adl 
is subject to. Examples include: al-Ma’rifa, an educational association 
working to defend the socioeconomic interests of teachers in the city of 
Sidi Slimane, which was always refused to be accepted its documents 
since its creation in 2005; al-Mishkat and as-Sobh, two other small 
cultural/social association (based respectively in the cities of Sidi Slimane 
and Sidi Kassem), which had no problems at the moment of filing their 
documents and obtaining the final receipt (both in 1999), but which both 
encountered repeated administrative obstruction by part of the authorities 
in carrying out their activities.    
? The Group against Racism for Assisting and Defending Foreigners and 
Migrants (Groupe Anti-raciste d’Accompagnement et de Défense d’Etrangers et 
Migrants, GADEM), which monitors the treatment by Moroccan 
authorities of migrants, in particular sub-Saharans, and was unable to 
obtain its registration receipt as the authorities objected the reference to 
racism in its name. 
 
3.1.2. Freedom of Assembly 
As the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly is also granted by 
art. 29 of the Constitution. Further, art. 21 of the ICCPR affirms the right of 
peaceful assembly and excludes any restrictions other than those imposed in 
conformity with the law for the same reasons stated for the right of association 
(i.e. for safeguarding national security or public safety, public order, the protection of 
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others). 
The margins allowed by the law to Morocco’s authorities to restrict freedom 
of assembly are indeed pretty large. The Law on Public Gatherings5 does not 
                                                                 
5 Law on Public Gatherings, Dhahir No. 1-58-377 of November 15, 1958 
www.sgg.gov.ma/rec_lib_pub_fr.pdf 
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require prior authorization to hold a demonstration in a public space (art. 2), 
but obliges the organizers to notify the planned event at least 3 days in advance 
to the authorities, which may forbid the demonstration if they deem it “likely to 
disturb the public order” (art. 13). Further, the law only entitles legally 
recognized political parties, trade unions, and professional associations to 
organize public demonstrations, and forbids “armed gatherings” as well as 
“unarmed gatherings capable of threatening public security”, which public 
authorities are thus empowered to disperse (art. 11).  
Indeed, public gatherings and demonstrations appear to be normally 
tolerated by the regime, with the notable exception of those organized by 
Saharawi activists, which on the contrary often encounter harsh repression by 
part of the authorities.6 Another most frequent target of police repression are 
the protests organized around the country by chapters of the National 
Association of Unemployed University Graduates (ANDCM).7. 
With regard to the recent protests which spread out starting on February 
2011, Human Rights Watch reports that while the police tolerated some of 
them, in several other cases it intervened attacking and beating protesters 
severely, causing many injuries, even though they were generally peaceful 
protests.8 Some of the harshest police violence occurred at peaceful protests 
organized by the 20 February Movement in Casablanca, Kenitra, and Rabat, 
and slightly less violently in Fès, Tangiers and Témara.  
The security forces which dispersed the demonstration were reported to 
belong to the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (Forces Auxiliaires Marocaines, FAM), a 
law enforcement agency in charge of certain public order functions, and the 
Mobile Intervention Unit (Corps Mobile d’Intervention, CMI) – both corps that 
have often been used by the Moroccan authorities to break up peaceful 
demonstrations.9 Hundreds of protesters were detained; most were released, 
but some were tried and received prison sentences.10 Also, during one of these 
demonstrations - organized in the town of Safi on 29 May and violently 
dispersed by security forces - the 30-year old protester Kamal Ammari was 
severely beaten and died 4 days later.11 
                                                                 
6 For human rights’ abuses on Saharawis and conditions in Western Sahara, see analysis in par. 3.5.2. 
7 Human Rights Watch (2011) “World Report 2011 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
8 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
9 Amnesty International (2011) “Moroccan authorities must uphold freedom of assembly” (Public Statement, 
24 February 2011) 
10 Security forces were also reported to have harassed relatives of the 20 February Movement activists. 
Amnesty International (2012) “Annual Report 2012– Morocco / Western Sahara”. 
11 The forensic doctors concluded that Ammari died from a pre-existing condition, aggravated by “a 
simple blow to the torso”. The case remains under investigation (Human Rights Watch, 2012) 
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3.1.3. Freedom of Movement 
Art. 24 of the Constitution provides for freedom of movement within the 
country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.  
These rights are generally respected, although in some cases the Ministry of 
Interior restricts the freedom of civil servants to travel outside the country, 
mostly teachers and military personnel. Also in Western Sahara the freedom of 
movement is generally respected, travel documents are usually made available 
to Saharawis and only fewer cases of movement restrictions are reported. 
Indeed, the government tends to encourage the return of Saharawi refugees if 
they acknowledge its authority over Western Sahara. 
As concerns the situation of refugees, the government usually cooperates 
with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing 
protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, asylum 
seekers and stateless persons. As the country has not yet established a national 
asylum procedure, it defers to the UNHCR as the sole agency in the country 
entitled to grant refugee status and verify asylum cases. 
Though, in the past years there have been some credible reports of 
government authorities expelling illegal migrants into the desert along the 
border with Algeria, with no food and water or any kind of assistance.12 
                                                                 
12 US Department of State “2010 Human Rights Practices – Morocco Country Report” (8 April 2011) 
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3.2. Freedom of the Media and Freedom of Expression 
 
The Moroccan Constitution formally guarantees the freedom of thought, 
opinion and expression (art. 25), as well as the freedom of the press (art. 28). 
Also the right of access to information held by public administrations, elected 
institutions and public service bodies is granted, but with the important clause 
that it can be restricted by the law in order to assure the protection of national 
defence, internal and external security, the private life of persons as well as their 
freedoms and rights (art. 27).  
Indeed, precise red lines exist which include questioning the integrity of the 
Monarchy, the state officials, Islam and national territory. Several forms of 
speech and expression are criminalized under Moroccan law - well beyond the 
limits allowed from international law - and they have variously and often been 
used to arrest, condemn and imprison journalists. Most prominent among 
them: 13 
? Under the penal code: defamation (art. 442); 
? Under the press code: offenses or insults directed to the king, any of the 
princes or princesses, the Islamic religion, the monarchical system, or the 
national territorial integrity (art. 41); publication of false information either 
if done in bad faith, or disturbing the public order, or stoking fear in the 
population (art. 42); defamation against individuals (art. 44); defamation 
of courts, state institutions and officials (art. 45 and art. 46); offensive 
speech directed toward heads of state, prime ministers, and foreign 
ministers (art. 52); 
? Under the 2003 Counterterrorism Law: any expression seeking to justify 
terrorism (art. 218.2). 
There are 17 daily and 90 weekly publications in Morocco, over 70% of 
which are privately owned.  
Broadcast media remain dominated by the State: the main sources of 
information on standard television are state media whose coverage is 
monopolized by the government,14 and the State holds the authority to appoint 
the heads of all public radio and television stations. The regime retain thus 
considerable control over the editorial content of domestic broadcast media and 
                                                                 
13 Human Rights Watch (2012) “Comments on the EBRD's Technical Assessments for Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia” (Human Rights Watch, 7 May 2012)  
14 Namely Qanat al Aoula (Channel 1) and 2M, which provide daily news in Arabic, French and 
Amazigh. 
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radio stations are largely prohibited from broadcasting programs of a political 
nature.  
Further, though the King claims to have liberalized this sector by 
establishing in 2002 the High Authority of Audio-visual Communication 
(HACA) - responsible for issuing broadcast licenses and monitoring content to 
ensure compliance with licensing requirements - as an “independent 
administrative body”, this organization fails to have the necessary 
requirements to factually operate independently, as of its nine members, five 
are appointed by the King, two by the Prime Minister, and two by the 
Presidents of the Houses of Parliament. 15  
Indeed, Moroccans can access critical reports through pan-Arab and other 
satellite television channels, and foreign publications are widely available. 
Though, nor domestic neither foreign media are immune from the regime’s 
supervision and/or repression, with the government  carefully monitoring both 
printed and broadcast media, as well as blogs and websites, and often cracking 
down on those producing critical content. 
According to many observers – among which Freedom House, Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch - critical journalism and critical 
expression in general in Morocco is widely harassed and curbed by 
government authorities through various means, such as: legal prosecutions 
against journalists or activists (leading to large fines or prison condemns); 
revoking of licenses; suspension/confiscation of publications; and aggressive 
financial harassment/boycott. Also self-censorship is consequently largely 
widespread. In the last three years, indeed, the following most prominent cases 
were reported: 16  
? In January 2009, the independent daily Al-Jarida al-Oula was fined 
US$19,000 for defamation after a trial in which the newspaper was not 
represented by legal counsel or staff. In March, the paper’s managing 
director, Ali Anouzla, and its publisher, Jamal Boudouma, were sentenced 
to two-month jail terms and fined US$23,000 for defamation and insults 
against the judiciary.  
? In February 2009, Fouad Mourtada was sentenced to three years in prison 
for “identity usurping,” for creating a falsified – though non-defamatory - 
                                                                 
15 Actually, the new constitution includes a provision on HACA (art. 165), but there’s no evidence so 
far of any real change towards a stronger autonomy. 
16 Freedom House (2011) “Freedom of the Press Annual Report 2011 - Morocco”   
Freedom House (2010) “Freedom of the Press Annual Report 2010 - Morocco”  
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profile of the King’s brother on Facebook. He was then pardoned by the 
King the next month. 
? In April 2009, journalist and blogger Hassan Barhoun was sentenced to 10 
months in prison and a US$570 fine for allegedly circulating false news 
and for collusion in a corruption case. 
? In June 2009, five journalists from three independent dailies were fined 
US$11,400 (the maximum amount designated under the press law) and 
ordered to pay damages for US$114,000, for insulting Libyan leader 
Gheddafi, following complaints from the Libyan embassy in Rabat.  
? In August 2009, upon the Ministry of Interior’s order, over 100,000 copies 
of the newspaper TelQuel (and its Arabic-language sister publication 
Nichane) were seized and destroyed, after the newspaper published results 
of an opinion poll on the King’s decade in power, despite the results being 
positive.17 
? In September 2009, the newspaper Akhbar al-Youm was banned, upon the 
Ministry of Interior’s order, for publishing a cartoon of a royal family’s 
member at his wedding ceremony. Its publisher, Taoufik Bouachrine, and 
the cartoonist, Khalid Gueddar, were sentenced to three-year prison terms 
and fined US$11,370 plus US$340,000 in damages for “lacking respect 
toward the royal family.”  
? Always in September 2009, blogger Mohammed Erraji was arrested and 
sentenced to two years in prison for insulting the King in a blog entry. 
Though, the verdict was overturned on appeal and he was released. 
? In October 2009, Idriss Chahtane, publisher of the Al-Michaal newspaper, 
was sentenced to one year in prison and a US$1,140 fine for running 
articles about the king’s health (he was then pardoned and released in 
June 2010, after serving 8 months). Other two Al-Michaal’s journalists, 
Rachid Mohamed and Mostafa Hiran, were sentenced to two months in 
prison and fined US$572 each. In November, the newspaper was banned 
on the grounds that Chahtane was serving a prison sentence. 
? In February 2010, blogger Boubaker al-Yadib was sentenced to six months 
in jail for posting photos of police brutality online. 
                                                                 
17 The act was criticized by The Moroccan National Press Syndicate as “doubly illegal”, due to the 
absence of legislation forbidding the publication of opinion polls, besides the fact that the publications 
were seized without a judicial order. (Freedom House, 2010) 
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? In June 2010 Radio Mars was fined and suspended for 48 hours after a 
guest claimed he wanted to one day become president of Morocco. 
? In 2010, the Ministry of Communication banned the distribution of the 
French weekly L’Express several times. Also, the regime was able to shut 
down the independent weekly Le Journal Hebdomadaire by draining its 
financial resources, through successfully organizing an advertising 
boycott of the paper and seizing its assets after a court declared its parent 
company bankrupt.  
? In October 2010 – after having already denied accreditation renewal to two 
Al-Jazeera journalists earlier in the year - the government accused the 
Qatari-based satellite network of reporting on the Western Sahara with a 
bias against the regime, damaging the country’s image. All accreditations 
for Al-Jazeera journalists in Morocco were thus rescinded, effectively 
suspending all the channel’s reporting in the country. 
? In November 2010, the same allegations for biasedly reporting on Western 
Sahara were addressed towards Spanish media coverage, and the officials 
expelled three Spanish journalists and prevented 10 others from flying 
there to report on the conflict.  
? On 28 April 2011, Rachid Nini, columnist of the Moroccan daily al –Masa’, 
was arrested and prosecuted for “gravely offending state institutions, 
public figures and the security of the nation and citizens” (under art. 263, 
264 and 266 of the criminal code) for having published stories about 
Moroccan intelligence Chief Abldellatif Hammouchi. On 9 June he was 
sentenced to one-year in prison.18 
? On 11 May 2012, popular rapper Mouad Belghouat (al-Haqed) was 
sentenced to one-year in prison for “insulting the police”. He had 
previously been in pre-trial custody since March 29 because of a rap song 
(“Dogs of the State”) and its related YouTube video denouncing police 
corruption, for which he was charged of “showing contempt toward 
public servants in the exercise of their duty with the intention of 
undermining their honor”19  
 
                                                                 
18 Human Rights Watch (2012), Errazouki S. (2012) 
19 Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Prison for Rapper Who Criticized Police”, 12 May 2012 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/12/morocco-prison-rapper-who-criticized-police. The main evidence was a 
YouTube video containing a photo-montage of a policeman whose head had been replaced by a 
donkey’s. Belghouat denied any connection to the video and its lawyers told HRW that no evidence 
was presented in court implicating Belghouat in the production or posting of the video.  
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Occasionally, also physical attacks on journalists do occur, but they are far 
less common than legal actions. There were no reported physical attacks in 
2010, while in November 2009 the al –Masa’s journalist Moustafa Hajiri was 
reported by the Press Syndicate to have been assaulted by the police while 
covering demonstrations against price increases in Rabat. 
Indeed, the Press Freedom Index annually released from Freedom House 
reports a gradually deteriorating score for Morocco in the last decade, and 
records the country’s media as passing from a “Partly Free” status in 2000 to a 
“Not Free” status in 2011.20 
                                                                 
20 The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in the 
world, analysing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical scores ranging from 1 to 100, 
and rates each country's media as "Free” (1-30), "Partly Free" (31-60) or "Not Free” (61-100). Morocco 
has kept steadily deteriorating in the last decade, passing from a 49 score in 2000 (Partly Free), to 58 in 
2002 (Not Free), 61 in 2004 (Not Free), 62 in 2007 (Not Free), 64 in 2009 (Not Free), 66 in 2010 (Not Free) 
and finally 68 in 2011 (Not Free). (Freedom House, Freedom of the Press data 2012: “Scores and Status 
Data 1980-2011” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press) 
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3.3. Religious/Cultural Freedoms and Women Rights  
 
3.3.1. Freedom of Religion 
Morocco recognizes Islam as the state religion, though granting all 
Moroccans the freedom of religion.  
Indeed, according to the 2011 Constitution: Morocco is a Muslim State, and 
“the pre-eminence accorded to the Muslim religion […] is consistent with the 
attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of 
tolerance and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and 
the civilizations of the world” (Preamble); Islam is the State religion, though the 
free exercise of beliefs is guaranteed to all (art. 3); the guarantee of such 
freedom as well as the respect of Islam is assured by the King, in his role as the 
Commander of the Faithful and Chair of the Superior Council of the Ulemas 
(art. 41).21  
Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – 
which Morocco has ratified without reservations – also affirms the right of 
individuals to adopt any religion or beliefs they want as well as to manifest it 
either individually or in community, privately and in public, through worship, 
observance, practice, and teaching (art. 18).22   
The almost totality of Morocco’s 34.8 million population is Muslim (98.7%) 
– the overwhelming majority being Sunni Muslims, while the Shia Muslims are 
estimated between 3,000 and 8,000. Other religious minorities are the Christians 
(1.1%) and the Jews (0.2%). 
Although the constitution provides for the freedom to practice any religion, 
restrictions on this right are in practice identified by the law and put in place by 
the government and some discrimination is operated between the different 
religious minorities:23 
? Any expression of opinion alleged to offend Islam can be legally 
prosecuted. 
                                                                 
21 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, July 1, 2001 
The Supreme Council of Ulemas, appointed by the king with representatives from all 16 regions of the 
country, has the exclusive right to issue fatwas. A separate Brussels-based Council of Ulema was 
established for the more than 3 million Moroccans living abroad. 
22 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), (adopted by Resolution 
2200A-XXI of the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966) 
23 US Department of State (2011) “2010 Human Rights Practices – Morocco Country Report” 
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? Sunni Muslims are allowed to proselytize others, while it’s explicitly 
prohibited by the law to proselytize Sunni Muslims.  
? The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA) monitors and 
provides guidance on Friday mosque sermons and the Koranic schools, to 
ensure the teaching of the approved doctrine and prevent extremist 
rhetoric. 
? The government must authorize the construction of any new mosque. 
? The authorities generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of 
Islam, education, and charity, while often suppressing the activities of 
religiously-oriented political groups.24 
? Minor religious communities are tolerated with varying degrees of 
restrictions, but the distribution of non-Muslim religious materials is 
forbidden.25  
? Judaism enjoys a protected status that other religions and non-majority 
forms of Islam do not: a separate set of laws and courts covering personal 
status and family matters exists for Jews, while for all other faiths normal 
courts run by Sharia-trained Judges cover personal status matters. Further, 
the government's annual education budget funds the teaching of Islam in 
all public schools and Judaism in some public schools. 
? Authorities and police closely monitor the small communities of Shia 
Muslims as well as of Christians, though they not often interfere with their 
activities. Occasional credible reports exist that authorities closed down 
unauthorized or informal mosques, apparently suspected of conducting 
extremist religious activities or not complying with state-defined 
standards. 26 
? According to the law, non-Muslims must formally convert to Islam before 
they can adopt children in the country; a Muslim man may marry a non-
Muslim woman, while a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim 
man unless he converts to Islam.  
                                                                 
24 Political parties founded on religious bases are prohibited by law, though the government permits 
several parties identified as "Islamic oriented" to operate. 
25 The government often confiscate Bibles, Shia tracts, and other literature that did not adhere to Sunni 
Islam, as allegedly used for purposes of proselytizing. 
26 Human Rights Watch (2012) “Comments on the EBRD's Technical Assessments for Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia” 
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? Though, the designation of religion on passports or national identity 
documents is not required and there are no prohibitions on religious 
clothing or symbols in either the public or private sphere. 
? The government is entitled to summarily expel, without due process, any 
foreign resident alleged to be "a threat to public order," regardless of the 
due process requirement (art. 26 of the Law on Entry and Residence of 
Foreigners in Morocco and Illegal Immigration and Emigration). This is actually 
not in contrast with art. 13 of the ICCPR, which allows expulsion of 
foreigners only if “in accordance with law” and for “compelling reasons of 
national security”.27  
 
3.3.2. Women’s Rights and the Family Code (Moudawana) 
Among Arab Muslim countries, Morocco stands remarkably progressive in 
terms of women rights. 28  
The new 2011 constitution formally guarantees equality between man and 
women through its art. 19, which clearly states that “man and woman enjoy, in 
equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, economic, social, cultural 
and environmental character” enounced in the Constitution and in 
international conventions, and also provides for the commitment of the State in 
working for the realization of such parity, in particular through the creation of 
an authority specifically in charge of the struggle for parity and against all 
forms of discrimination (further reaffirmed in art. 164).29 
Further, on 8 April 2011 Morocco withdrew its reservations - while 
maintaining other reservations, though - to articles 9.2 and 16 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)30, 
signalling a commitment to eliminate gender discrimination in marital 
rights/responsibilities and in the right of spouses to confer Moroccan 
nationality on their children when the other spouse is non-Moroccan.  
                                                                 
27 Recently, over 150 Protestant Christians have been victims of summary expulsions in 2010, as a 
measure of “urgent necessity for state or public security”. Human Rights Watch (2011) “World Report 
2011 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
28 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
29 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, July 1, 2001 
30 “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, adopted by UN General 
Assembly on 18 December 1979, ratified by Morocco on 21 June 1993. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm 
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Last but not least, in 2004 major progressive reforms have been brought to 
the Family Code (Moudawana)31 improving women’s rights in marriage, divorce 
and child custody. 
The Moudawana is the traditional personal status code (or family code) in 
Moroccan law, which regulates all issues related to the family, in particular the 
marriage, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. Its first version 
was codified in the immediate post-independence, in 1957-58, by a group of 
Ulamas working under the auspices of the Monarchy. Intended to signify the 
nation’s unity and modernity as well as its Islamic identity, it basically codified 
the system of existing patriarchal and kin-based social structures within the 
newly independent state, by drawing most of its substance on the classical 
Maliki Sunni Islamic law. Remarkably, it is the only section of Moroccan law 
that relies primarily on Islamic sources (rather than Spanish or French civil 
codes), virtually conferring it some sense of immutability which strongly 
contributed to obstacle any attempts to amend it later on. 
Indeed, though some calls for reform were already raised during the 1960s 
and 1970s, its religious origins managed to block any serious movement for 
reform until the late 1980s. It was not before 1993 that some modest reforms 
were enacted under King Hassan II, as a result of a new born attention on 
women’s rights brought by the flourishing of many Moroccan civil society 
organizations - including many women’s ones - along with an increased 
international attention on these issues. An increased activism followed this 
initial change, bringing to the set-up of a working group32 - composed by 
several Moroccan women’s organizations and led by the Moroccan Association 
for Women Rights (Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes, AMDF) – to 
examine the family code in order to propose amendments. The outcome was 
the formulation of a Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development, 
mainly centred on strengthening women involvement in development and 
politics as well as their education’s opportunities.   
The Action Plan, which was presented in 1999, divided Morocco’s political 
elite and the government as well into two opposing factions - the traditionalists 
(supported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs), opposing the proposed 
reforms as allegedly rooted in Western influence, and the modernists, willing to 
prevent the influence of Islamic extremists on these issues. The debate extended 
                                                                 
31 Royal Dahir n° 1.04.22 issued on 3 February 2004, to implement Law n° 70.03 as the Family Code 
(Moudawana) http://www.hrea.org/moudawana.html 
32 The initiative was mainly funded by the World Bank. 
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beyond the realms of politics, eventually generating huge rallies in Casablanca 
and Rabat in March 2000.33 
In 2001, Mohammed VI set up a commission tasked with reforming the 
Mudawana, and consisting of a Supreme Court justice, religious scholars, 
political representatives, and various intellectuals - including many 
representatives from women's organizations. In October 2003, a plan to replace 
the whole family code was submitted to the Parliament and finally approved – 
with over 100 amendments - in January 2004, receiving the overall praise of 
international actors, among which the United States, the European Union, the 
World Bank and Human Rights Watch. 34 
The major provisions brought by the 2004 reforms were the following:35  
? The minimum age of marriage for man and women was raised from 15 to 
18 years; in addition, boys and girls under custody may choose their 
custodian once they reach the age of 15. 
? The requirement of a marital tutor as a condition of marriage for women 
was removed (though still possible for a woman to voluntarily designate a 
male relative as her marital tutor); any imposition to a woman to get 
married against her will was forbidden, as well as the wife's duty of 
obedience to her husband was rescinded. 
? Limits to polygamy were introduced, subjecting the possibility to have a 
second wife to a series of strict conditions: the authorization by a judge; 
the existence of a an exceptional and objective justification for it; the first 
wife’s consent; the man’s disposal of sufficient resources to assure equal 
maintenance and support to both families in all aspects of life. Further, 
woman were recognized the right to petition for divorce in case of 
polygamy as well as to explicitly insert in their marriage contract a clause 
preventing polygamy. 
? The right to petition for divorce was recognized to both men and women 
(though procedures for reconciliation and mediation are encouraged); 
divorces become legally allowed in situations of mutual consent, of 
abandonment or violence, or in cases where men fail to fulfil their 
marriage contract’s obligations. Further, divorce proceedings were placed 
under secular courts’ competence, rather than religious officials’ one. 
                                                                 
33 Harrak F. (2009) 
34 The King deliberately chose to have these reforms endorsed by the Parliament as a further source of 
legitimacy, whereas the original Mudawana and its 1993 amendments were enacted by royal decrees. 
35 Harrak F. (2009) 
 
 
75
? The family was placed under the joint responsibility of both spouses; 
priority on child custody (which entangles the keeping of the house) was 
conferred – in order - to the mother, then the father, then the maternal 
grandmother and finally to the most qualified relative as deemed by the 
judge; the protection of children’s rights according to the international 
conventions that Morocco has signed was affirmed, along with the right of 
children born outside of wedlock to be acknowledged of the paternity. 
? Married couples were given the possibility to negotiate an agreement the 
management of their assets separate from the marriage contract. 
Though, despite these positive achievements, the new code still preserved 
some discriminatory provisions with regards to inheritance rights and to the 
right of husbands to unilaterally repudiate their wives (with prior 
authorization by a judge).  
But, beside this, the most worrying concerns reside in its implementation, 
due to the fact that it largely depends on the judiciary’s willingness to enforce it 
and that its content and intents remain controversial and not widely agreed. In 
the country’s rural and underdeveloped areas in particular, the gap between 
formal legal reforms and their practice in reality is significant. 
Also, another most worrying trait concerning women rights is the still on-
going absence of a specific legislation addressing or criminalizing violence 
against women and girls, so that real women conditions appear to be still 
lacking concrete protection and safeguard. The first comprehensive Moroccan 
National Study on Violence against Women carried out in 2009 by the High 
Planning Commission (Haut Commissariat au Plan, HCP) - a government agency 
tasked with compiling socio economic and demographic national statistics - 
furnishes insightful data on this issue: on a population of 9.5 million women 
aged 18-64, almost 6 million, or 62.8%, experienced some act of violence during 
2009, 3.8 million of which in urban areas and 2.2 million in rural areas. Among 
these, the most frequent form of violence was the psychological violence, 
reported by well 48% (i.e. 4.7 million) of the interviewed, while 1.4 million 
(15.2%) reported physical violence and 827,000 (8.7%) reported sexual abuses. 
Further, most of the violence occurs within the domestic context, with 3.7 
million women (55%) reporting conjugal violence, while 3.1 million (32.9%) 
reporting violence in public places. 36 
                                                                 
36 High Planning Commission (2011) “National Study on Violence against Women”(survey carried out in 
2009, results released in 2011) http://www.hcp.ma/downloads/Violence-a-l-egard-des-femmes_t13077.html 
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3.4. Human Rights Violations  
 
3.4.1. Illegal Detentions, Mistreatments and Torture under  
   Counter-terrorism Law 
One of the most worrying grey zones regarding human rights protection in 
Morocco concerns the numerous allegations of illegal detentions, mistreatment 
and torture perpetrated by the security forces against persons suspected of 
links to terrorism – abuses which certainly violates both international and 
domestic law but which are largely prompted by the excessively broad scope of 
the 2003 Counter-terrorism Law which, adopted in the aftermath of the 2003 
Casablanca bombings, has given the government an almost unlimited legal 
margin to limit the human rights and basic civil liberties of Morocco’s citizens. 
On 16 May 2003, Morocco suffered the worst terrorist attack in its modern 
history when five coordinated suicide bombings in Casablanca killed 45 people. 
Officials reported the perpetrators to belong to two Islamist groups - Sirat al-
Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia - allegedly linked with Al Qaeda.  
Twelve days after these attacks, Morocco passed the so-called Counter 
Terrorism Law (Law No. 03-03 of 28 May 2003 on Combating Terrorism), which 
includes an extremely broad definition of terrorism, reduces the rights of 
suspects in terrorism-related cases and hardens penalties for terrorist-classified 
offenses.37The law indeed: 
a) Defines as terroristic any act which is “deliberately perpetuated by an 
individual, group or organization, whose main objective is to disrupt 
public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror” and includes 
acts as theft, extortion, and any speech, writings or printed materials 
which is sold, distributed or displayed in public places or meetings, or 
through any audio-visual or electronic means of information.38 
b) Extends to 12 days the maximum amount of time the police can hold a 
suspect before presenting him to a judge.  
c) Confers to the Rabat Court of Appeals (located in the city of Salé) the 
exclusive nationwide jurisdiction on first instance trials to persons facing 
charges under this law. 
                                                                 
37 Law 03-03, promulgated by Dahir No. 1-03-140 of 28 May 2003 (published in the Official Bulletin, 5 
June 2003), amending the Penal Code, No. 1.59.413 of 1962. 
38 This definition has indeed been used to convict and imprison journalists as well as persons posting 
statements online against the American occupation in Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2010) 
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This law stands in sharp contrast with the remarkable steps that Morocco’s 
has been doing in the recent years in committing itself towards the prevention 
of torture, ill-treatment and unpunished human rights abuses in general, which 
can be summarized in the following points: 
? In 1993, it ratified the United Nations “Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”39  
? In 2006, it amended the Penal Code by prohibiting torture and bringing 
the code’s definition of torture closer to the one found in the UN 
Convention. This new broad definition considers as torture “any act that 
causes severe physical or mental pain or suffering intentionally inflicted 
by a public agent or upon his instigation or with his express or tacit 
consent, upon a person for the purpose of intimidating or pressuring him 
or for pressuring a third person, to obtain information or a confession, to 
punish him for an act that he or a third party committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or when such pain or suffering is inflicted for any 
other objective based on any form of discrimination”(art. 231). Further to 
this, art. 293 of the Penal Procedure Code prohibits the use of confessions 
obtained through “violence or coercion” as evidences in trials and remarks 
that perpetrators of such violence must be subject to the penalties 
provided in the Penal Code.  
? Always in 2006, Morocco lifted its reservation to art. 20 and art. 22 of the 
Convention against Torture, thereby recognizing the competence of the 
Committee against Torture to open investigations when it receives reliable 
and apparently well-founded indications that torture is being 
systematically practiced, as well as to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals claiming to be victims of 
a violation of the convention.40  
? The new 2011 Constitution includes the prohibition of torture “under any 
of its forms and by anyone” and of any “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or infringement of one’s dignity” (art. 22), as well as of 
“arbitrary or secret detention and forced disappearances” (art. 23).   
                                                                 
39 United Nations “Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment”, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984 (Resolution 39/46), entered 
into force on 26 June 1987. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html 
40 Though, Morocco has not signed the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), 
aimed at establishing a system of regular inspections of detention places conducted by both 
international experts and a domestic independent body. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) 
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? In 1990 it established the Moroccan Human Rights Advisory Council 
(Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme, CCDH) as a national institution 
mandated to protect and promote human rights in the country and to 
prosecute perpetrators suspected of violating them. The CCDH was 
replaced in March 2011 by the National Human Rights Council (Conseil 
National des Droits de l’Homme, CNDH), with a mandate expanded in 
accordance with the UN Paris Principles. Among its main tasks, the 
CNDH: monitors cases of violations and may conduct necessary 
investigations; may intervene, on an urgent basis, to prevent any possible 
individual or collective human rights violation; visits places of detention, 
prisons, reintegration centers and hospitals; submits annual and thematic 
reports on human rights to the King, the government and the Parliament 
and publishes them on the Official Bulletin. Its Managing Board consists of 
a President and a Secretary General and 37 members. 41 
• In January 2004 – upon the CCDH’s recommendation - the Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission (Instance d’Equité et de Réconciliation, IER) was 
established, as the first equity commission in the Arab world,  tasked with 
addressing the human rights abuses perpetrated against Moroccan 
citizens by the authorities in the period 1956-1999 and providing the 
victims with reparations. During its 2-year operate, the IER - headed by 
former political prisoner Driss Benzekri, who had spent 17 years in jail - 
held public hearings where victims could testimony the abuses they 
suffered, and in January 2006 it submitted its final report to the King, 
including a series of recommendations for legal and institutional reforms 
designed to prevent repeating past abuses. Following the submission, the 
government acknowledged responsibility for “disappearances” and other 
past grave abuses, compensating around 16,000 among victims and 
relatives. Nonetheless, many critics point out that even though victims 
were given a chance to publicize their suffering and receive compensation, 
no Moroccan officials or security force members have so far been 
prosecuted for such rights violations, and most of the institutional reforms 
recommended by the IER still remain to be implemented.42Furthermore, 
the government has shown to be fairly intolerant to discussions of these 
past abuses, and in June 2008 the private daily Al-Jarida al-Oula was 
ordered by a Rabat court to stop publishing testimony given at the IER.43 
                                                                 
41 Of which 8 appointed by the King, 10 by NGOs, 6 by the Parliament, 2 by the higher religious 
bodies, 1 by the Judges association, plus 10 Chairpersons of Regional Human Rights Commissions.  
Website of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) http://www.ccdh.org.ma/spip.php?article88 
42 Human Rights Watch (2011) “World Report 2011 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
43 Freedom House (2009) “Freedom in the World Annual Report 2009 - Morocco” (Freedom House, 2009) 
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In the aftermath of the 2003 bombings, over 1,500 suspected Islamists 
extremists were arrested with the charge of “belonging to a terrorist network”. 
Though sharply declined since 2004, arrests in terrorist-related cases have 
partly revived following some minor terrorist attacks in 2007. In this occasion, 
hundreds more suspected Islamist militants were arrested and imprisoned, all 
of which still remain in prison.44 
Among the numerous mass terrorism cases being carried out, probably the 
most prominent has been the “Belliraj case”, which saw 35 suspected being 
convicted on appeal on 16 July 2010 on charges of mounting a terrorist plot. It 
was pretty unique as it involved well six political figures among the 
defendants, including senior figures in four political parties (three moderate 
Islamist parties and a socialist party). All 35 defendants were found guilty and 
sentenced to various prison terms. In April 2011, though, the King pardoned 
five of the political figures convicted, while the 29 other defendants continue to 
serve their prison terms, including a life term for the alleged ringleader 
Abdelkader Belliraj.45 
Since 2003, several allegations of security forces abuses and mistreatments 
on persons suspected of terrorism have been reported, especially 
acknowledging cases of “disappearances”. Both domestic and international 
NGOs, such as the AMDH, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, 
have raised these cases to Moroccan authorities, but so far no concrete action 
has been taken, and courts have generally failed to investigate these allegations.  
Most of the reports highlight strong similarities in the kind and path of 
abuses perpetrated, which can be summarized in the following ones:46 
? Arrests carried on by agents in plainclothes producing nor a warrant for 
arrest nor an ID proving their identity as Judiciary Police’s agent (the only 
ones empowered to make arrests); 
? Lack of prompt notification of the arrest to the respective families (in 
violation of the  Penal Procedure Code, art. 67, that requires relatives to be 
notified as soon as the decision for detention is taken by the officials); 
? Agents searching homes of the suspects and confiscating items, without 
prior written permission of the residents or apposite warrant signed by 
the prosecutor (in violation of the Penal Procedure Code, art. 62.3 and 79); 
                                                                 
44 Human Rights Watch (2011) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
45 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
46 Human Rights Watch (2010) “Stop Looking for Your son” 
 
 
80
? Arrested being held in pre-charge, incommunicado detention for longer 
than the 12-day maximum period allowed by Moroccan law for terrorism 
cases; 
? Arrested allowed to see a lawyer only well after the first four days of 
detention - the limit set by Moroccan law – and often only after having 
being forced to sign a written statement prepared for them by the police, 
which prevented them from reading it; 
? Physical abuses and alleged tortures perpetrated during interrogations;  
? Secret detention being carried out in secret facilities; most reports refer to 
an alleged secret detention center in Témara, near Rabat, which hosts the 
headquarters of Morocco’s domestic intelligence agency, the General 
Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (Direction Générale de la 
Surveillance du Territoire, DGST). If true, this would be a serious violation 
of the law as the DGST is an agency that lacks the status of Judiciary Police 
and has thus no authority to arrest, detain or question suspects - a 
prerogative that the Moroccan law reserves only to security force 
personnel with the status of Judiciary Police, acting under the supervision 
of the public prosecutor. Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied the 
existence of a detention facility run by the DGST in Témara; in May 2011, 
delegations from parliament and the CNDH visited the Témara center, but 
reported finding no evidence of any detention facility operating there.47 
Further to this, also the situation concerning Morocco’s prisons conditions 
in general is reported to be very poor and not meeting international standards. 
The Moroccan Observatory of Prisons (Observatoire Marocain des Prisons, OMP) - 
an umbrella group of lawyers promoting better prison conditions - and other 
human rights NGOs continue to report that prisons are overcrowded, prone to 
violence and with dramatically poor hygienic conditions.48 
Lastly to be added, a further revival of terrorism-related arrests is being 
experiencing again after an allegedly terrorist incident occurred on 28 April 
2011, when a bomb exploded in a touristic café in Marrakesh, killing 17 persons 
and wounding dozens, with no group claiming responsibility.49  
 
 
                                                                 
47 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
48 US Department of State “2010 Human Rights Practices – Morocco Country Report” (8 April 2011) 
49 On 28 October, the Special Terrorism Chamber of the Rabat Court of Appeals convicted 9 suspected 
Islamist militants in the attack, sentencing 8 to prison and one to death. (Human Rights Watch, 2012) 
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3.4.2. Human Rights Abuses in Western Sahara and on Saharawi 
   Activists 
Another huge grey area concerning human rights respect in Morocco is 
represented by the widely reported violations perpetrated by the authorities in 
the region of Western Sahara and towards Saharawi activists advocating self-
determination for their people.  
It is undeniable that Morocco’s repression in Western Sahara has being 
strongly easing over time since the 1970s and 1980s, when Morocco and the 
POLISARIO were at war: Saharawi activists enjoy now much more freedom 
than before in conducting their activities, traveling abroad and promoting their 
cause within and outside the country, and Morocco has been gradually opening 
the door to wider debate on these issues.    
Though, despite these improvements over time, serious rights violations 
continue, and Saharawis remain subject to severe restrictions by part of 
Moroccan authorities on almost all of the most basic freedoms. Remarkable 
violations which are continuously reported include: unfair trials; arbitrary 
arrests, violence and torture by the security forces; restrictions to the freedom 
of assembly through prohibition or repression of Saharawi demonstrations; 
restrictions to the freedom of association for human rights organizations, 
mainly through legal administrative obstruction; restrictions on foreign 
journalists and observers; restrictions to press freedom.50 
? Unfair trials. Saharawis accused of politically motivated offenses are not 
usually granted fair trials. The common violations of due-process rights 
include: torture or mistreatment by police under interrogation to extract a 
statement incriminating themselves or others; coercion by police to sign a 
statement without reading it, the contents of which is almost always 
repudiated by the defendants at the trial; later repudiate; lack of timely 
medical examination to check for signs of torture or other abuse; no efforts 
by the judges to investigate defendant claims that confessions are 
extracted through force; common refusal by the judges to allow witnesses 
testimonies in favour of the defence if deemed to have probative value. 
Though, as the sentences are concerned, the usual prison terms which are 
currently imposed on Saharawi activists for politically motivated offenses 
– normally 3 years or less - are way shorter than those that the courts 
imposed in the 1980s-1990s, which tended to reach even 10/20 years. Also, 
royal pardons often free many prisoners before the end of their term. 
                                                                 
50 Human Rights Watch (2008) “Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps” 
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? Arbitrary arrests, violence and torture by the security forces. Despite 
Morocco refuses and condemns torture and mistreatment both in its 
domestic laws and through international commitment (as seen in par. 
3.5.1), reports of physical abuses and violence committed by police against 
Saharawi activists and suspected activists are indeed more than frequent. 
Three types of violence can be highlighted as the most frequently 
reported: a) violence inflicted during the interrogation of suspects in 
custody; b) violence against persons in their custody as punishment for 
alleged participation in illegal street demonstrations; and c) excessive force 
used to disperse illegal demonstrations. Further to this, perpetrators 
remain largely unaccountable as Moroccan officials generally fail to fulfil 
their obligation to investigate the evidence for the complaints submitted 
by alleged victims to the prosecutor’s offices. 
? Restrictions to the freedom of assembly. Moroccan authorities use the 
wide discretion that the law affords them to systematically refuse to 
authorize or disperse political demonstrations whenever they suspect the 
organizers of favouring Saharawi independence, by labelling 
organizations and gatherings as “pro-separatist” and by deeming them as 
“likely to threaten the public order.” They usually accuse Sahrawi political 
activists of inciting violence as part of their public protests, invoking the 
risk of violence as a justification to prevent or break up demonstrations. 
Truly, most pro-independence and human rights demonstrations in 
Western Sahara are peaceful; violence only occurs on an occasional basis 
by part of some participants which deliberately seek to engage in clashes 
by throwing rocks, cans, bags or bottles to the police - an occasional 
protester violence which should definitely not justify broad bans on the 
right of assembly as the one that are indeed concretely reported. 
? Restrictions to the freedom of association for human rights organizations.   
Remarkably, in the Sahara region hundreds of NGOs exist, along with the 
local office of the CNDH and even a specific Committee for the Defence of 
Human Rights, Public Liberties and Camps’ Populations within the Royal 
Advisory Council for Sahara Affairs (Conseil Royal Consultatif des Affairs 
Sahariennes CORCAS)51, created by Mohamed VI in 2006. Though, 
Moroccan authorities tend to discriminate among different types of 
organizations, and while allowing the proliferation and the free operation 
of most types, they regularly impose a regime of harassment and 
                                                                 
51 CORCAS website http://www.corcas.com/SearchResults/Committees/tabid/506/Default.aspx 
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restrictions toward Sahrawi human rights organizations. Most prominent 
examples of such repression are: the refusal to grant legal recognition to 
the ASVDH and CODESA;52 the dissolution of the Sahara branch of the 
Forum for Truth and Justice (Forum Marocain pour la Vérité et la Justice, 
FMVJ);53 the impediment to work to the local branch of the legally 
recognized AMDH, through administrative obstruction and multiple 
arrests of its president. In practice, no one single regionally based human 
rights organization exists in Western Sahara that operates freely in actively 
exposing human rights violations committed by Moroccan authorities.  
? Restrictions on foreign observers. Moroccan authorities continue to 
obstacle the work of foreign journalists and observers who seek to follow 
the Western Sahara question (although less than in past years, when 
foreign journalists and human rights delegations were regularly 
expelled).54 
? Restrictions to press freedom. While having interfered less in recent years 
with the work of foreign journalists in the Sahara, Moroccan authorities 
continue to monitor them closely and incidents continue to occur. Western 
Sahara remains one of the red-lines issues for Moroccan media, for which 
they tend to engage in self-censorship to varying degrees. The two 
national TV channels and other official media do normally spread the 
official view of the conflict: speakers in favour of self-determination or 
against Moroccan authority over the region are virtually never put on air; 
some criticism over the details of the Autonomy Plan it’s occasionally 
admitted, but not its rejection; coverage of pro-independence rallies and 
disturbances as well as allegations of abuses committed by the authorities 
against Sahrawi activists is very limited. There are only a few of the 
privately-owned dailies and weeklies which give space to the views of the 
Saharawis advocating for the region’s independence or for a referendum 
upon independence. There’ s also a state-run regional television channel, 
TV Laâyoune, launched in 2004, who has won a pretty large Saharawi 
public because of its Sahrawi cultural programming and coverage of local 
news, but which nonetheless face sharps limits when dealing with larger 
political questions. 
                                                                 
52 As seen in more details in par. 3.2.1 
53 The FMVJ is a small organization aiming at investigating on circumstances of human rights 
violations; help the victims of such violations to obtain moral and material compensation; support 
judicial and institutional reforms toward better human rights protection. 
54 Among the most prominent recent cases: the expulsion of a French NGO Human Rights Delegation 
in April 2008, the block of an ad-hoc fact-finding mission by the European Parliament in late 2005 
(decided after sustained disturbances erupted in the region). 
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Another point of serious concern is the situation of human rights in the 
Tindouf Refugee camps, located in a desert region of Algeria near the border 
with Morocco and administered by the POLISARIO front, with Algeria’s 
cooperation. Established over thirty years ago by refugees who fled Moroccan 
forces advancing through Western Sahara, these camps host now 
approximately 125,000 residents, still living in tents or modest huts without 
running water and heavily dependent on international humanitarian aid. 
Despite the POLISARIO’s professions of openness to monitoring, the 
apparent easing of repression in recent years and the presence of many foreign 
humanitarian organizations, the human rights conditions of the refugees 
remain vulnerable due to the camps’ isolation, the lack of regular on-the-
ground monitoring and the legal limbo in which the camp exist. Indeed, the 
host country, Algeria, which is accountable under international law for 
protecting the rights of all persons within its territory, has ceded de facto 
administration of the camps to the POLISARIO - a liberation movement not 
formally internationally accountable for its human rights practices - which 
administers the camps on every aspect, by operating courts, prisons, an internal 
police force and controls on the camp’s borders. Algeria has effectively 
abdicated responsibility for human rights violations committed on its own 
territory, which is a situation unacceptable under international law. 
Major human rights violations occurring in the camps are:55  
? Restrictions to the freedom of speech. Saharawi refugees in the camps 
enjoy substantial freedom in criticizing POLISARIO leadership over 
aspects of its day-to-day management of the camps, while sharp 
censorship exists over political speech and over any questioning of its 
continued leadership and positions over fundamental issues. The camps 
have no dissidents, demonstrations, media or organizations of any real 
significance that openly challenge the legitimacy of the POLISARIO in  
embodying the national cause, or that advocate in favour of Morocco’s 
Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara. As the POLISARIO holds complete 
control over allocating resources and jobs in the camps, it’s easy for it to 
impose operating difficulties on dissident individual/organization, most 
often with no need of any formal prohibition or direct repression.56   
                                                                 
55 Human Rights Watch (2008) “Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps” 
56 Indeed, s small independent newspaper and a dissident faction of the POLISARIO do exist but with 
very little impact on public life; the only one human rights NGO operating in the camps, the 
Association for the Families of Saharawi Prisoners and the Disappeared (AFAPREDESA), does not 
monitor violations inside the camps but rather advocates for Sahrawi victims of abuses committed by 
Morocco. 
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? Restrictions to the freedom of movement. Evidence of formal or actual 
restrictions on refugees’ movements in/out the camps is almost inexistent. 
Though, a sort of a fear regime surrounds these movements: as those 
quitting the camps to live in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara are 
portrayed as sell-outs or worse, they often keep their destination secret, 
fearing the Front might prevent them from traveling and usually leave 
without belongings and relatives. 
? Allegations of Slavery. Although the POLISARIO openly and firmly 
oppose slavery, evidence of residual slavery practices affecting some black 
residents of the camps – which are a minority -  have been variously and 
extensively reported. Such residuals concern one practice in particular: the 
refusal by some local personal-status judges (qadi’s) to perform the act of 
marriage for black women informally designated as “slaves” unless their 
“owners” give their consent (a practice which still persists in Mali and 
Mauritania indeed).  
A serious grey area regarding the situation in Western Sahara is the extent 
of the mandate of the United Nations’ peacekeeping force for Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), which is not entitled to monitor human rights, although the 
Resolution 1979 creating the mission explicitly called for the development and 
implementation of “credible measures to ensure full respect for human 
rights”.57 Further, though the 2011 United Nations Security Council resolution 
renewing MINURSO’s mandate contained human rights language more 
explicit than in previous years, it still failed to enlarge it to include human 
rights monitoring - an enlargement which is indeed supported by the 
POLISARIO but opposed by Morocco.58    
Overall, human rights violations on Saharawi activists continue to occur on 
a pretty regular basis. Among the most prominent recent cases: 
? On 14 April 2011 three non-violent pro-independence Saharawi activists - 
Ali Salem Tamek, Brahim Dahane, and Ahmed Naciri – were 
provisionally released after 18 months of pre-trial detention. They had 
been arrested - together with four other activists - in October 2009 upon 
their return from a visit to the Tindouf refugee camps, on charges of 
“harming Morocco’s internal security. The trial of the seven started in 
October 2010, was postponed repeatedly and it’s still opened.59 
                                                                 
57 Remarkably, MINURSO is the only peacekeeping operation created since 1990 that has no human 
rights monitoring component. 
58 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
59 Human Rights Watch (2012) “World Report 2012 – Morocco and Western Sahara” 
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? Twenty-three Saharawi civilians remained in pre-trial detention at Salé 
Prison waiting for a trial before a military court, for their alleged 
involvement in the clashes occurred in November 2010 at the Gdim Izik 
protest camp near El-Ayoune, which caused casualties on both security 
forces and civilians. Another 120 Saharawis were bailed and faced less 
serious charges before a civilian court for their role in the clashes. One 
year after they occurred, no trials had begun.60 
 
 
Tab. 3.1    International Conventions ratified by Morocco 
Name  Date of Ratification/Signature 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 
May 3, 1979 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
May 3, 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
June 21, 1993 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
December 18, 1970 
Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) 
June 21, 1993 
Convention on the Rights of the Child June 21, 1993 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families 
June 21, 1993 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
April 8, 2009 
Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
February 6, 2007 (signed) 
Source: USAID, Morocco Rule of Law Assessment 2010 
 
                                                                 
60 In early October 2010, several thousand Saharawi residents of El-Ayoun erected a tent camp outside 
the city (in Gdim Izik) to dramatize a list of economic grievances. After a short attempt to negotiate 
with camp leaders, on 8 November authorities dismantled the camp by force, encountering some 
violent resistance which ended up with a balance of 13 deaths, including 11 members of the security 
forces. So far, no impartial and independent investigation has been undertaken upon those events. 
[Human Rights Watch (2011) “World Report 2011 – Morocco and Western Sahara”; Amnesty International 
(2012) “Annual Report 2012– Morocco / Western Sahara.]    
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3.5. Morocco’s Civil Society 
 
If compared to other countries in the Maghreb region - let alone the Arab 
world at large - Morocco stands out as having a well-developed and relatively 
free civil society, consisting of a significant and diverse network of 
organisations; according to some estimates, more than 30,000 legally declared 
associations are active in the country.61  
Most of them flourished during the last 20 years as a consequence of the 
1990s political opening, which allowed the associative domain to enshrine a 
new dimension of internationalisation, diversification and professionalism, and 
especially set up a legal framework much more favourable to the development 
of civil society than in the past. Indeed, in 1979 Morocco ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)62, freedom of 
association become a constitutional right and in 2002 a new legislation was 
adopted to facilitate the use of foreign funding by Moroccan organizations. 
This associative boom has been characterized by some key features, namely: 
the diversification of the associations’ domains of action and their exceptionally 
increased role in social services’ delivering and community development; the 
emergence of a more pluralistic culture, where the positions of such new actors 
are less determined by partisan loyalties than by ideas and strategies, finally 
favouring the direct engagement of the citizens; the emergence of the feminist 
movement. 
These evolutions favoured the emergence of formal and durable coalitions 
as well as ad-hoc and cause-related ones. Face to such a remarkable flourishing 
of associations, the State has not remained neutral and its attitude towards 
them has notably varied in the last two decades: before the 1990s, it tended to 
tolerate the work of the associations, especially those active at the local and 
rural level, though closely monitoring them (as the rural world was 
traditionally the Makhzen’ domain); starting in the 1990s, it begun to 
progressively adopt a more liberal attitude, favouring in particular the 
development of those associations providing social services, which could thus 
fulfil those activities where the state happened to have manifest gaps.  
Most recently, the State has re-assumed a certain supervisory attitude over 
the associative movement, by developing a strategy of control operating 
through different means: (a) co-optation of the movement’s cadres and their 
                                                                 
61 Kausch K. (2008) 
62 United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by Resolution 
2200A-XXI of the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966, ratified by Morocco on 3 May 1979. 
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promotion to the higher levels of the public apparatus, as a response to the 
State’s search for new, younger and more credible elites, as well as a way to 
divert them from engaging in political action; (b) incentives to create new 
NGOs completely committed and loyal to the State; (c) tight control over the 
associations’ assets, limiting their resources to the strictly necessary, mainly in 
order to confine them to socio-educative functions and prevent any aspiration 
to enlarge their scope to the political and economic realms; indeed, as a 
corollary of this, the partnerships between associations and ministerial 
departments tend to be fairly unbalanced, in so far as these latter tend to adopt 
an instrumental approach towards the associations, perceived as mere 
implementers of their policies and programmes rather than real partners.63 
Indeed, such a booming proliferation of associations and NGOs strongly 
supported by the state, has been variously interpreted: while many observers 
have expressed admiration for the vibrancy of Morocco’s civil society, many 
others have been claiming that the sharp increase in the number of associations 
in the country has been part of a conscious state strategy, aimed at establishing 
bridges with different social sectors, at side-lining the political parties,  and at 
promoting internationally an image of a democratizing country.64  
So said, a rough and non-exhaustive overview of the wide Moroccan civil 
society landscape can be offered below, by grouping these organizations in: (a) 
Professional Associations (Business Associations and Trade Unions); and (b) 
Non-Governmental Organizations. 
a) Business Associations and Trade Unions  
In Morocco there have never been institutionalized practices of 
participation promoting the associative movement of employees and formally 
involving it into the decision making process on a regular basis. Even now, 
associational life is actually sporadically involved in decision making and its 
power of influence largely depends on its lobbying capacity instead than on 
institutionalized mechanisms of consultations and demands’ inclusiveness. 
As concerns the business associations, Moroccan entrepreneurs only 
emerged on the public sphere as key economic actors and autonomous interest 
groups since the 1990s, fostered by the liberalization and privatization 
processes. Previously, they had no social recognition and were instead 
commonly viewed as rent seekers. The main Moroccan business association is 
the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (Confédération Générale des 
Entreprises du Maroc, CGEM), which, having started a process of image-lifting 
                                                                 
63 Naciri R. (2004) 
64 Korany B. (1995) 
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and capacity-building process in the late 1980s, finally gained its status of 
autonomous interest group independent from the state with the signing of an 
agreement with the Interior Ministry in 1996, which formally gave it 
recognition as a social actor, entitled to participate to the re-formulation of the 
political pact. Institutionally, its legitimacy ad representativeness is built on its 
intermediation and negotiation competences. Its mechanisms of influence are 
more the lobbies/interest groups’ pressure tools than the parliamentary classic 
channels. The CGEM plays a strong role in Moroccan political decision making 
process: it interfere in social negotiations; it regularly offers expertise and 
technical advice to the government and the parliament on the elaboration of 
policies and laws pertaining the social domain; it engages in discussions with 
European Union and work closely with it on the identification of projects. 
Nonetheless, all these relations still lack an adequate structural framework, 
which is why the CGEM is keeping proposing a group of permanent liaison 
with the Parliament in order to organize these relations on a permanent, 
institutional and regular basis.65 
As regards instead the Trade Unions, Morocco has an old syndicalist 
tradition dating back to the period of the protectorate, with the first union 
group being created in 1956. At present, Moroccan Trade Unions can be 
divided in two categories: (1) A category related to the central authority, strictly 
unionist and limited to professional concerns with no claims to interfere in the 
political realm. It essentially consists of the Moroccan Work Union (Union 
Marocain du Travail, UMT), the oldest and most important Moroccan unionist 
group, created in 1956 and closely linked to the UNFP during the 1960s; it has 
both strong following among wage-earners and strong financial means; it 
practices lobbying and gets to be heard by managers. (2) A category of unions 
created by political parties. It basically consists of the General Union of 
Moroccan Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains, UGTM), linked to 
the Istiqlal Party, and the Democratic Confederation of Labour (Confédération 
Démocratique du Travail, CDT), formerly linked to the USFP. 
All these workers’ unions are particularly active at the parliamentary level - 
with strong representations in the Upper Chamber - and do take part in major 
economic and social debates. Thought, beside a strong power in the negotiation 
of labour relations, they have weak legislative power on the whole, and only 
contribute marginally and often indirectly to the elaboration of laws. Indeed, 
unlike the CGEM - which carries out studies and investigations and often 
intervenes in the political and electoral debates through economic policy’s 
proposals - the workers’ unions often limit themselves to demand or denounce, 
                                                                 
65 Ben Ali D. (2005); Cherkaoui M. and Ben Ali D. (2007) 
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often only on a principles-driven strand, with a pressure strength mainly 
exerted through blockage powers and a domain of action limited to the social 
realm.66 Such a limited scope may presumably be explained by two key 
shortcomings inner to the trade unions’ movement: (a) the deficit in expertise 
and competence, as the sporadic presence of university professors and 
journalists in their ranks does not suffice to overcome the lack of a permanent 
structure able to regularly provide juridical/economic advice and information; 
(b) the lack of an information system of their own, as they have no databases 
and virtually no studies or investigations, thus gathering most part of their 
information from outside (i.e. reports/studies from international organisms or 
specialized press).67 
b) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Besides the above-mentioned process of empowerment/autonomy-gaining 
of the professional associations, the most remarkable feature of the civil society 
renaissance experienced in Morocco since the 1990s is the flourishing of a huge 
landscape of major and minor non-governmental organizations, most of them 
engaged in the cause of human rights protection. 
As will be shown later in the chapter, government's attitude toward 
domestic and international human rights organizations operating in the 
country varies depending on the sensitivity of the issues, but is generally 
cooperative. The main domestic and independent human rights NGOs that the 
government recognizes – and also subsidizes - include the Moroccan 
Association of Human Rights (Association Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme, 
AMDH) operating since 1979 and currently counting around 10,000 members, 
and the Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights (Organisation Marocaine pour 
les Droits Humaines, OMDH), founded in 1988 and initially banned as 
extremist.68 The government cooperates on a pretty regular basis with both the 
AMDH and the OMDH, responding to their inquiries and recommendations. 
The AMDH in particular usually provides information, on an informal basis, to 
the government as well as to government-affiliated organizations. 
                                                                 
66 For instances, they exerted a certain power in slowing the rhythm of the 1990s privatization process, 
in blocking for many years the adoption of a controversial new work code, and in renegotiate in a 
significant way the remunerations of public sector workers inspite of inflation and budgetary 
constraints. (Ben Ali, 2005) 
67 Ben Ali D. (2005) 
68 The Moroccan League for the Defence of Human Rights (Ligue Marocaine pour la Défense des Droits de 
l’Hommes, LMDH) - which was part of the Istiqlal party - was also among the main ones, but it’s no 
longer active.   
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Among the numerous other local groups with which the government 
regularly or occasionally cooperates, the most consolidated relationship are 
with the Forum for Truth and Justice (Forum Marocain pour la Vérité et la Justice, 
FMVJ), the Moroccan Prisons Observatory (Observatoire Marocain des Prisons, 
OMP), and Transparency Maroc.  
Major international NGOs also often engage in cooperation projects with 
the Moroccan government/authorities and carry out regular investigations in 
the country, either through their local branches or through ad hoc missions; 
among them, the most active are Transparency International (through its local 
chapter based in Casablanca), Amnesty International (though its local branch 
based in Rabat) and Human Right Watch. 69 
                                                                 
69 US Department of State “2010 Human Rights Practices – Morocco Country Report” 
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4. Socio-economic Development and Economic 
Reforms  
 
4.1. Social and Human Development: an Overview 
 
The first nationally representative Living Standard Measurement Survey 
(LSMS) in Morocco was conducted in 1990-91, followed by a second one in 
1998-99 and the most recent one in 2007. Following is an overview of the main 
results emerging from these surveys, mostly relying on the analyses that the 
World Bank and UNDP carried out drawing on these sources. 
 
4.1.1. Poverty and Human Development in the 1990s 1  
During the 1990s decade the country experienced a sharp increase in 
poverty and a certain stability in inequality, though coupled with a general 
improvement in the main social indicators – which nonetheless kept lagging 
behind comparable levels countries both in regional terms (MENA region) and 
in income terms (middle-income countries). 
Overall, the incidence of poverty (the total number of those below the 
poverty line) increased from 13.1% in 1990 to 19% in 1998 (from 3.4 million to 
5.4 million persons) and the number of economic “vulnerable” people 
increased from 35% to 44% (from 9 to 12 million. This increasing trend was also 
reported in other standard poverty measures, highlighting that poverty 
increased also in depth (the poor got poorer) and severity (the distribution of 
welfare among the poor become more unequal). Despite the increase in 
poverty, the profile of poor remained relatively constant: 
? Poverty largely remained a rural phenomenon, with 66% of the poor 
living in rural areas, and almost one Moroccan out of four being poor in 
rural areas, compared to one out of ten in urban areas. 
? Both in rural and urban areas greater poverty remained associated with 
larger household size and larger number of children and with low level of 
education (64.3% of the poor have no education and 17.5% have only 
primary education). 
                                                                 
1 This sub-paragraph draws on the World Bank (2001) “Kingdom of Morocco - Poverty Update.Vol. I: Main 
Report”. Where not differently specified, data and figures refer to 1999, the LSMS’s year. 
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? The problem of the “working poor” remained striking: employment kept 
failing to protect from poverty, with 80% of the poor at the national level 
being employed, 6% unemployed and 14% inactive; unemployment 
remained higher among the urban poor (31.5%, compared to a national 
level of 25.7).2   
? Geographically, poverty increased in all regions, with the exception of the 
oriental one; the poverty rate remained highest in the Center-south (29%), 
Center-north (28%), and North-west (24%) regions, accounting together 
for almost 40% of the total poor.  
As concerns inequality, the 1990 decade showed an equal pattern of almost 
stability on a high level in both urban and rural areas, although the former 
slightly more unequal than the latter. The Gini coefficient indeed stagnated 
around a pretty high 39%; both at the beginning and at the end of the decade 
the richest 50% of the population makes almost 75% of the total expenditure, 
while the top 10% accounts for more than 30% of the total expenditure on 
consumption. Overall, this testifies of a highly static society, where lack of 
mobility adds to unequal living conditions.  
As concerns social development, the increase in the Government social 
expenditures (from 8.4% of GDP to 12.5% between 1990 and 1998) resulted in a 
clear improvement of most social indicators: adult illiteracy, primary enrolment 
rates, death rates, life expectancy, access to electricity and piped water, all 
recorded significant progresses. Though, despite such improvements, two great 
issues of concern remained still: a) aggregate figures kept masking wide gender 
disparities as well as wide urban/rural imbalances; b) although the percentage 
discrepancy with the same indicators of other comparable countries decreased, 
it still stayed very large and the pace of improvement should have been 
accelerated further. 3 
Essentially, most of the poverty increase recorded in Morocco during the 
1990s was due to the poor performance of the economy, and in particular was 
linked with the following major socio-economic changes: a) a decline in 
manufacturing exports; b) an increase in the urban unemployment rate due to 
an increasing urbanization coupled with a declining labour demand growth; c) 
                                                                 
2 The distribution of the poor by sectorial activity showed that at the national level most of the poor 
worked in the agriculture sector (56.6%), followed by services (25.5%) and construction (12.6%); 
further, urban poor household heads are most likely to be either wage earners in the private sector or 
self-employed, as opposed to the rural poor ones who were mainly self-employed. 
3 Though the Human Development Index (HDI) in Morocco increased from 0.54 in 1990 to 0.58 in 
1997, this level was still the lowest among the other MENA; also the Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI) confirmed Morocco lagging well behind all other comparable countries. 
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unfavourable climatic conditions, coupled with bad agricultural policies and 
unfavourable price changes, which contributed to risen rural poverty; d) a 
decline in international worker remittances (which dropped from about 11% of 
total private consumption in 1991 to 8.4 % in 1998); e) an increase in public 
expenditures in consumer food subsidies which resulted to be poorly targeted 
to the poor;  f) low levels of public spending in social sectors, which – though  
increased during the 1990s – still but remains insufficient and well below those 
of other countries in the region and at the same level of income.4 
 
4.1.2. Poverty and Human Development in the 2000s  5  
After the largely lost decade of the 1990s, Morocco achieved unprecedented 
rates of poverty reduction during the 2000s, most likely as a result of the 
increased interest given to social issues and poverty alleviation since 
Mohammed VI accession to the throne. 
The overall poverty ratio decreased from 15.3% to roughly 9%, with a much 
more marked fall in in rural areas (- 10.6%) than in urban areas (- 2.8%) Part of 
this evolution is explained by the effect of sustained growth on unemployment, 
which reached its 30 year low of 9.6% in 2008.  
Despite the huge decline in absolute poverty, economic vulnerability 
remained widespread, with 17.5% of the population showing consumption 
levels just above the poverty line. Together, the poor and the near poor (the 
vulnerable) account for 26.5% of the population, meaning that 8 million of 
Moroccans keep living in poverty or under constant threat of poverty.6  
Though, such remarkable achievements in poverty reduction were not 
accompanied by a similar trend in inequality: the partial closure of the rural-
urban gap did not cancelled entrenched disparities, with rural poverty still 
accounting for 70% of overall poverty, and a rural poverty rate of 14.5%, 
compared to a 4.8% for urban areas; disparities among regions remained 
                                                                 
4 Social spending rose from 35% to 43% of total public expenditures, and from 9.1% to 12.5% of GDP 
between 1991 and 1998, while other countries in the region and at the same level of income spend on 
average close to 20% of GDP on social programmes. 
5 This sub-paragraph draws on the World Bank (2009) “Morocco - Country Partnership Strategy for the 
Period 2010-2013.Vol.1”. Where not diversely specified, data and figures refer to 2007, the LSMS’s year. 
6 The importance of looking at near poverty in addition to absolute poverty results mainly from two 
factors: a) Poverty in Morocco is measured by using a frugal poverty basket, with a poverty line well 
below that used by other middle-income countries which thus pick up only the very poor; b) This 
period was preceded by a decade of increasing poverty which saw many near poor being pushed into 
poverty; with the 2000s resumed growth these transient poor moved back to near poverty indeed, but 
core chronic poverty remained unchanged. 
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substantial, though practically all regions contains pockets of severe poverty in 
slum areas or villages; the stunning increase in income inequality in both urban 
and rural areas reveals that growth for the poor was slower than the average 
growth, and still below the levels needed to cut poverty by half in 20 years.  
Although the overall decrease in unemployment rates has indeed 
contributed to reduce poverty levels, employment still fails to guarantee 
protection from poverty: with an absolute majority of the poor being employed, 
that of the “working poor” remains a substantial problem. It mostly concerns 
the informal sector - and primarily agriculture (employing 70% of total labour 
force), characterized by low pay, job tenure’s insecurity and lack of safety 
standards.7 On the contrary, the formal – and especially the public – sector 
offers good safety nets and significant wage premiums (but the poor, 
predominantly with no or only basic education, cannot compete for such jobs). 
Access to education has improved at all levels, but this was not 
accompanied by equivalent progress in the returns to education and serious 
disparities persist in the progression through the system. Indeed, the national 
net enrolment rate increased from 52.4% in 1991 to 93.5% in 2007 for primary 
school, from 17.5% to 43.4% 2007 for middle school, and from 6.1% to 17.5% in 
2007 for upper secondary school. This increased enrolment in compulsory 
education made pressures on higher education, leading to a 25% increase in 
student enrolment between 1993 and 2006. Remarkable progresses were also 
achieved in reducing the gender gap in access to education for children: the 
gender parity index in primary education between urban boys and rural girls 
aged 6-1 1 has narrowed from 1.5 to 1 over the decade. Though, despite the 
achievement of an almost universal access to primary education, major 
problems still persist as regards the completion rates: only 71% of children 
aged 6-11 complete primary schools; the illiteracy rate of the 15-24 cohort 
remains at a high 24% - with strong repercussions on labour productivity; 
illiteracy rate for woman remains at a high 52.7% at the national level, reaching 
a stunning 72.2% in rural areas. Lastly, major problems still persist in the 
quality of education: despite high expenditure per pupil, grades of Moroccan 
students in the TIMSS 2003 survey are low compared to the MENA region and 
other participating countries. 
Despite a general expansion of services, the poor benefited only slightly by 
such improvements, due to a series of financial, social, and geographic barriers 
which prevent them from regular access to quality services in sectors such as 
                                                                 
7 Almost 70% of Morocco's poor are employed in just two sectors - agriculture and construction - 
which are characterized by informality. 
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education, maternal health, and housing. Besides, in the absence of effective 
safety nets, large out-of-pocket payments for services further constrain the 
budgets of the poor. 
Of particular concern remains the situation of the health indicators, which 
despite a general improvement, still keep showing important gaps.  The health 
financing and management systems especially suffer from a deterioration of 
physical infrastructure due to a lack of appropriate maintenance and form 
acute personnel constraints at both medical and management levels, which 
makes it failing to meet the needs of the majority of the population.8 
Progress in housing and infrastructure is also uneven: despite impressive 
spending on a slum-upgrading program, around 4 million people (or 780,000 
households) still live in substandard or inappropriate housing; despite massive 
investments in the water supply leading to improved access to safe water on a 
national scale, rural areas still experience serious lack of potable water.  
Though uneven and mixed, Morocco’s success in reducing poverty during 
the decade is undeniable, with an overall positive balance of the poverty trend. 
If most of the merit can be obviously be credited to the overall positive 
economic growth and to the increased government social spending, also other 
factors are likely to have played a key role, namely: (a) demographic transition: 
the rapid decrease in the number of children per woman experienced over the 
past decades (dropped from an average of 5.4 children/woman in 1980-1985 to 
2.4 in 2005-2010) has reduced the pressure on household budget as well as on 
public investments and labour markets, freeing resources for other important 
uses such as investments in basic infrastructures; (b) fiscal resources: thanks to 
overall good public deficit situation, Morocco has a broad fiscal space and 
ability to invest in public projects; (c) credit extensions and microcredit 
associations: the government strong support to the private sector through 
credit allocations, as well as the widespread engagement of microcredit 
associations,  largely contributed to lifting the liquidity constraints on small 
and medium sized firms as well as on poor households;9 (d) increased 
remittances from Moroccans living abroad, which constituted a bulk support 
for households; (e) increased role of NGOs, both domestic and international , 
often in partnership with state and local governments, and in particular after 
the 2002 law which to allowed domestic NGOs to receive foreign funds.10 
                                                                 
8 Maternal mortality stands at 227/100,000 (or 45 times Europe’s average); infant mortality rates 
(40/1,000 in 2004) remain intolerably high. 
9 In 2009 Morocco allocated 80% of its total credit to the private sector, and it receives on average 59% 
of total microcredit loans granted in the MENA region. 
10 Achy L. (2010) 
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4.2. Key Phases and Trends of Socio-economic Development 
 
4.2.1. Four phases of Socio-economic Development 
As regards socio-economic development since Morocco’s independence, 
four important phases may be distinguished, which are significant for the 
periodization of social policies in Morocco.11 
a) The first phase (1956 – 1970)  
The first phase followed independence and was characterized by nation-
state building within an authoritarian regime. 
As was the case for most of MENA countries after independence, in 
Morocco as well the new state aimed at creating a wide social base of support 
for the new regime, therefore trying to consolidate its legitimacy especially 
among the popular classes in rural and urban areas. The adoption of Morocco’s 
initial social policy was thus lead by practical concerns (i.e. nation-building, 
state formation and consolidation, regime legitimation) rather than citizen 
rights considerations, and constituted a crucial part of the country’s post-
independence development project.  
Thought embracing very early a free-market neo-liberal economic ideology, 
Morocco opted for a strong state-led approach to distributional and social 
policies in order to reduce the devastating impact of colonization: the 
government set up specific allocations to the Ministries of Health, Education 
and National Aid to undertake relevant social actions, while leaving little scope 
for private sector in these fields. However, although promoting free and 
generalized access to education and health structures, the provision of social 
services in the first post-independence period resulted highly insufficient and 
poor in quality. 
b) The second phase (1971 – 1982)  
The second phase was characterized by the re-launching of parliamentary 
politics after two abortive military coups and a period of social and popular 
unrest. Facing this situation, the ruling elite adopted a populist model of 
distributive social policies to consolidate social welfare and support popular 
classes, in particular the urban ones. Legislation on industrial relations and 
social security based on French patterns was passed, in addition to free 
education and healthcare. Also, following repeated droughts, the state 
intervened directly in the agricultural sector by introducing a system of 
                                                                 
11 Ennaji M. (2006) 
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support policies for the main agricultural crops (e.g. provision of irrigation 
services and other rural infrastructures) along with the exemption of the sector 
from taxation, a wide food subsidies’ scheme and the redistribution of 400,000 
hectares of land. 
Such a populist model of development based on state authoritarianism and 
high public spending was mainly possible thanks to the boom of the phosphate 
prices in 1974-1976 which provided the state with the resources it needed to 
implement it, but as soon as the economic bonanza started to reverse, its 
unsustainability become evident: by the early 1980s, faced with problems of 
financial capacity and weak economic performance – further worsened by the 
cost of the Western Sahara campaign – the government had to revise its 
economic and social policy and turn to the IMF and the WB for implementing 
an austerity program of economic adjustment.  
c) The third phase (1982 – 1987)  
The third phase was a period of economic recession which saw the 
implementation of drastic measures of economic liberalization, privatization 
and social policy’s marginalization.  
In the early 1980s indeed, Morocco had to face a severe economic recession 
complemented by devastating public finances. Hence, following the 
recommendation of the IMF and the WB, in 1982 Morocco adopted a Structural 
Adjustment Plan which introduced a wide range of neo-liberal economic 
measures such as severe cuts in public spending12, a vast privatization 
program, a gradual retreat of the state from social welfare and a general 
expansion of the private sector, together with the passing of a new legislation 
fostering national and foreign investments.13 
Such these budgetary cuts and restrictions led to the erosion of social 
services and welfare spending, particularly hitting education, health and social 
benefits, resulting in social tensions which finally culminated in a series of bred 
riots and mass protests in 1982, 1984 and in 1990.   
                                                                 
12 Actually, the two institutions were both calling for fiscal consolidation, but disagreed on the means 
to achieve it: while the WB feared that too much austerity could jeopardise its own sectoral efforts, the 
IMF was more concentrated on macroeconomic stabilisation and insisted on more expenditure 
reduction. (Harrigan J. and El-Said H. 2009) 
13 The expansion of the private sector was particularly encouraged in matters of health and education: 
the 1990s saw the creation of many private schools and institutions - among which the first private 
Anglophone university, the Al Akhawayn University at Ifrane – and the setting up of many 
sophisticated private medical centres and clinics.  
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Truly, despite these neo-liberal measures, free healthcare, free education 
and subsidies to housing and food products did not disappear, but started to 
show a deteriorating trend in quality. Moreover, King Hassan II always 
maintained a high profile as the implicit guarantor of social welfare and 
provider of services to the poor: whenever social tension arose over economic 
decisions - such as the over-mentioned subsidy reductions and following bred 
riots – he promptly stepped in with public announcements to reverse the 
policies and appease the population.    
d) The fourth phase (1998 – present)  
The fourth phase saw a changing political climate with the first alternance 
government led by the USFP in 1997 and the accession to the throne of the new 
King Mohammed VI. During this phase, economic liberalization continued, 
along with new measures to encourage privatization. However, a renewed 
interest in state-driven social policy took place in this phase, with the 
elaboration of a more comprehensive social development strategy.  
Social development become the government’s top priority: a Home 
Secretary for National Aid (Secrétariat d’Etat Chargé de l’Entraide Nationale) was 
created in order to guarantee rigour ad consistency to this approach,  the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (Ministère des Affaires Sociales) was renamed Ministry 
of Social Development (Ministère du Développement Social), the government’s 
budget allocated for social development increased – gradually passing from 
41% of the general state budget in 1997-1998 to 47% in 2000 to 50% in 2010. 
 
4.2.2. Key Recent Economic Reforms and Performance14 
Overall, Morocco’s economic performance during the past decade offered a 
picture of significant general improvement, with sustained high GDP growth, 
falling unemployment, rising investment and low inflation. Over the period 
2000-2008 GDP growth averaged 5.1% (almost twice the previous decade’s 
average); per capita GDP almost doubled to reach US$2,800; the growth pattern 
became less volatile and in particular less dependent on agriculture (a sector 
which still counts for a large 13% of GDP); unemployment declined from 14% 
to 9.6%; investment increased sharply from around 25% to 36% of GDP; 
inflation remained limited at about 2.5% on average; integration in the global 
economy improved, though the share of trade on GDP keeps being low (76%). 
Since 2005, the country embarked on a path of sound macroeconomic 
policies and public finances consolidation by endorsing rigorous fiscal policies 
                                                                 
14 World Bank (2010; 2009) 
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(which led to budget surpluses of around 0.3% of GDP in 2007 and 2008), a 
prudent debt strategy (central government debt declined from 62%of GDP in 
2005 to 47.3% of GDP in 2008), a restrictive monetary policy aimed at 
maintaining low and stable inflation, and enhanced financial sector 
supervision. Overall, these efforts led to a stable macroeconomic situation, 
stronger public finances, and a sound financial sector. 
Along with macroeconomic and fiscal consolidation, enhancing 
competitiveness has ranged among the top priorities of Morocco’s government: 
indeed, specific sector strategies to boost investment and productivity have 
been designed and implemented in most dynamic sectors with high growth 
potential, also involving private sector participation. Gross investment, which 
averaged 25% of GDP during the 1990s, increased rapidly in the 2000s to reach 
an outstanding 36.3% of GDP in 2008. Most of the investment was due to the 
private sector and state owned enterprises (61%), followed by households 
(28%) and public administration (11%), and was reinforced by a strong increase 
in Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) (8% over the period 2005-2010). Most of 
the FDIs were channelled to five sectors: telecommunications (22%), new 
industry sectors (20.9%), tourism (17.8%), real estate (16.5%) and banking 
(5.9%) - all sectors which actually showed high growth rates over 2001-2008. 
As a result of the reforms carried out in the 2000s, Moroccan economic 
structure has undergone outstanding positive changes, among which: the share 
of the primary sector shrunk by 3.5% points of GDP to reach an average of 
15.7% over the period 2001-2008 (a figure which is high compared to leading 
transition economies, but whose downward trend is encouraging), which 
helped GDP growth to become more resilient to the uncertainties of the 
agricultural sector; the weight of the services sector increased by 4.3% points, 
averaging 56.1% of GDP, mostly driven by the dynamic telecommunication 
sector and other services provided to businesses and households; though, the 
manufacturing sector experienced a contraction, seeing its share on GDP 
declining from an average 18.8% in the 1990s to an average 16.5% in the 2000s.  
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4.3. Current Government Development Policies  
 
Since the start of the decade, the magnitude of the social and economic 
challenges that Morocco has being going through has pushed the government 
to take a strong stand on development issues. Indeed, after having led over the 
past few years a number of diagnostic analyses and studies with the 
participation and support of civil society, academia and think tanks15, it finally 
come out with a renewed national development vision, which underpins a 
process of interconnected strategic reforms in several spheres: a) international: 
focus on increasing integration in regional, European, and global markets, and 
in particular strengthening strategic partnership with the EU (to be analysed in 
chap. 5); b) political: focus on respect for human rights, fight against 
corruption, consolidation of electoral democracy and acceleration of the 
decentralization agenda (as analysed in chap. 3); c) economical: focus on 
achieving employment-creating growth through economic opening and 
liberalization, fostering support to private sector development and foreign 
direct investment, major infrastructure works and selective sector priorities; d) 
social: focus on enhancing the education sector’s performance, reducing the 
incidence of poverty as well as the rural-urban gap, and improve women 
conditions.16 
 
4.3.1. The Current Government Development Programme  
In 2007, the government launched a comprehensive Social and Economic 
Development Program for the period 2008-2012 which framed the main 
directions for reforms, centred around three key objectives: 17 
a) Improve social outcomes, focusing on education, health, and better social 
protection (namely substituting ineffective subsidies with targeted safety 
nets mechanisms). 
b) Enhance growth, export potential and investment in the country by 
focusing on key productive sectors (industry, agriculture and fisheries), 
infrastructure sectors (energy, transport, water) and transversal strategies 
(exports, ICT, business environment).  
                                                                 
15 Among the most important of such analyses: the 2006 UNDP’s Report “50 years of Human 
Development and Perspectives to 2025”; the 2008 Report of the Superior Council of Education; the 2009 
Report of the Royal Institute of Strategic Studies (IRES); and the “Scenarii 2030” exercise led by the 
High Planning Commission (HCP).  
16 World Bank (2009) 
17 World Bank (2009) 
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c) Implement all sectors cross-cutting reforms such as improving 
governance, reforming public administration and justice sector, and 
deepening decentralization and de-concentration.  
As a first step, key ministries produced new sector strategies grounded on 
above-mentioned diagnostics, formulating short and medium-terms action 
plans, supported by newly created agencies to implement them, or by new 
inter-ministerial structures to coordinate transversal issues. As a key 
component of the overall program, substantial increases in budget allocations 
for the selected sectors were settled, within a multi-year framework. Beyond 
the elaboration of sector strategies, the government gave a strong push to cross-
cutting reforms for improving local government autonomy, social safety nets, 
public administration performance and governance.  
The overall national program can thus be broken down according to the key 
sector/areas strategies and key cross-cutting reforms and be outlined in the 
following points: 
a) Social Sector: Social Protection 18 
The social protection system is probably the one in most urgent need of 
deep and comprehensive reform, both as concern the social insurance system 
and the social assistance programs. 
The social insurance system in Morocco protects wage earners (and their 
dependents) in the formal economy and includes: family allowances; limited 
health insurance; and old age, survivors and disability insurance.   
Family allowances provide wage supplements to families with children, 
and are financed through a social insurance system by employees’ payroll 
taxation; though, they result to be unfair due to their coverage limited to public 
and formal private sector and targeted to middle-income urban wage earners: 
the lowest quintiles result excluded by these allowances, so that Morocco 
happens to lack any kind of cash transfer scheme for providing income support 
to poor families with children. 
The pension system is fragmented among several funds, with the four 
major ones covering about 97% of contributors.19 The system appear highly 
ineffective as the high fragmentation into different schemes negatively affects 
                                                                 
18 Wolrd Bank (2001) 
19 The four main schemes are: the CNSS (Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale) for private sector 
employees; the CMR (Caisse Marocaine de Retraite) for civil servants; the CIMR (Caisse Inter-
professionnelle Marocaine de Retraites) as a voluntary supplement to the CNSS; and the RCAR (Regime 
Collectif d'Allocation de Retraite) for temporary workers in the public sector. 
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labour mobility and increases administrative costs; its financial sustainability, 
even though in no immediate danger of collapsing, is actually at risk, with 
some of the schemes (i.e. the CNSS) being already experiencing annual deficits. 
Social assistance programs in Morocco, costing over 2% of GDP, consist of 
three programs: universal consumer food subsidies; public works employment 
programs administered by the Promotion Nationale (PN); an in-kind welfare 
program for the needy administered by the Entraide Nationale (EN). Overall, 
they appear to be highly ineffective due to their modest coverage compared to 
the existing number of needy, their being badly targeted to the poor/vulnerable 
while mostly benefiting the non-poor, their showing efficiency problems and 
high leakages.  
The system of universal and flat consumer food subsidies accounts for 
almost 4/5 of government expenditures on social assistance programs. 
Originally introduced to stabilize prices of strategic goods with no explicit 
focus on the poor, it is an inefficient way to help reduce poverty as 
disproportionally favouring the rich in absolute terms, who consume relatively 
more of the subsidized goods: only about 25% of the food subsidies reach the 
poor.20  
The Promotion Nationale (PN) is an autonomous Directorate under the 
Interior Ministry, seeing the implementation of labour-intensive public works 
to fight rural under/unemployment and to improve rural infrastructure. 
Although being generally effective in creating employment in rural areas 
trough productive investments, in creating high quality basic infrastructure 
work and in establishing participatory mechanism to involve local 
communities, it still presents some pitfalls concerning the lack of projects 
financial sustainability, the lack of explicit monitoring of the outcomes and the 
fact that jobs created are not always based on labour intensive mechanisms. 
The Entraide Nationale (EN) is an in-kind welfare program offering a 
variegate series of small-scale services (literacy, basic training, housing, pre-
schooling etc.) to disadvantaged women, children and youths. Despite its 
relevance as the only public agency in the country delivering in kind pro-poor 
services, its performance do result inadequate, due to limited coverage (only 
1.6% of the poor population reached), highly centralized administration, weak 
organizational capacities, lack of both cost/performance monitoring and 
outcomes’ follow-up. 
                                                                 
20 Though, it is important to add that their welfare effect is stronger for the poor, as subsidized 
products account for a higher proportion of the poor's expenditure, and for 40% of their caloric intake. 
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Firmly committed to reform and consolidate the whole social protection 
system, the government has explicitly endorsed a reform strategy focused on: 
(a) improving the management and operation of food subsidies; (b) improving 
equity, efficiency and impacts of poverty reduction and human development 
programs; (c) improving targeting and monitoring/evaluation of social 
protection system; (d) expanding and diversifying social security coverage. 21 
b) Social Sector: Education 
The biggest pitfalls of Moroccan educational system reside in its overall low 
quality and in the higher education’s inadequacy/detachment from the labour 
market’s requirements. Such issues have extensively been addressed already in 
the past, as education has always ranked among the top priorities of King 
Mohammed social programmes. 
In 1999, a Royal Commission on Education Reform (Commission Spécial 
d’Education-Formation, COSEF) was established, which proposed a broad set of 
reforms, including: decentralization by delegation of management to regions 
and promoting local responsibilities; increasing partnership with other actors 
(private sector and civil society); increasing student/teacher ratios; redesigning 
education cycles; staff rationalization across and within primary and secondary 
levels; strengthening teacher training programs and upgrading teaching 
methods at all levels. Though, this large reform agenda failed to set up clear 
and defined operational targets for the above-mentioned priorities as well as to 
address the institutional capacities of implementing agencies.22 
Trying to address these issues on a more concrete basis, the Government 
launched in June 2008 an Education Emergency Plan 2009 -2012 (Plan d’Urgence, 
or Programme Najah), which drew out four strategic directions: (a) achieving 
universal compulsory basic education by 2015; (b) improving quality in upper 
secondary and higher education/training, especially in science and technology 
areas (c) improving system performance (teaching, management and 
administration); (d) mobilizing resources effectively. Particular attention is paid 
to the objective of filling the gap between labour market needs and 
higher/vocational education/training scheme: in order to improve the labour 
market information system, an Employment Observatory has been established, 
together with an overall system for the monitoring and evaluation of labour 
market policies and programs; universities are being encouraged to carry out 
regular graduate tracking surveys to be made public. 23 
                                                                 
21 World Bank (2009) 
22 World Bank (2001) 
23 World Bank (2009) 
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c) Social Sector: Health  
The management and regulation of the public health sector are 
responsibility of the Government - largely through the Ministry of Health – 
which is also the major provider of services at all levels and specifically of basic 
services. There is no compulsory health insurance system: health insurance is 
covered by a voluntary system for the formal sector including mutual insurers 
for civil servants, some categories of professionals and public enterprises; a 
private health insurance for private sector enterprises and individuals; and a 
compulsory social security scheme (the CNSS, which does not provide medical 
insurance but does offer some limited health benefits for children through its 
family allowance system). 24 
With the Health Action Plan 2008-2012, the government set up the 
following objectives for the reform of the health sector: (a) reduce the intensity 
of major health problems; (b) reduce the inequity in access to health services for 
poor and rural populations; (c) improve financing, governance and efficiency of 
the sector. Particular attention is being paid to developing a care package for 
easy access, adequate quality and proper distribution of health services; 
developing more comprehensive nutrition activities integrated in the provision 
of maternal and child health services; and fostering an integrated management 
of non-communicable diseases (NCD) prevention and treatment at primary 
provider level (with the creation of a National Commission on NCD, among 
other measures).25 
d) Productive Sector: Agriculture  
With a view to make agriculture an engine of equitable growth and poverty 
reduction, the government launched in 2008 a national agricultural strategy - 
the Plan Maroc Vert (2009-2020) - structured around two pillars: (I) large-scale 
irrigation and commercial agriculture; and (II) predominant rain-fed sub-
sector. The plan sets up a structure of institutions and incentives along with a 
legal and regulatory framework favourable to the investment climate, and it’s 
complemented by specific national plans for fisheries, climate change and 
water management. Its major objectives include: increasing competitiveness 
and diversification of the agricultural sector; improving integration of 
smallholders into domestic markets; fostering public-private partnership in 
wholesale markets; improving public sector’s support and services to 
smallholders.  
                                                                 
24 World Bank (2001) 
25 World Bank (2009) 
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Key to the overall framework is the state commitment to develop a national 
climate change strategy to improve resilience to climate variability and change, 
structured around the following steps: impact analysis in key sectors (already 
completed); design of climate resilience sector policies; establishment of climate 
early warning systems and launch of pilot programs in selected areas; 
improvement of inter-agency coordination on climate change. 
As for water management, key objectives outlined in the National Water 
Strategy 2009-2020 are: improved irrigation water management; increased on-
farm use of water saving irrigation technology; improved water resources 
quality protection; enhanced water supply and sanitation service coverage and 
efficiency; better inter-ministerial coordination in the sector; reduced water 
losses and better control of ground water use. 26 
e) Productive Sector: Industry 
In February 2009, the government adopted a new Industrial Emergence 
Strategy, the “National Compact for Industrial Emergence II” (2009 - 2015), a 
route-map for industrial development to boost productivity of industrial 
activities which have been losing their competitiveness and export shares over 
the last years. The cost to the budget is estimated at around US$1.5 billion. 27 
f) Infrastructures: Energy and Transport 
The new Energy Strategy 2009 - 2012 launched by the government in 2009 
made energy efficiency improvements a national priority, setting up the 
following national priority actions: diversification around competitive energy 
technologies (the oil share to be reduced to 40% by 2030); development of 
national renewable energy potential as well as other domestic energy resources 
(in particular by intensifying hydrocarbon exploration activities); integration 
into the regional energy market, through enhanced cooperation and trade with 
both Maghreb countries and the EU. In support of these activities, a national 
Orientation Committee chaired by the Prime Minister has been created. 
The national Transport Action Strategy 2008 – 2012 aim to enhance a 
coherent strategy for the development of transport infrastructures along two 
pillars. The first pillar regards rural roads and focuses on improving access of 
rural populations to basic infrastructure (only 54% of rural population has 
access to roads which can be regularly used) and on clarifying responsibilities 
over their maintenance; the second pillar concerns urban transport and focuses 
on developing the relevant institutional framework by establishing urban 
                                                                 
26 World Bank (2009) 
27 World Bank (2009) 
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transport agencies in main urban areas and at national level, formulating 
investment plans, improving planning and management efficiency, ensuring at 
the same time its environmental and social sustainability.28 
g) Transversal strategies: ICT, Exports 
Particular attention has been paid to develop national strategies for 
enhancing the country’s potential in two key transversal sectors: the ICTs, with 
the launch of Maroc Numéric (2009 – 2013), and the Exports, with the launch of 
the National Plan for Exports (2009-2018). 
h) Cross-cutting reforms: Local Government Improvement, Public 
Administration Reform and Fiscal Stimulus Package29 
Central to the government agenda have also been a series of cross-cutting 
reforms likely to impact on the overall performance of all other sectors. Most 
important ones are: decentralization process and programmes for increasing 
local government autonomy, empowerment and accountability;30 public 
administration reform;31 and a comprehensive fiscal stimulus package.32   
 
4.3.2. A New Approach to Social Development Policies: the National 
          Initiative for Human Development (INDH) 
As particularly concerns the social realm, the country’s extraordinary socio-
economic challenges as well as the imbalance between its middle income status 
and its social indicators (corresponding to those of a less developed country), 
has recently put social policies and social development among the top priorities 
of the government overall economic policy.  
Remarkably, both Hassan II and Mohammed VI took on a strong stand on 
these issues, engaging themselves to play a high profile and active role in 
initiatives and programmes concerning poverty reduction, health, education, 
                                                                 
28 World Bank (2009) 
29 World Bank (2009) 
30 In 2008, the 2003 Charte Communale was amended to transfer a range of management responsibilities 
to the commune and incentives are provided to communes to develop a Communal Development 
Plan aimed at increasing participatory strategic planning at the local level. 
31 Main trajectories of the reforms include: developing a new results-oriented budget system with 
public policy evaluation mechanisms; improving public sector governance through enhanced internal 
and external controls, more transparent budget reporting and simplified procedures; simplifying 
administrative procedures through the development of e-government. 
32 In the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis, several fiscal easing measures were introduced by the 
government to help affected firms cope with the decline of external demand; alongside, a high level 
Council for Strategic Monitoring was set up in early 2009 - comprising concerned ministers and 
representatives of the business and banking sector - to follow developments related to the crisis. 
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and employment. Truly, this attitude has been criticized as a conscious attempt 
to visibly monopolize efforts to alleviate poverty and undermine elected 
institutions’ powers.  Indeed, implementation of these initiatives has received 
extensive complaints by local NGOs and economists for lacking real 
consultation on local views and needs, as if it was more serving as a mean of 
propaganda than as a true effort to curb poverty.33 
Anyway, besides any critical assessment, the Moroccan government did 
openly convey its commitment to the country’s social development through 
endorsing a strategy focused on three priorities:34 
? Extension of basic social services such as sanitation, drinking water, 
healthcare and education to poor populations, especially in rural areas. 
? Increase of the employment rate and of population’s revenues by 
reforming the administration law relevant to investment and the creation 
of jobs, and the facilitation of the inclusion of young graduates in the job 
market. 
? Reinforcing assistance programmes of social protection by directing social 
aid to the poorest categories of the population. 
In this context, one of the most significant steps which have been taken is 
the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative Nationale pour le 
Development Humain, INDH), a massive, high-profile, nation-wide development 
program launched by the government in May 2005 to mobilise the country’s 
institutional and financial resources to improve living conditions among the 
population and raise national social indicators. 
Like all major government initiatives in Morocco, the INDH was announced 
in a royal speech on May 18, 2005, in which King Mohammed VI recognized 
urban slums, illiteracy, low levels of school attendance, unemployment and 
exclusion as the main Moroccan social problems, against which the State has to 
assume its responsibility by undertaking a strategy of “social modernisation” 
through integrated public policies, not neglecting the “importance of public 
participation to ensure the suitability and feasibility of the projects […] 
building on the dynamism of the network of associations and of local 
development agents”.35  
                                                                 
33 Willis M.J. (2009, 2008)  
34 Ennaji M. (2006) 
35 Text of the King’s speech, announcing the creation of the INDH, 18 May 2005: 
http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/06C42C8B-0F3C-4CF2-8ED3-563C0E421F6F 
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The first phase of the Initiative (2006/2010) was financed in part by the 
national budget (around 60%) and in part by local authorities and international 
grants (around 20% each).36 During this phase the INDH invested over US$1.7 
billion in about 700 local participatory plans, financing more than 22,000 
activities, reaching 5.2 million beneficiaries.  
The three key points of the INDH identified in the king’s speech were: (1) to 
reduce the social deficit - both urban and rural- through better access to basic 
infrastructure and social services; (2) to promote income-generating activities 
and employment; and (3) to offer assistance to the most vulnerable social 
groups to help them emerge from their precarious conditions. 
The program designated 360 rural municipalities and 250 marginal 
neighbourhoods as priority beneficiaries, creating in each of them a Local 
Human Development Committee. These Committees - under the Walis’ 
tutelage - bring together the regional delegations of the national ministries (the 
“external services”), with the participation of also local authorities and socio-
economic agents, and are responsible for setting priorities, selecting projects for 
financing, establishing institutional agreements and monitoring/evaluating 
project management. This structure was complemented at the national level by 
a cross-cutting programme involving the creation of a Human Development 
Observatory, a network of experts, a national information and communications 
system and a series of training programmes for all involved partners.37 
As the overall assessment of the first phase was generally positive (i.e. 
successfully setting up an inclusive institutional architecture and efficiently 
starting to address welfare gaps for the target population), a second phase was 
launched by the King in June 2011, covering the period 2011-2015, and 
envisaging both an expansion of the target population and the geographic 
scope as well as an increase in resource allocation. The new allocation foresees 
US$2.1 billion, financed mostly by the central government (55%) and the local 
authorities (33%), and partly by other public agencies (6%) and external grants 
(6%); the targeted results focus on improving supply and access to basic 
services, infrastructure and economic opportunity for poor and vulnerable 
groups, and strengthening local participatory governance. Further, as a reign-
long commitment by part of Mohammed VI, the Initiative is expected to 
continue through a third phase and beyond.38  
                                                                 
36 A particular support in terms of funds as well as expertize and technical support came from the 
World Bank, whose support as the key technical partner was explicitly requested by the Moroccan 
government immediately after the launch of the programme.   
37 Martín I. (2006) 
38 World Bank (2012a; 2012b) 
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The most striking feature of the INDH ostensibly resides in the new 
approach to development it adopted, which represents a complete breaking 
point with Morocco’s past policies. Such a rupture is essentially highlighted by 
the following key traits of the INDH approach: 39 
? The adoption of a human development philosophy, focusing on 
improving social indicators and reducing social exclusion, instead of the 
economic growth perspective adopted so far, which focused almost 
exclusively on macroeconomic adjustment and market liberalization and 
led to decades of “growth without development” policies. 
? The adoption of a bottom-up, integrated participatory methodology, 
based on local governance, partnership and sustainability through the 
involvement of all local civil society, political and economic agents in a 
single process, whereas the former government’s approach to dealing with 
poverty so far had been centrally driven, with low levels of participation, 
weak coordination amongst line ministries, and inadequate targeting. 
? The focus on transparency and results orientation in the procedures for 
setting priorities and selecting projects, with public tendering for the 
submission of projects open to local groups, professional organizations, 
trade unions, cooperatives and associations. 
? The adoption of a project-based methodology (foreseeing the 
implementation of the INDH exclusively through specific projects) which 
should have the virtue of producing tangible results in short periods of 
time, being easily evaluated and monitored and filling the gaps in the 
country’s economic and social infrastructures.     
Though, despite these positive innovative traits, the INDH still intrinsically 
presents some points of concern regarding its implementation, namely:40 
? Its linkages with and fitting into the general framework of the national 
development and employment strategies remain unclear. Indeed, the 
planning, management and implementation of the INDH are not 
entrusted to the Ministry of Finance nor to the Ministry of Social 
Development, Family and Solidarity, but rather to the Walis (Provincial 
Governors) - responsible to the Interior Ministry – with the strategic 
supervision at the national level devolved to an inter-ministerial 
committee chaired by the Prime Minister; and further, the contribution of 
the INDH to job creation remains pretty unspecified.  
                                                                 
39 Martín I. (2006) 
40 Martín I. (2006) 
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? Its project-based approach could run the risk to fail to generate an 
endogenous, integrated and sustainable development process. Indeed, the 
risk of lack of coordination and coherence among projects in different 
sectors as well as different regions of the country may limit the INDH 
impact to simply mitigate social exclusion, failing to provide long-lasting 
solutions to rural and urban poverty or to foster any inter-regional equity. 
? Its exclusive focus on social impact and social indicators – rather than on 
social development as a structural component of endogenous economic 
growth – could eventually led to a “development without growth” policy that 
lacks linkages between microeconomic projects and general 
macroeconomic strategy. Thus, although likely to raise the living 
standards of the poorest social groups, the INDH may not contribute to 
foster a more modern and dynamic economy, expanding opportunities 
and people’s choices and disentangling Morocco from dependence on 
external aid. 
? Its contribution to the democracy-building process is extremely doubtful, 
in so far as the institutional structure of the INDH remains vertically 
centred around the highest national government authority in each 
province (the Walis) and to the Prime Minister, rather than on elected local 
authorities. In fact, although the participatory approach will likely ensure 
a broad-based social consultation process, fostering the growth and 
activity of local associations and strengthening the administrative 
capabilities of local authorities, the government oriented institutional 
structure will likely prevent any real transfer of political power to the local 
level, thus consolidating an already on-going process of administrative 
decentralisation without political devolution. Practically, the INDH will 
likely fail to alter the existing imbalance between the growing 
functions/responsibilities granted to local authorities and the lack of a 
corresponding transfer of real political power and control of financial 
resources.  
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4.4. Critical Assessments and Key Development Challenges 
Ahead  
 
Despite the positive growth experience of the last decade, structural 
constraints still persist in Morocco which prevent the country from reaching its 
full growth and developmental potential: in order to consolidate its recent 
development achievements, Morocco will have to address a broad series of 
substantial challenges - both immediate and on longer terms – concerning 
various aspects of its economy, which will be key to maintain its development 
path on the long run along a sustainable progress trajectory. 
These interconnected challenges can be clustered around three main 
areas/objectives: (a) accelerating growth and job creation; (b) reducing social 
disparities; and (c) ensuring sustainability.  
a) Accelerating growth and job creation 
? Improve human capital quality, job productivity and the quality of 
growth. Morocco’s economic growth continues to be hindered by a vicious 
circle of low quality human capital/low productivity/low wages. As 
current growth rates are insufficient to absorb the overall labour supply in 
the long run, achieving a higher productivity path is key to maintain a 
positive growth trend and consolidate progress in reducing poverty. 
Though Morocco has been investing no less than 6% of GDP in education 
for many years and progresses have been made in the sector, concerns 
about quality and efficiency remain - usually associated with lower formal 
employment and the proliferation of part-time and informal jobs. The low 
quality of growth meant that the decrease in unemployment rates has not 
fully translated in improved households' well-being, and recent 
employment creation has concentrated in low skilled-low paid jobs mostly 
in the informal and agricultural sectors. To address these problems, 
Morocco will have to: foster active labour market and retraining programs 
(targeted in particular to workers in the informal and agricultural sectors); 
progressively increase formal sector employment; improve labour 
mobility, which will in turn require more flexibility in labour regulation 
along with the introduction of income protection mechanisms and the 
expansion of the social insurance system’s coverage.41 
? Address structural unemployment problems. Though considerably 
decreased in recent years, unemployment in the country still remain at 
                                                                 
41 World Bank (2009, 2010) 
 
 
113
high levels: the total unemployment rate fell from 13.6% in 2000 to 9.6 % in 
2009, before slightly raising to 10% in 2010 as a side effect of the global 
crisis.42 Particularly higher levels of unemployment concern urban areas, 
the youth and people with higher level of education.43Unemployment 
among young and university graduates is a long entrenched structural 
problem in Morocco, whose roots rely in a series of interconnected factors: 
state-led job-creation policies adopted in the 1980s44; a not yet sufficiently 
developed economy able to require highly-skilled workers; imbalance 
between the rates of demographic and economic growth; lack of coherence 
between the system of education/training and the employment 
requirements, with universities producing poorly qualified graduates who 
lack training directly relevant to modern enterprises.45 In this context, 
reforms designed to enhance labour market flexibility and to reduce the 
gap between the education system and the labour market requirements 
are crucial to help curbing structural unemployment in the country.46 
? Further consolidation of public finances and overall public sector 
management reform. To maintain the level of its priority public 
investments in the long run, the country needs to keep increasing the 
availability of public resources through advancing its fiscal consolidation 
strategy, based on four main elements: reform of the tax regime (reducing 
the bias toward excessive direct taxation)47; control of the public wage bill; 
reform of the oil and food subsidies system (reducing energy subsidies, 
replacing food subsidies with targeted support to vulnerable groups); 
introduction of performance-based budgeting.48    
? Readdress the anti-export, low value-added, insufficient diversification of 
its trade regime. Morocco’s last two decades of growth have been mainly 
internal demand-driven: past policies and investments have favoured the 
production of non-tradable goods and services with high import inputs 
and geared towards domestic markets (real estate, telecommunications, 
                                                                 
42 See Tab. 4.1 
43 During the 2000 decade, unemployment of young people with a baccalaureate has more than 
doubled, that among university graduates multiplied by four, while that among people without no 
certificate decreased. (Ennai M., 2006) 
44 Until 1980, college and university graduates were recruited mainly by the public sector, with high 
levels of government money being utilized in the creation of new jobs for them: the limitations 
intrinsic to such policies become evident with the introduction of the structural adjustment plans and 
the consequent cut in public-led job creation. (Ennai M., 2006) 
45 Ennai M. (2006) 
46 IMF (2011) 
47 Recent cuts in top tax rates on corporate and personal income have relatively attenuated the tax bias. 
48 World Bank (2010); IMF (2011) 
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retail, transport, and financial services). But as internal demand alone is 
insufficient to sustain high growth rates, the country urgently needs to 
readdress the current anti-export, protectionist bias of its economy and 
develop an export-led strategy, through measures such as: rationalize the 
tariff regime and revise restrictive non-tariff measures; open domestically 
focused services to competition; reduce port and transportation costs; 
improve coordination among border agencies. Further, exports’ 
composition suffers from a serious lack of sophistication (value-added 
incorporation) and diversification: poor investment in high value-added 
sectors translate in low value added exports lacking competitiveness and 
failing to penetrate external markets; although exports’ structure has 
recently evolved from traditional agriculture and phosphate exports 
towards finished goods (especially garments) for the EU market and semi-
finished products (fertilizers and phosphoric acid), its performance is still  
lagging behind Morocco’s competitors.49 Lastly, over the last decade 
Morocco pursued a strategy of selective market opening mainly with non-
MENA countries through bilateral or regional agreements (Euro-Med, US-
FTA, Turkey-FTA): large potential gains in terms of growth could be 
obtained by advancing intra-Maghreb/MENA integration, especially in the 
services, banking, energy and transport sectors.50 
? Address agriculture’s structural problems. Though central for promoting 
growth, the primary sector in Morocco remains one of the least productive 
in the region (employing almost 1/2 of the labour force but yielding only 
13% of GDP) and little has been done so far to address its core structural 
problems: low productivity at farm level and low value-added along the 
agro-food chain; low quality and little diversification of products; weak 
investment incentives; dualistic structure with a predominant traditional 
rain-fed sub-sector and a smaller, more competitive, export-oriented 
irrigated one; deficient rural transport infrastructure; weak land rights 
tenure systems; all these factors keep locking the sector into a stagnant 
output/limited job creation/ low incomes trap. 51 
? Further improve the business environment. Despite the wide range of   
reforms implemented over the past decade - which gained the country a 
                                                                 
49 The weaknesses embodied in the Moroccan trade structure were further revealed by the on-going 
global crisis: the trade deficit deteriorated from 22.3% of GDP in 2007 to 24.3% in 2008, due mainly to a 
volume effect rather than to a price effect. Insufficient exports diversification is revealed by Morocco’s 
extremely low number of exported products per 1 mln inhabitants, with respect to that of similar 
income-level countries (42, compared to 130 for Tunisia and 160 for Malaysia). 
50 World Bank (2009, 2010) 
51 World Bank (2009, 2010) 
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stable macroeconomic environment, an improved investment climate, and 
a well-developed financial sector - progresses in business environment 
have not yet led to the structural transformation of the private sector into a 
competitive, diversified and technologically sophisticated sector, core 
engine of a high-growth economy. Weaknesses remain, especially in those 
areas (like regulatory reform) which require large public agency 
coordination and which show significant gaps between the regulations 
and their implementation. Most important constraints to business and to 
the emergence of new industrial players are: difficult access to land; high 
tax rates; credit constraints; lack of transparency in administrative 
procedures and in the judiciary system; corruption; poor property rights 
enforcement; competition from the informal sector; and the dominant 
position occupied by a few large incumbents.52 
? Further enhance financial market reforms. Though financial sector reforms 
to date have been notable in Morocco, the goal of advancing private sector 
development will require further financial sector liberalizing reforms, to 
be focused on: improving competition; broadening access to financial 
services (especially for SMEs and citizens at large); lowering 
intermediation costs; introducing new instruments  (especially face to the 
growing demand for long term finance); promote the non-banking branch, 
by strengthening the role of capital markets; building institutional 
capacity to enforce the recently enacted financial legal framework, by 
introducing an effective prudential supervisory infrastructure.53 
? Engage in second generation ICT reforms. Morocco did engage early in 
telecommunications liberalization and privatization through a series of 
reforms in the 1990s, which enabled fast growth of telecommunications 
services and the development of IT and off-shoring industries. Though, 
such first mover advantages has eroded with time and the sector is now 
facing a number of constraints related to lack of efficiency and 
competitiveness. The modernization of the IT sector - aimed at improving 
the performance of both the national industry and the off-shoring SMEs - 
will require engaging in a broad range of second generation reforms, 
especially focused on: lowering the high prices in broad-band and mobile 
segments by increasing competition; improving the low levels of ICT 
exports; improving the scarce IT skills; strengthening and empowering 
regulation. 54 
                                                                 
52 World Bank (2009); IMF (2011) 
53 World Bank (2009); IMF (2011) 
54 World Bank (2009) 
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b) Reducing social disparities55 
? Foster equity-enhancing growth and inclusiveness.  With a Gini index of 
0.41, Morocco shows relatively high levels of inequality by regional 
standard, apparently increasing over time; the recent rapid improvements 
in some social indicators as well as in employment rates have indeed left 
large groups of the population excluded. Reducing the country’s high 
social disparities and promoting inclusiveness of marginalized groups 
through an equity-enhancing growth, will require a comprehensive 
reform effort towards better targeted social protection policies, centred 
around: promoting equal access to government services and economic 
opportunities; reforming the regressive policies (such as energy and food 
subsidies) and strengthening social protection systems and safety nets.  
? Reduce the rural-urban gap. The strong disparities between rural and 
urban areas still constitute a major concern for Morocco: both access to 
and quality of basic social infrastructure and services such as roads, 
health, education, water, sanitation and electricity in remote rural areas 
are poor and backwards; rural household expenses remain on average 
35% lower than urban ones; cities remain the bulk of economic dynamism, 
counting for 80% of productive activity (industry and services) and ¾ of 
employment opportunities. Given the continuing path of urbanization that 
the country is still experiencing, a major challenge will be to respond to 
the increasing urban demand for infrastructure and social, without leaving 
the rural areas behind.  
? Improve women conditions. Despite significant improvements in the last 
decade, some social indicators for women continue to score fairly poorly 
and require concrete actions to be taken: high rates of maternal mortality 
could largely be lowered by improving prenatal care and equipped 
facilities provision;56 low rates of women literacy require further action to 
enhance equal access to education for girls;57 higher rates of 
unemployment for women than for men require more active policies 
toward women entry in the labour market.  
? Improve quality and coverage of service delivery. Some key social sectors 
such as health and education require decisive actions directed both 
towards expanding access and enhance performance. Among the key 
                                                                 
55 World Bank (2009); IMF (2011) 
56 Data reveal that only 4.3% of pregnant women in the poorest quintile are assisted by a doctor during 
the delivery, and that over 70% of deliveries occur at home. 
57 Morocco is one of the few countries where the gender gap in illiteracy rates has increased since 1970, 
rather than substantial decreasing as in other countries. 
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measures to be addressed: fostering greater accountability through 
improved incentive systems as well as monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms; advance de-concentration of the sectors; enhance equal 
provision of opportunities to the population by diversifying financing.  
c) Ensuring sustainability58 
? Reduce vulnerability to climate changes. Morocco remains highly 
vulnerable to droughts and adverse climate changes in general, mainly 
due to the following set of inter-connected factors: large reliance on 
agriculture – and particularly on rain-fed yields - as source of income and 
employment; lack of effective risk management instruments; limited 
capacity of urban faster-growing sectors to create new jobs to absorb 
excess rural labour force; relatively large share in total exports (15%) of 
products from irrigated agriculture, which overuses increasingly scarce 
water resources. Such a situation poses serious concerns, as climate 
projections for Morocco over the coming decades depict a warmer and 
drier climate, with precipitations likely to decline 10% by 2030, and 20% 
by 2050: as a consequence, drops in rain-fed yields of up to 10% in certain 
regions are expected, as well as a widening gap between demand and 
supply of irrigation water, with inflows to reservoirs expected to decline 
by 30%. Though these concerns are being addressed by the new Plan 
Maroc Vert under implementation, further and stronger action towards 
adaptation are required in order to lower the country’s vulnerability. 
? Consolidate the on-going reform of the water sector. The water sector in 
Morocco is faced with relevant challenges, most remarkably: water 
scarcity likely to be worsened by climate change; weak sector governance 
and institutions; inefficient water use in agriculture; and inadequate access 
to water supply and sanitation services. Due to these pitfalls, frequent 
droughts have a major impact on the economy, public spending is less 
efficient than it could be, irrigation water in public irrigation schemes is 
frequently rationed and groundwater is running out. Actions need to be 
taken to advance the on-going reform program aimed at the sector’s 
institutional and infrastructure development, in particular concerning: 
more efficient water allocation and planning; better interagency 
coordination; better enforcement of groundwater and pollution control 
rules; introduction of subsidies for technologies such as micro-irrigation to 
improve water supply and sanitation services social transfers. 
                                                                 
58 World Bank (2010, 2009) 
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? Consolidate the on-going reform of the energy sector. The greatest current 
challenges for Morocco’s energy sector consist in enhancing energy 
security while at the same time ensuring that needs of energy consumers 
(either citizens or firms) are efficiently met with no burden for the 
economy. In particular, ensuring supply’s security will require: reducing 
the country’s heavy dependency on energy imports (97%) – which causes 
energy supply risks and exposure to price fluctuations; diversifying the 
energy mix currently dominated by coal and oil (87%); developing  
indigenous energy resources (i.e. solar and wind); enhancing efficiency in 
energy use, and reinforcing regional integration in the Mediterranean 
electricity market (as all countries in the region face common challenges in 
terms of growing domestic energy consumption and increasing demand 
for green electricity both at home and across the Mediterranean). 
 
Overall, prospects for the medium term are basically good: the world 
economic recovery in 2010 supported growth in Morocco, though new risks 
and uncertainties emerged in 2011, with the growth’s slowdown in a number of  
EU countries (Morocco’s main trading partners), the persistence of high 
commodity prices, and the continuing global financial instability. Anyway, 
Morocco is expected to continue recording a strong economic performance, 
with growth expected to remain at about 4.5%-5% in 2012 and reach 6% in the 
medium term, due to the positive impact of fiscal consolidation on domestic 
demand and based on the assumption of continued implementation of  sound 
macroeconomic stability policies and planned structural reforms. Also, a 
further stimulus to the country’ s competitiveness could come from the 
suggested move to a more formal inflation targeting system together with a 
more flexible exchange rate – which is currently under evaluation by monetary 
authorities. 59 
To conclude the above presented analysis, mention must be done of some 
significant critical assessments on the impact of the neo-liberal economic 
reforms which have extensively been introduced in Morocco’s from the mid-
80s on: This impact indeed, far from being clear-cut, have triggered lots of 
critical analyses which deny the dominant discourses according to which neo-
liberalism should bring economic growth and eventually lead to political 
liberalization. 
Some interesting critics tried to explain the relatively low performance of 
Moroccan economy during the last four decades using a political economy 
                                                                 
59 IMF (2011) 
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approach, whereby suboptimal growth outcomes are the result of contracting 
problems among players in the economy:  the liberalization of the economy 
does not necessarily result in the reduction or suppression of rents as the state 
can continue to control the polity through rent distribution despite 
liberalization – which is apparently the case for Morocco.60   
Also, the economic reform programs could have overestimated the ability 
or willingness of market actors to demand political accountability and 
transparency, giving instead scope for adaptability strategies of ruling elites, 
changes in distributional coalitions and paradoxical effects on state and 
markets.61  
An interesting insightful analysis from Zemni and Bogaert points out how 
these reforms are having a highly contradictory impact on Morocco’s 
democratic transition in so far as they are producing an uneven political, 
institutional, and geographical reorganization of the state’s power which can be 
resumed in the following points: 
? If neo-liberalism implies a general retreat of the state from many of its 
previous functions, this didn’t translated in Morocco neither into a 
complete disappearance of the state nor into a weakening of its power, as 
Moroccan ruling elites adapted themselves to the new reality of economic 
globalisation.  
? De-regulation of the national scale has in fact been side-lined by a re-
regulation towards other scales, trough the transferring of power from the 
state to new hybrid governmental arrangements mixing state and market, 
new cross-national networks that transcend traditional boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion. This de-territorialisation is inducing uneven 
geographical developments by creating a geographical landscape of 
specialized clusters in which some places, territories and scales are 
systematically privileged – trough specific regulatory regimes - over 
others as sites for capital accumulation.  
? The debate on democracy has progressively been de-politicised and 
technocratised, due to the rising emphasis credited to the concepts of good 
governance and efficiency rather than on the quality of representation 
mechanisms as parameters to judge project implementation, with critiques 
of societal dysfunctions based on practical and procedural - instead than 
structural – arguments.  
                                                                 
60 Cherkaoui M. and Ben Ali D. (2007) 
61 Dillman B. (2001) 
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? This concomitant de-regulation of the national scale and good governance-
based approach weakens the locally elected bodies (i.e. municipalities) 
while strengthening the power of the Walis, which are nominated by the 
King, directly accountable to him and responsible to the Interior Ministry. 
It is indeed notable that the INDH financial planning/management has 
been allocated not to the Finance Ministry but to the Walis, so that the 
Interior Ministry remains the central locus for regulating monarchical 
power, thus bypassing (or at least “balancing”) elected local institutions. 
Far from resulting in a more democratic decentralisation of power and 
enhancement of citizen accountability and local participation, these good 
governance reforms in Morocco only translate, thus, in a de-concentration 
of central authority and re-organization of the power of the Makhzen. 
? State-citizen relationships are also invested by this redeployment of the 
state’s prerogatives, as the state embarks on an identity-formation strategy 
aiming at the construction of “responsible citizens”: as the state takes 
upon itself the creation of new chances to enhance citizens’ capabilities, it 
asks in return  the citizens to become responsible, accountable and 
responsive to the opportunities created by the government.  
? Lastly, market reforms concentrated on FDI hampered the development of 
a strong national middle class, while favouring new external players 
which are generally not interested in democratic development, and 
causing a “detachment” of the middle class from the national interests. 
Thus, envisioning behind these shortcomings a high potential for an 
uprising of mass discontent and protest movement, they conclude: “While it is 
very well possible that certain (limited) personal freedoms may be granted and 
political openings enforced, the actual reform projects are simultaneously 
undermining the classic social contract that tied the state to its citizens. The 
retreating state is undermining its own position by making the individuals less 
dependent on its procuring of services. This is already widening the 
possibilities for oppositional groups to protest […] this opposition (whether in 
its Islamist, leftist or newly emerging protest movement forms) is not because 
of their exclusion from global projects of development or the free market but 
because of their differential integration into it. Therefore it is likely that in the 
future in Morocco (but also in neighbouring countries) neoliberal reform will 
enhance instability as it is widening the economic cleavage between the rich 
and the poor. This in turn, can result in turmoil, triggering authoritarian 
reactions and repression […]”.62 
                                                                 
62 Zemni S. and Bogaert K. (2009) 
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Tab. 4.1 Main Macroeconomic Indicators 
INDICATOR 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP (current US$, billion) 18.820 12.869 25.820 32.986 37.020 59.523 65.637 75.226 88.882 90.908 90.802 100.221 
GDP growth (%) 3.6 6.3 4.0 -6.6 1.6 3.0 7.8 2.7 5.6 4.8 3.7 4.5 
GDP pc (current US$) 955 573 1,033 1,213 1,272 1,931 2,106 2,389 2,793 2,828 2,796 3,054 
GDP pc growth (%) 1.0 3.7 2.0 -8.0 0.3 1.9 6.6 1.6 4.5 3.7 2.6 3.5 
Inflation (%CPI) 9.41 7.73 6.78 6.12 1.89 0.98 3.28 2.04 3.71 0.99 0.99 0.92 
Unemployment  
(% of labour forces) … … 15.8 22.9 13.6 11.0 9.7 9.7 9.6 10.0 … … 
Youth Unemployment (% of 
labour forces aged 15-24) … … 31.1 … 19.3 15.7 16.6 17.2 18.3 21.9 … … 
FDI, net inflows (%GDP) … … 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.69 0.84 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.25 
Central Government Debt 
(%GDP) … … … … … 56.5 57.3 53.5 47.3 47.1 50.3 … 
External balance on goods 
and services (%GDP) - 9.35 - 8.01 - 5.41 - 6.61 - 5.37 - 5.60 - 5.48 - 9.12 - 13.39  - 10.99 - 9.92 - 13.41 
Agriculture, value added 
(%GDP) 18.48 16.45 18.26 15.09 14.94 14.68 16.89 13.73 14.63 16.39 15.38 15.09 
Manufacturing, value added 
(%GDP) 16.88 18.37 18.99 18.95 17.46 16.28 15.68 15.04 14.04 15.92 15.30 15.50 
Industry, value added 
(%GDP) 31.03 33.08 33.42 34.06 29.11 28.22 27.15 27.31 30.32 28.59 29.66 29.86 
Services, value added 
(%GDP) 50.49 50.47 48.31 50.85 55.95 57.10 55.96 58.95 55.04 55.02 54.96 55.05 
Public Spending on 
Education (%GDP) 5.89 5.94 … … 5.76 … 5.50 … 5.56 5.38 … … 
Public Spending on Health 
(%GDP) … … … 1.26 1.23 1.46 1.71 1.88 1.93 1.89 … … 
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators) http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco 
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Tab. 4.2 Main Socio-Economic and Development Indicators  
INDICATOR 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Poverty Ratio at $1.25/ day (%) … 10.29 … … 6.25 … … 2.52 … … … … 
Poverty Ratio at $2/day (%) … 28.53 … … 24.34 … … 14.03 … … … … 
National Poverty Ratio (%) … … … … 15.3 … … 9 … … … … 
Rural Poverty Ratio (%) … … … … 25.1 … … 14.5 … … … … 
Urban Poverty Ratio (%) … … … … 7.6 … … 4.8 … … … … 
GINI Index … 39.19 … … 40.63 … … 40.88 … … … … 
Income share held by the highest 
20% (%) … 46.15 … … 47.7 … … 47.88 … … … … 
Income share held by the lowest 
20% (%) … 6.58 … … 6.47 … … 6.52 … … … … 
Human Development Index (HDI)1 0.364 0.406 0.435 0.466 0.507 0.552 0.559 0.565 0.57 0.575 0.579 0.582 
UN Education Index2 0.181 0.23 0.254 0.299 0.354 0.418 0.422 0.433 0.437 0.442 0.447 0.447 
Gender Inequality Index3 … … … 0.71 0.69 0.54 … … … … 0.53 0.51 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 57.63 61.29 64.15 66.61 68.68 70.42 70.72 71.02 71.31 71.59 71.86 … 
Mortality rate < 5 (per 1,000 births) 134.9 106.3 85.9 68.9 55.3 44.2 42.2 40.3 38.6 37 35.5 … 
Mortality rate neonatal (per 1,000 
births) … … 36 31 27 23 22 21 20 20 19 … 
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators) http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco 
     UNDP (International Human Development Indicators) http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MAR.html 
                                                                 
1 The Human Development Index (HDI), calculated by the UNDP, is a measure of national development alternative to conventional ones (such as income or GDP 
growth). It is a composite measure of four indicators for three basic humand development dimensions: Health (life expectancy at birth); Education (mean years of 
schooling; expected years of schooling); Income (GNI pc). In the HDI world ranking of countries (from the one with the highest HDI to the one with the lowest 
one), Morocco ranked 130th on 187 countries in 2011. 
2 UN Education Index: expected and mean years of schooling. 
3 The Gender Inequality Index (GII), calculated by the UNDP, is a measure of women’s disadvantage in three dimensions: (a) reproductive health; (b) 
empowerment; and (c) labour market. It ranges from 0 (fairly equality between man and women) to 1 (high inequality). The indicators used for its calculation are 
respectively: (a) maternal mortality ratio - adolescent fertility rate; (b) share of parliamentary seats held by each sex - secondary and higher education attainment 
levels; (c) women’s participation in the work force. 
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5. External Actors Influencing Internal Dynamics  
 
5.1. The European Union 
 
Relations between Morocco and the European Union are fairly long-
standing and consolidated - dating back to July 1969, when a first bilateral 
Association Agreement with the then European Community (EC)  was signed for 
a five years period. This was superseded in 1976 by a Cooperation Agreement 
signed within the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), started 
by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 as a first attempt to 
develop a comprehensive Mediterranean policy through a multilateral 
cooperation framework envisaging economic and financial aid in the form of 
bilateral financial protocols. 
In 1980 the GMP was replaced by the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), 
which increased the aid package associated with the fourth round of financial 
protocols and started to emphasize the importance of human rights, by 
inserting a negative conditionality1 clause enabling the European Parliament to 
freeze the budget of a protocol when faced with serious human rights 
violations. 
Encouraged by the EC Mediterranean enlargement to Greece in 1981 and to 
Spain and Portugal in 1986, in July 1987 King Hassan II submitted to the 
European Parliament (EP) a formal application to join the EEC, on the basis of 
three main arguments: Morocco’s close ties with the EC; its commitment to 
develop a market economy; and the democratization of the country’s political 
sphere.2 Though, the application was rejected on the grounds that Morocco was 
not a European country. 
In January 1992, the country was affected by the new RMP conditionality 
clause as the EP decided to freeze Morocco’s fourth financial protocol on the 
grounds of human rights abuses – with reference to the United Nations 
Resolution 660 on the Western Sahara and the scandalous conditions of 
                                                                 
1 Negative conditionality: imposition of sanctions (i.e. freezing of financial grants), for not complying 
with the standards (in this case relating to human rights and democracy) required by the external 
actor providing the assistance. Positive conditionality: provision of financial grants or other forms of 
reward depending on the compliance of the beneficiary country with the criteria fixed by the donor 
country. 
2 The discourse on democratization was only limited to the development of a multiparty system and 
the circulation of local and international press, not referring to human rights’ issues. 
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political prisoners – a decision which triggered a strong reaction both from 
Morocco and from some EU governments, particularly Spain.  
Though, co-operation regained quickly, and already in February 1992 the 
idea of developing a comprehensive EC-Morocco partnership was discussed in 
the Council within the framework of European Political Co-operation (EPC), 
without however reaching a final decision. Following this, the Spanish 
government started pushing for developing closer relations with the Maghreb 
countries, eventually leading to the June 1992 Lisbon Summit endorsing 
proposals for a Euro-Maghreb Partnership. The partnership focused on the 
common commitment to: respect for international law; respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic values such as free and regular 
elections; the establishment of democratic institutional systems guaranteeing 
pluralism, citizens’ participation and minorities’ rights; peaceful coexistence 
between cultures and religions. Remarkably, other than marking the shift from 
“development assistance” to “partnership”, a more explicit reference to 
political dialogue appeared, with a stronger focus on democracy and human 
rights – though still limited to a regular exchange of information and greater 
mutual consultation on political and security matters. 
In November 1995, the Barcelona Conference inaugurated the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also known as the Barcelona Process) - which 
could be seen as the evolution of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership - to set up a 
general framework for the relations between the EU, its member states and the 
countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean area (the “Mediterranean 
Partners”).3 Aim of the EMP was the “creation of an area of dialogue, exchange 
and cooperation to guarantee peace, stability and prosperity in the 
Mediterranean”, through the adoption of a “three baskets” structure based on 
(1) a political and security partnership, (2) an economic and financial 
partnership and (3) a social and cultural partnership.4 
The EMP relies on a complex institutional structure, based on three 
coexisting dimensions: (1) a multilateral dimension - meant to be the novelty 
with respect to the previous bilateral-based Mediterranean policy - consisting 
of a variety of inter-governmental bodies5, as well as of a non-governmental 
                                                                 
3 Originally there were 12 partners states: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Since then, three countries lost their 
EMP partner status (Cyprus and Malta, which acceded the EU in 2004, and Turkey, which gained the 
status of “EU potential candidate” in 2005), while Mauritania and Albania were added in 2007.  
4 European Commission (1995): Barcelona Declaration 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf 
5 The Euro-Med Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Euro-Med Sectoral Ministerial 
Conferences; the Euro-Med Sectoral Working Groups/Committee; the Euro-Med Committee for the 
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cooperation among parliaments, economic actors and civil society (through the 
Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum6 and various Euro-Med Networks7); (2) a 
bilateral dimension, based on the signing of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements between the EU and each single partner; and (3) a 
unilateral dimension, entrenched in the MEDA program, the budget allocation 
unilaterally granted from the EU to the partner countries. Overall, the EMP has 
institutionalized the EU-Mediterranean relations through a “light” institutional 
structure, carried on through political documents and substantial agreements 
rather than formal agreements and international treaties, and subject to 
continuous revisions over time. 
Though the EMP was basically launched as a multilateral region-building 
process emphasizing the need for a parallel cooperation on the economic, social 
and political sphere, in practice its implementation has been carried out mainly 
through the signing of bilateral Association Agreements stressing economic 
cooperation much more than the other ones. Moreover, while these 
Agreements provided for a clause of negative conditionality (Art.2 of each 
Agreement) along with the usual positive conditionality, to encourage democratic 
political change, this clause has almost never been applied, in order to avoid 
destabilization effects on the existing regimes, which clearly showed the 
preference of the EU for maintaining stability in the region rather than 
promoting democratic reforms. 
Within the framework of the EMP, in February 1996 Morocco and the EU 
signed a bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA)8, which 
entered into force on 1 March 2000 and constituted a turning point by giving 
the relations between the EU and Morocco a much more comprehensive, 
structured and institutionalized basis. Within this framework, financial support 
was provided through the MEDA Democracy Program (the main operational and 
financial instrument of the EMP): over the period 1996-2006, Morocco emerged 
as one the of the largest recipients of EU’s assistance in the Mediterranean,  
receiving over €1.6 billion funds through the MEDA I (1996-1999) and the 
MEDA II (2000-2006) programs.9 As all other EMAAs, also the EU-Morocco 
                                                                                                                                             
Barcelona Process; the Meetings of Senior Officials on Political and Security Questions; the “Barcelona 
Teams” within the EU member states, the “Barcelona Teams” within the partner countries, the 
Working Groups of the Council and of the Commission. 
6 European Parliament delegations in the Maghreb and Arab Mediterranean Union (AMU), in the 
Mashreq and Gulf States, in Palestine and Israel. 
7 Euromed Civil Forum, EuroMesco, Euromed Energy Forum, Euromed Transport Forum, etc 
8 European Communities “Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between EU and its Members States and 
Morocco”” (Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 March 2000)  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:070:0002:0190:EN:PDF 
9 European Commission (Europeaid) website: Morocco webpage 
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EMAA contains the negative conditionality clause stating that “respect for the 
democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the domestic and external 
policies of the Community and of Morocco and shall constitute an essential 
element of this Agreement” – which has nonetheless never been applied. 
Overall assessments of the EMP democratization efforts in the whole 
Southern Mediterranean region have widely been pretty poor, due to the  
almost exclusive emphasis being posed on the economic sphere (markets’ 
liberalization and opening to international trade), while largely neglecting the 
political dimension – and Morocco is no exemption to this. Indeed, most part of 
the MEDA funds was devoted to support economic transition, boosting jobs 
creation and reducing poverty and only a very low share was earmarked for 
governance and human rights. Further, other relevant shortcomings regarding 
the MEDA funding targeting/implementation include: (a) projects are 
channelled through government bodies (mainly the Minister of Social 
Development, Solidarity, Employment and Professional Training), which 
makes their contribution to a areal bottom-up reform process unlikely; (b) even 
within the democracy and human rights areas, actions has been concentrated in 
some sub-areas (i.e. human rights education and women rights) while 
neglecting others (i.e. children rights; prisoners’ rights; media freedom; 
freedom of association for Islamist non-violent organizations; support for free 
and transparent election processes); (c) strong preference for regional 
horizontal projects, which can suffer for inconsistency between different 
degrees of democratization across countries as well as of problems of 
disruption in the projects’ stages and lack of follow up; and (d) preference for 
big projects - whose impact is often confined to urban areas and a limited 
number of actors - while underfunding small and multiple projects – which 
could instead better target huge pockets of needy people in the rural areas.10 
After the 2004 East Enlargement, a strong priority in EU foreign political 
agenda became that of securing its borders with the new neighbourhoods. In 
this context, it launched in May 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)11, 
with the objective of “avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between 
the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, 
stability and security of all concerned”.12 The ENP applies to all EU’s 
                                                                                                                                             
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/morocco/morocco_en.htm 
10 Baracani E. (2005); Haddadi S.(2002); Kausch K. (2008); Panebianco S.(2009) 
11 European Commission (2004) “Communication from the Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy – 
Strategy Paper” (Brussels, COM (2004) 373 final, 12 May) 
12 European Commission website - ENP webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm 
 
 
127
immediate neighbourhoods by land or sea13, and consists in the EU’s 
commitment to provide them with “all but institutions”14, which means that it 
can extend to the neighbourhood the economic benefits related to the four 
freedoms (movement of people, capitals, goods and services) and foster 
negative integration (removal of barriers), but it does not entail the prospect of 
membership, not even in the longer term. The ENP is carried out through the 
signing of bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each single neighbour, 
elaborated under the principles of differentiation (country-specific approach) 
and joint-ownership (involvement of the partner country all along the 
elaboration and implementation of the Plan), and covering a wide range of 
policy domains (i.e. enhanced political dialogue and reform; economic and 
social reform and development; trade related issues; market and regulatory 
reform; cooperation in justice and home affairs; transport, energy, information 
society and environment; people-to-people contacts; financial cooperation). 
Main financial instrument supporting the ENP through concrete assistance 
actions is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which 
replaces the MEDA programs. 
As concerns the whole Mediterranean area, the ENP does not substitute the 
EMP but rather is meant to complement her with enforced instruments for 
cooperation. Indeed, the new policy strategy does present some relevant 
differences from the EMP, which make the overall framework of EU’s 
Mediterranean policy resulting in a sort of mixture of different theoretical and 
practical approaches. Main differences between the EMP and the ENP include: 
(a) while the EMP envisaged a multilateral region-building process, the ENP 
relies on a purely bilateral, targeted approach (the differentiation principle); (b) 
while the EMP Association Agreements were unilaterally planned and 
managed by the EU, the ENP Action Plans are elaborated and regularly 
updated with the participation of the beneficiary country (joint-ownership); (c) 
while both the Association Agreements and the Action Plans include clear 
references to the EU values such as human rights and democracy, good 
governance and rule of law, the latter are less keen than the former ones in 
fostering achievements in these spheres. In fact, not only they fail to indicate 
timelines and deadlines for reforms to be adopted, but they also further reduce 
the scope for the use of “negative conditionality”, preferring instead to rely on 
“positive conditionality”; (d) even under a simply conceptual-narrative view, 
while the EMP uses the term partnership, the ENP simply refers to 
                                                                 
13 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
14 Prodi R. (2002)  
 
 
128
neighbourhood, which clearly softens the emphasis on a deeper integration 
rooted on common and shared values and identities.15 
According to the Commission, Morocco has given the ENP a “very warm 
reception and has been very cooperative regarding its implementation”16, being 
indeed among the very first countries to sign an ENP Action Plan with the EU 
in July 2005. Relations between Morocco and the EU under the ENP are framed 
by the following 5 instruments: (1) The ENP Country Report17 - issued by the 
Commission in May 2004 – which constituted a first assessment on how to 
deepen bilateral relations; (2) the ENP EU-Morocco Action Plan18- adopted in 
2005 for a five year period – which sets up the agenda of political and economic 
reforms over the short/medium term;. (3) periodical ENP Progress Reports 
produced by the Commission on the implementation of the Action Plan; (4) the 
ENP Country Strategy Paper 2007 – 201319, which defines 5 strategic axes of co-
operation for the covered period (i.e. development of social policies; economic 
modernisation; institutional support; good governance and human rights; and 
environment protection); and (5) the ENP National Indicative Programmes, 
covering the periods 2007-201020 and 2011-201321, which propose how to 
allocate the budgetary resources directed to Morocco under the ENPI.22  
Overall funding granted to Morocco through the ENPI amounted to €654 
million for the period 2007-2010 and €580 million (planned) for the period 2011-
2013. Further to this, in 2007 Morocco was, along with Ukraine, the first ENP 
partner to receive additional allocations from the Governance Facility, an 
additional fund rewarding countries which made most progress in the field of 
democracy and human rights, according to agreed commitments; the 
additional allocation of €28 million was used for public administration’s 
modernisation, poverty reduction, social services and education programs).23  
                                                                 
15 Panebianco S. (2009) 
16 European Commission (2004a) “Commission Staff Working Paper, ENP Country Report Morocco” (SEC 
2004 569, 12 May 2004) http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/morocco_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf 
17 European Commission (2004a)  
18 European Commission (2005) “ENP EU-Morocco Action Plan” 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 
19 European Commission (2007) “Morocco – Country Strategy Paper 2007 - 2013” 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_morocco_en.pdf 
20 European Commission “ENPI - Morocco 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme” 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_morocco_en.pdf 
21 European Commission “ENPI – Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper Morocco 2007–2010 and 
National Indicative Programme 2011-2013” (in French) 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_csp_nip_morocco_en.pdf 
22 Carafa L. and Korhonen K. (2008); European Commission (Europeaid) website: Morocco webpage 
23 Kausch K. (2008a) 
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The EU-Morocco Action Plan identifies nine priority areas of cooperation, 
namely: legislative reform and international human rights standards; counter-
terrorism; trade liberalisation; creation of a favourable investment climate; 
poverty reduction; education and training; migration; transport; and energy. As 
concerns in particular the section “political dialogue and reforms” – with its 
chapters “democracy and the rule of law” and “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” - planned objectives and measures include: capacity building in 
public administration, decentralisation, access to justice, modernisation of 
courts, prisons and legal procedures, support to implement the IER 
recommendations, adherence to and compliance with international 
conventions, combating corruption, strengthening dialogue on human rights, 
freedom of association and expression, women and children’s rights, and 
cultural and linguistic rights. Though, concerns exist on the extent to which 
such envisaged measures do actually contribute to the declared objective, in so 
far as the Action Plan fails to specify timeframes, actors, implementation and 
evaluation mechanisms defining how and when the envisaged objectives are to 
be achieved.24  
Most remarkably, the formulation of the Action Plan failed to include some 
of the most relevant deeper structural reforms requirements linked to the 
fundamental systemic shortcomings that the Commission had highlighted in its 
2004 Country Report assessment, namely: lack of respect for the constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers; limited powers of parliament and 
government; lack of judiciary’ s independence; weakness of political parties; 
and limited ability of civil society to impact on major political decisions. As 
Kausch critically point out, “the accumulation of more or less connected ad hoc 
reforms is not automatically a process, let alone a transition to democracy. The 
priorities in the political chapters of the ENP Action Plan indirectly support this 
flawed logic by focusing on a collection of selective modernisation measures, 
rather than on a coherent strategy that includes the more delicate aspects of 
systemic level change previously identified as crucial by the Commission’s own 
assessment”.25 
Also, a major shortcoming of the overall EU policy towards Morocco (and 
actually toward North Africa in general) is its failure to directly engage with 
the domestic moderate Islamist political movements/organizations and to 
incorporate them in the implementations of its development assistance and 
                                                                 
24 The Action Plan has indeed been widely criticised for these reasons, including by the European 
Parliament and by a number of Moroccan human rights NGOs consulted by the Commission in 2007. 
(Kausch K., 2008a) 
25 Kausch K. (2008a, 2009b) 
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policy initiatives in the country/region. Indeed, although a quite general  
consensus exists on Islamists groups representing key agents of socio-economic 
change, they keep being ignored by the EU because of the “securitization” 
dynamic. In Morocco, the PJD - as a legally recognized political actor with 
parliamentary representation – does indeed have fairly regular and 
unproblematic contacts with European diplomats,  and also occasional contacts 
occur between European embassies and some illegal but non-violent Islamist 
movements (such as Al Adl); but still - despite frequent abstract declarations of 
intent -  inclusiveness remains theoretical and a development of strategic ties 
via systematic contacts with moderate Islamist groups in the country has not 
yet taken place.26 
Since the adoption of the ENP in 2004, the EU’s policy toward the 
Mediterranean has been kept on this dual track EMP/ENP. However, at the 
Mediterranean Summit of Heads of States and Governments held in Paris in 
July 2008, the French EU Presidency (represented by the then French Prime 
Minister Nicholas Sarkozy) re-launched the Barcelona Process under the new 
label of “Union for the Mediterranean”27, with the aim of infusing a new vitality 
into the Partnership and raising the political level of the strategic EU/South 
relationship. Though in theory the overall objective of the new Barcelona 
Process has remained that of transforming the Mediterranean in an area of 
peace, democracy and prosperity through a multilateral partnership based on 
regional cohesion and integration, the Union practically further fostered the 
shift – already begun with the ENP - toward a more operative dimension, by 
insisting more on specific projects aimed at socio-economic development than 
on the construction of a general framework to promote democratic political 
reforms.28 Main innovations of the Union regard the institutional setting and 
include: (a) a rotating co-presidency with one EU president and one president 
representing the Mediterranean partners; and (b) a Secretariat based in 
Barcelona and responsible for identifying and promoting projects of regional, 
sub-regional and transnational value across different sectors.29 
On the occasion of the EU - Morocco Association Council held on 23 July 
2007, Morocco and the EU decided to launch a joint process aimed at 
strengthening their bilateral relationship: on 13 October 2008, Morocco became 
the first southern Mediterranean country to be granted the Advanced Status, 
supposedly constituting the starting point for a new phase of privileged 
                                                                 
26 Kausch K. and Youngs R.(2008) 
27 Paris Declaration (2008) 
28 Panebianco S. and Rossi R. (2008) 
29 European Commission website - Euro-Med webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm 
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relations. A Joint Document30 was adopted outlining an ambitious road map 
(further reinforced by a subsequent Joint Statement31 adopted after the 2010 
Granada EU-Morocco Summit) covering the political, economic, financial, 
social and human spheres and envisaging specifically the participation of 
Morocco in various EU agencies and programmes as well as its progressive 
integration in the EU common market and the gradual convergence of its 
legislative and regulatory framework to the EU’s acquis communautaire.32 
For Morocco, the main benefits of the new status should consists in its 
emerging as the EU’s closest Mediterranean partner in the Mediterranean as 
well as in boosting its economy, while for the EU, important factors include: 
Morocco’s symbolic choice for Europe; the opening up of Morocco’s market for 
EU exports; and Morocco’s cooperation on key European interests such as 
energy, migration, organised crime and counter-terrorism. Also, being the first 
country to be granted this new status under the ENP, Morocco becomes a key 
EU foreign policy laboratory for the EU to develop a new, more attractive 
formula for its relations with its Southern neighbouring countries where EU 
membership is not an option. 33 
Though, beyond the declaratory effect, the Joint Document doesn’t seems to 
add much in all these fields to what already provided in the ENP Action Plan: 
it does not establish any binding framework for political dialogue; it does not 
grant any substantial concession in fields of strategic interest for Morocco (i.e. 
agricultural trade liberalization34, mobility of Moroccan citizens or level of 
                                                                 
30 Council of the European Union (2007) “Joint Document on the Strengthening of Bilateral 
Relations/Advanced Status” (in French) http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/joint-eu-morocco-document-
strengthening-bilateral-relations-advanced-status 
31 Council of the European Union (2010) “ Joint Statement, EU-Morocco Summit, Granada, 7 March 2010” 
(Brussels, 7220/10, 7 March 2010) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/113247.pdf 
32 As concerns the political and strategic dialogue, the Joint Document provides for: ad hoc summits 
between leaders of both parties - including informal meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers; ad hoc 
sectoral meetings with Moroccan government ministers on the fringes of regular EU Council of 
Ministers meetings; mutual consultation in multilateral fora; ad hoc invitation of the Moroccan 
ambassador to committees and groups of the Council of the EU; eventual participation of Morocco in 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU crisis management operations. In the 
economic field, the med-term objective of a Common Economic Area is established, through four basic 
axes: (a) legislative approximation of Morocco to the acquis communautaire; (b) signing of a deeper and 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement; (c) economic and social cooperation; and (d) accession of 
Morocco to the trans-European networks and sectoral cooperation. (Martín I.,2009) 
33 Kausch K. (2010) 
34 Nb. Well noted that agricultural trade liberalization between Morocco and the UE is probably the 
most crucial point in their bilateral relations, a further in-depth analysis of the issue per se would 
certainly have been of a certain utility, but it would also have gone beyond the scope of this work, 
other than burdening it too much, thus the choice to deliberately leave it aside.     
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financial cooperation); and the envisaged access to further EU financial means 
is deliberately ambiguously worded and deferred until the entry into force the 
new Financial Perspectives in 2014.35 Truly, many of the areas of enhanced 
cooperation covered in the roadmap are either not real novelties or rather 
vague or even both: translating those general declarations into a framework of 
precise, measurable and coherent actions that allow for systematic monitoring 
of progress will be crucial for the success of the new status.36 
Indeed, since the publication of the Joint Document - EU–Morocco relations 
have substantially continued on a business-as-usual mode. More recently,  in 
June 2011, Morocco’s Parliament was accorded by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe the status of Partner for Democracy, a designation - of 
which Morocco is the first beneficiary -  aimed at “strengthening institutional 
cooperation with parliaments of non-member states in neighbouring regions 
wishing to participate in the political debate on common challenges that 
transcend European boundaries.” The decision was welcomed by the Speaker 
of Morocco’s Lower House as part of the country's political and constitutional 
changes intended to bring "unity in diversity, proper economic governance, 
moral public policy and equal opportunities in all fields".37 
                                                                 
35 Martín I. (2009)  
36 Kausch K. (2010) 
37 Council of Europe (2011) “Parliament of Morocco Joins Council of Europe’s Common Home” (Press 
Release, 21 June 2011) http://hub.coe.int/web/coe-
portal/press/newsroom?p_p_id=newsroom&_newsroom_articleId=556541&_newsroom_groupId=10226&_news
room_tabs=newsroom-topnews&pager.offset=0 
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5.2. The United States  
 
Relations between the US and Morocco has always been very good, based 
on mutual cooperation and sustained high-level dialogue, fairly increasingly 
under King Hassan II’s and King Mohammed VI’s reigns. 
As a stable and comparatively moderate Arab Muslim nation, Morocco is 
particularly important to US interests in the Middle East, representing a major 
non-NATO ally and a key partner in promoting security and stability in the 
region, other than participating with US forces in major bilateral operations in the 
African continent. Accordingly, US policy toward Morocco has always been 
seeking sustained and strong engagement, identifying priorities of economic, 
social and political reform as well as of conflict resolution and 
counterterrorism/security cooperation. 
More generally, the US pro-active involvement in the  Middle East and North 
African region take place via trade policy, security cooperation and direct 
democracy assistance, through various channels and initiatives, ether multilateral 
or  bilateral. 
The general multilateral framework for democracy assistance is represented 
by the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, a fairly vague and 
all-encompassing process initiated by the US in 2004 and backed by the G8, the 
EU, the Bretton Woods Institutions and other multilateral bodies. An overarching 
framework which includes various and different activities, its agenda largely 
relies on the results of the 2001 UNDP Arab Human Development Report and 
puts major emphasis on democracy, economic liberalisation, and educational and 
societal changes - supposedly acting complementarily with the parallel Barcelona 
Process.38  
Financially, democracy aid is mainly channelled through the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the funds administered by the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). 
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a Presidential initiative 
established in 2002 as part of President Bush “Forward Strategy for Freedom” to 
bolster democracy and reform in the Middle East and fight terrorism. As the 
                                                                 
38 The institutional structure of the BMENA backed multilateral partnership has crystallised in the 
Forums for the Future, attended by Foreign and Finance Ministers from the region and various global 
actors, and eventually representing a channel for transnational Arab business interests to make their 
voice heard in support of reform. So far, the Forums have taken place in allegedly “progressive” and 
“friendly” states, starting precisely with Morocco in 2004. (Holden P.,2009) 
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BMENA, its agenda was strongly influenced by the results of the 2001 UNDP 
Arab Human Development Report 2002, with a structure which largely mirrors 
the EU’s Euro-Med Partnership and consists of  four pillars: political reform, 
economic liberalization, education and women’s empowerment. Based at the 
State Department, it operates through funding targeted projects on a national and 
regional level, mostly adopting a top-down approach. In Morocco, it mainly 
supports domestic NGOs with small grants (totalling approximately $1 million 
per year) in their efforts towards advancing peace, participatory democracy, and 
Moroccan citizens prosperity (mainly projects for civil society capacity building, 
public awareness campaigns and civic responsibility outreach).39  
Most of the democracy assistance funds are administered by the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) - the traditional American agency for 
economic assistance - and specifically by its Democracy and Governance Unit. The 
DG Unit mainly focuses on economic reform, democracy and governance, by 
following a rather balanced bottom-up/top-down approach. In Morocco, USAID 
(and its predecessor agencies) has managed an active and effective assistance 
program since 1953, exceeding $2 billion over its lifetime. USAID funding for 
Morocco has actually decreased since the 1990s – when it  engaged in extensive 
support to corruption awareness campaigns and governance reforms efforts – but 
is still remarkable: the current USAID/Morocco multi-sectoral assistance program 
totals $131 million for the period 2009-2013 and is centered around the three 
strategic objectives of enhancing trade and investment opportunities, improving 
basic education and workforce training, and fostering government 
responsiveness to citizens needs.40 
The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is a global financial instrument that 
operates through a rigid allocative conditionality, whereby countries which are 
judged to have achieved certain standards of political liberty, good governance, 
regulatory quality and economic freedom – rigorously assessed through a 
complex accumulation of indicators - are rewarded with funds to be used for 
their domestic development strategies. So far, Morocco is the only North African 
country to have qualified for the MCA: in August 2007, a US-Morocco MCA was 
signed for a total $697.5 million over 5 years, designed to stimulate economic 
growth by increasing productivity and improving employment in high-potential 
sectors, such as artisanal crafts and fishing.41 
As concerns instead the US trade policy in the Middle East, it is carried out 
though bilateral agreements – either Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or more modest 
                                                                 
39 Huber D. (2008); US Department of State website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm 
40 Huber D. (2008); USAID website: Morocco webpage http://transition.usaid.gov/ma/ 
41 Holden P. (2009); Arieff A. (2012) 
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Trade and Investments Framework Agreements (TIFAs) – within the overall 
frameworks of the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) initiative, launched in 
2003 with the aim to create a wider free trade area in the region. Mainly 
implemented through the US Trade Representative, the MEFTA aims at 
developing a form of open regionalism, linked to the US and in line with WTO 
rules, upon the believe that trade and investment cooperation is likely to support 
the rule of law and development efforts in general,  thus improving the whole 
regional climate. So far, Morocco is the only North African country to have 
signed an FTA in 2004 (the others having signed only more modest TIFAs). 
Despite dealing specifically with commercial/economic issues, the scope of the 
agreement seems to be backed rather on political reasons, with Morocco 
emphasising its open liberalised nature mostly to ensure international support. 
Entered into force in January 2006, the US-Morocco FTA eliminated tariffs on 95% 
of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products (with all remaining tariffs 
to be eliminated within 9 years), other than envisaging a comprehensive series of 
measures covering intellectual property rights protection, transparency in 
government procurement, investment, services, e-commerce, labour, and 
environmental protection – soon leading to more than a tripling of both the 
bilateral trade and the annual flow of US investment in the country.42 
Lastly, a cornerstone of US-Morocco relationship is represented by the 
cooperation on security matters,43 which has particularly been strengthened in 
recent years (after September 11) by counter-terrorism cooperation: Morocco is 
part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, has hosted and participated in NATO 
military exercises and has joined NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour 
(monitoring the Mediterranean Sea), further to regularly holding bilateral US-
Moroccan military exercises. Security assistance includes the Foreign Military 
Financing grants;44 the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
support;45 the Excess Defence Articles grants; and the assistance administered 
through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).46 
 
 
 
                                                                 
42 Arieff A. (2012); US Department of State website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm 
43 Arieff A. (2012) 
44 Aimed at: maintaining aging US origin equipment (aircrafts and transportation vehicles); boosting 
maritime surveillance to address illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking and illicit fishing; 
procuring transport and logistics equipment; and upgrade aerial surveillance. 
45 Through which Senior Military Officers receive training in the US. 
46 An US inter-agency regional program (State Department, Defence Department, and USAID) aimed 
at increasing North and West African states’ capacity to counter terrorism. 
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5.3. The Middle East and North African Region 
 
Morocco generally holds good ties with most countries in the broad Middle 
East and North Africa region, being also member of many regional economic 
and political organizations. Most relevant memberships include the League of 
Arab States,47 the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU),48 the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC),49 the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),50 the 
Agadir Agreement,51 and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)52.  
Morocco is very active in Maghreb and African affairs, being particularly 
involved in developing the North African regional economy and keeping good 
relationships with its Maghreb neighbours (except for Algeria), but also 
maintaining good ties with the West Africa and the Sahel region.  
Also, Morocco has always showed a certain commitment to support the 
peace process in the Middle East, encouraging Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
and urging moderation on both sides.53 Morocco-Israel economic and political 
ties were significantly strengthened after the 1993 Oslo accords, entailing also 
the opening of bilateral liaison offices (which were though closed in 2000 
following sustained Israeli-Palestinian violence). 
Morocco also traditionally maintains close relations with the Gulf Arab 
states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) 
– grouped in the political and economic union of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) - which have so far provided the country with substantial amounts of 
                                                                 
47 The Arab League is a regional organisation of Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa region 
- created in 1945 by six countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria) and currently 
consisting of 22 members – envisaging closer relations and collaboration on both the economic and 
political spheres. 
48 The AMU is a trade agreement signed in 1989 by the Arab countries in the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), aiming at economic and some sort of future political unity. 
Though, the union is currently inactive and frozen due to the deep political-economical disagreements 
between Morocco and Algeria (mainly regarding Western Sahara). 
49 The OIC is an international organisation created in 1969 and consisting of 57 member states, which 
aim at representing the collective voice of the Muslim community (Ummah) around the world as well 
as to safeguard and ensure its interests and well-being. 
50 The CEN-SAD is an agreement between countries in the Sahel and Saharan region, established in 
1988 and currently consisting of 28 members, aiming at achieving economic unity through the creation 
of a free trade area in the region. 
51 The Agadir Agreement is a free trade agreement between Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, signed 
in Rabat in 2004 and aiming at creating a free trade zone between the Arabic Mediterranean countries. 
52 The GAFTA is a pan-Arab free trade area established in 1997 by 14 Arab countries and strongly 
backed by the Arab League. 
53 Remarkably, in 1986 King Hassan II took the daring decision to invite the then-Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres for talks, becoming only the second Arab leader to host an Israeli leader. 
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financial assistance. Morocco's identity as an Arab Muslim state facilitates its 
ties with these countries, particularly after the 9/11 and the start of the "war on 
terror" (a trend confirmed by the relevant growth of the GCC investment in the 
country in the last decade). Remarkably, in the face of the recent 2011 turmoil 
of the Arab Spring, the conservative monarchies of the GCC have started 
adopting a certain defensive and self-preservation stand, trying to recalibrate 
their security alliances and expand their partnerships, which ultimately 
resolved in their proposal to extend the GCC membership to the non-gulf states 
of Morocco and Jordan. Most likely, the reason behind the Council’s interest is 
its desire to influence in a reactionary sense the course of domestic reforms 
within the non-oil monarchies: while the Gulf monarchies with their 
comfortable fiscal positions due to oil revenues were able to resist pressure to 
reform by granting generous benefits to their subjects, non oil-monarchies such 
as Morocco were instead forced to announce (and adopt) broad political 
reforms, including constitutional revisions. Indeed, reaction to the membership 
proposal in Morocco has been pretty cautious: the King certainly wants his 
strategic relations with the GCC to deepen, but he also well aware of the huge 
economic mismatch between the country and the Gulf States, and of the 
different social contract that ties him to his subjects. Indeed, the King did leave 
the prospect of closer integration with the GCC open, but nevertheless 
respected the clear timetable of reforms he had promised, sending a clear 
message that Morocco is unlikely to be part of a reactionary bloc intent on 
defending the status quo. 54 
Overall, whereas Morocco’s relations with countries in the broad MENA 
region are certainly wide and strong, they are somehow less relevant to the 
analysis presented in this work, as the external influence upon Moroccan 
domestic dynamic exerted by these countries is of minor entity, particularly if 
compared to the pressure exerted by the EU and the US.  
                                                                 
54 Achy L. (2011); Boukhars A. (2011) 
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5.4. International Organizations and NGOs 
 
As already shown earlier in this work (Parag. 4.2.1.), during the 1970s  
Morocco experienced a phase of positive economic growth mainly driven by 
the boom of the phosphate prices, which made possible the adoption of a 
populist development model characterized by huge state intervention in the 
economy, high public spending and large distributive social policies. Though, 
as by the early 1980s this positive economic trend started to reverse and the 
unsustainability of the model become evident, the government, faced to a 
severe economic recession complemented by dramatic public finances 
situation, had to revise its economic and social policy and turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) for 
implementing an austerity program of economic adjustment.  
In 1982, upon recommendation of these two international financial 
institutions, it a  adopted a Structural Adjustment Plan which introduced a wide 
range of neo-liberal economic measures such as severe cuts in public spending, 
a vast privatization program, a gradual retreat of the state from social welfare 
and a general expansion of the private sector, together with the passing of a 
new legislation fostering national and foreign investments. In that period, both 
the IMF and the WB appeared not be very concerned with the political changes 
deemed to accompany economic reforms, and largely refrained from 
intervening in the political sphere. 
Since then, the country has maintained stable relations with both 
institutions, which have indeed started since the 1990s to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach in their assessments/evaluations of the country’s 
economic progresses, by largely including concerns/recommendations 
regarding important structural political and social reforms. 
In its most recent country assessment55, the International Monetary Fund 
praised with much fervour Morocco for  its “sound macroeconomic policies 
and structural and political reforms” that have helped the country to 
successfully face the global crisis and respond to pressing social needs - as the 
passionate words of the IMF Alternate Executive Director for Morocco confirm: 
“After demonstrating strong resilience to the global financial crisis and the food 
and fuel price shock, Morocco is undergoing a major reform process to meet the 
expectations of its population toward more democracy and inclusiveness, 
increased employment opportunities, and improved social conditions. Early 
commitment of the highest authorities to political reform in response to the 
                                                                 
55 IMF (2011) “Morocco: 2011 Article IV Consultation- Staff Report” 
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‘Arab Spring’ has paved the way for a peaceful and orderly transition to a 
constitutional and democratic monarchy. The new constitution approved on 
July 1 consecrates the rule of law, the principles of good governance, human 
rights protection and gender and regional equality, and strengthens the role 
and accountability of the executive branch, the responsibilities and oversight of 
parliament, as well as the independence of the judiciary”. 56 
Though, the report did not fail to stress a series of further challenges to be 
urgently met in order for these measures to work effectively: (a) contain public 
expenditure (through reforming the generalized subsidies system, broadening 
the tax base and improving tax administration); (b) improve expenditures’ 
efficiency and quality to allow for sufficient and well-targeted social spending; 
(c) embark in the move to a flexible exchange rate in order to enhance 
competitiveness, but only after careful consideration of the timing and upon 
coordination with other necessary preparatory macroeconomic measures; and 
(d) adopt additional measures to strengthen governance, the business climate, 
trade integration with EU, human capital, private investment and labour 
market flexibility. 
Similar optimist appraisals have been widely expressed in the most recent 
years by the World Bank, which is variously engaged in the country in 
supporting the government’s development reform agenda. Significantly, the 
World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2013 for Morocco starts by 
affirming that “Morocco’s considerable development achievements over the 
past decade have initiated a process of social and economic transformation, 
positioning the country as one of the leading reformers in the MENA region”.57 
Though, along with the progresses achieved, it also stresses the still poor 
human development outcomes as a major challenge for the country, and 
suggests a development strategy based on three main coordinated pillars: (1) 
achieve higher growth and competitiveness with employment creation; (2) 
reduce social disparities and improve service delivery to citizens; and (3) 
ensure environmental sustainability. Such a strategy is deemed to require a 
combination of: higher quality human capital, improved business environment, 
better and cheaper access to key infrastructure services, a more competitive 
private sector, effective social protection systems and safety nets, reduction of 
the rural-urban gap, improvement of the women’s lagging condition, and 
solutions to the increasing vulnerability to climate change.  
                                                                 
56 Statement by Mohammed Daïri, IMF Alternate ED for Morocco, 5 October2011 (IMF, 2011) 
57 World Bank (2009) “Morocco - Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2013.” 
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Practically, the World Bank Group assistance to the country consists in 
supporting the implementation of the government reform program, in 
particular as concerns the upcoming challenges typical of second generation 
reforms, the areas requiring inter-agency coordination, and capacity building at 
large. Other than financial support through its Development Policy Loans (DPLs) 
and Specific Investment Loans (SILs), its significant contribution entails analytical 
work, advisory assistance and help on “the how to” of implementation. As part 
of the WB Group, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) has committed to lend $600 million annually over the period 2010-2013, 
while the International Finance Corporation (IFC) is deploying a sizable 
investment program - contingent on demand and market conditions – 
specifically in the financial, infrastructure, high value-added manufacturing, 
agribusiness and social (health and education) sectors.58 
Also, Morocco is strongly financially supported by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), actually being the largest of all the Bank’s client 
countries - with a total financing reaching $9 billion to date. After the country 
performance assessment held in 2005, the Bank ranked Morocco in the first 
group of the Bank’s most successful countries (with a total rating of 4.28 out of 
6). However, it also identified several areas in which the country still had 
serious shortcomings, namely: (a) public governance consolidation; (b) 
economic cooperation and regional integration; (c) government poverty and 
exclusion control policies; and (d) environment policies and regulations. 
Following this assessment, the Bank further committed to a Country Program for 
the period 2007-2011 in support of the government ongoing and new projects - 
amounting to $2,9 billion59 - which focused on three pillars: (1) strengthening of 
governance; (2) development and upgrade of infrastructure and enterprises; 
and (3) human development promotion.60The most recent Country Program for 
the period 2012-201661 it’s in strong continuity the previous one, reorganizing the 
former three pillars around two pillars: (1) strengthening of governance and 
social inclusion; and (2) support for development of “green” infrastructure. 
Finally, as already seen in earlier paragraphs in this work (particularly in 
Chap. 3), there are numerous International Non-Governmental Organizations 
which operate in Morocco, conducting researches, issuing reports and actively 
                                                                 
58 World Bank (2009) “Morocco - Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2013.” 
59 African Development Bank (2012) “The African Development Bank Group in North Africa 2012- A Year of 
Transitions” (African Development Bank, 2012) 
60 African Development Bank (2006) “Kingdom of Morocco – 2007-2011 Country Strategy Paper” (African 
Development Bank, Operation Department, February 2006) 
61 African Development Bank (2006) “Kingdom of Morocco – 2011-2016 Country Strategy Paper” (African 
Development Bank, Operation Department, February 2011) 
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campaigning/advocating on a wide range of themes mainly concerning 
democracy, transparency, corruption and human rights; among these, the most 
important are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, Save the 
Children, Transparency International. Along with them, there is also a 
remarkable involvement of many of the United Nations Agencies, namely the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization 
(UNESCO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
To sum up, this work carried out a somehow comprehensive analysis of 
Morocco’s recent developments and reforms in the whole political and socio-
economic environment, articulated in the following parts: (1) political system 
and constitutional framework; (2) civil rights/freedoms and civil society; (3) 
socio-economic development; (4) external pressures and influences on domestic 
dynamics.  
Final aim of such analysis was  to assess two interrelated questions: (1) is 
the country being endorsing a truly “new development model” on the road to a 
comprehensive path of democratization, or is it rather being trapped into a 
“stalled democratization”, or even just being adopting a “piecemeal strategy” of ad 
hoc and often superficial reforms which cannot be described as a real process of  
transition?; and (2) should Morocco’s partial resilience to the recent 2011/2012 
Arab Spring be considered as the sign of a substantial population’s satisfaction 
with the country’s socio-economic conditions and with the allegedly ongoing 
democratization path, or is rather the result of a smart “survival strategy” by 
part of the Monarchy which is able to handle - through a successful mix of 
concessions and suppression – the demands for change coming from the 
masses?    
Indeed, what immediately emerges from the above presented analysis is 
first of all the impossibility to offer a clear-cut and definitive answer to both 
questions, so that the most suitable possible answers result to be precisely a 
nuanced balance between the different theses; evidence shows that: (1) some 
kind of a democratic transition did actually started in Morocco, but it’s a path 
which is hindered by too many grey areas and where the piecemeal approach is 
still too much present to be make it possible to speak of a genuine transition of 
the whole system; and (2) the milder and softer Arab Spring which took place 
in the country testifies that despite Moroccans do have claims concerning the 
political and socio-economic situation in the country, these don’t go further 
beyond to question the legitimacy and authority of the Monarchy, which has 
thus been able to endorse their requests in a peaceful way and adopt a survival 
strategy allowing it to preserve its privileged power position in the system by 
relinquishing parts of ifs powers.   
These conclusions are drawn upon the evidence appearing from the 
analysis of each one of the above-mentioned spheres, a recapitulating summary 
of which is drafted in the below paragraphs. 
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6.1. The Political System and Constitutional Framework  
 
As concerns the political system and constitutional framework, we saw a 
gradual opening of the political ground starting under Mohammed V (1956 - 
1961) and being carried on – through cycles of liberalizations and authoritarian 
revivals - by its successor Hassan II (1961 - 1999), though the biggest push for 
democratic reforms is probably the one being endorsed by the now ruling King 
Mohammed VI (1999 - present).  
Major reforms involved the two constitutional reforms of 1993 and 1996, 
which entailed in particular the introduction of a bicameral Parliament 
complemented with a gradual and limited extension of its powers. Major 
parliamentary elections were held in June 1993, November 1997, September 
2002 and September 2007, significantly representing historic turning points: the 
1997 elections saw for the first time an Islamic Party (the PJD) being legally 
allowed to compete in political elections, as well as the first alternance 
government being formed, while the 2002 and the following 2007 elections 
were both hailed as the most fair and transparent in Morocco’s history that far. 
Though, the most recent and possibly important turning point was the 
adoption of a new constitution in July 2011 - in response of the 2011 mass 
protests spread out over the country – followed by new parliamentary elections 
held in November 2011. An overall digest of the most relevant democratic 
reforms introduced with the new text include: 
? The assertion - in the Preamble - of the principles of participation, 
pluralism, good governance, respect for the democratic rule of law, liberty, 
solidarity, equality and social justice as the foundations of Morocco’s state. 
? The recognition of the country’s cultural and linguistic intrinsic pluralism, 
granting the Amazigh language the status of official language along with 
the Arab, and granting the Hassani language the right to be preserved and 
protected. 
? The introduction of a whole new section (Title II) granting the 
fundamental freedoms and rights of the individuals, which remarkably 
extended the set of individual liberties constitutionally protected. 
? Along with the previous point, the notable extension of the guarantees 
granted to the various forms of collective aggregation and representation 
of citizens. 
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? The recognition of the Judiciary as an independent power (instead than 
simply as an independent authority) vis-à-vis the legislative and executive 
powers. 
? The introduction of a whole new section (Title XI) on good governance, 
including, among others, guarantees against corruption in the Public 
Administration, as well as the establishment of a National Council on 
Human Rights and of a national Ombudsman for citizens’ complaints 
against the Public Administration. 
? The introduction of new provisions allowing for more territorial 
pluralism, decentralization and regionalization. 
? The reduction of the prerogatives pertaining to the King, at the advantage 
of those of the Head of Government and of the Parliament. In particular: 
the assertion of its dual supremacy as both political and religious leader is 
split in two separated spheres; he is not anymore recognized as “sacred”; 
he must appoint the Head of Government from within the party winning 
the elections and not anymore on his own autonomous will; he is now 
required to preliminarily consult with the Head of Government, may he 
want to terminate the mandate of one or more of the Cabinet members.  
? The expansion of the prerogatives pertaining to the Head of Government, 
namely: he can demand the King to terminate the functions of one or more 
of the Cabinet members; he can be delegated the presidency of a Council 
of Ministers by the King;  he presides over the Council of Government, 
which prepares the general policy of the state (a power previously held by 
the King); he can dissolve the Lower House after consulting the King and 
the Presidents of that Chamber and of the Constitutional Court (another 
power previously held by the King); he makes appointments to civil 
offices in the public administration and to high functions of public 
establishments and enterprises, besides making proposals to the Council 
of Ministers for the appointment of other major civil offices (all 
appointments previously pertaining to the King). Previously, his powers 
were virtually limited to the exercise of the regulatory power and the 
coordination of the different Ministers’ activities. 
? The expansion of the prerogatives pertaining to the Parliament, in 
particular: the explicit recognition of Morocco as a parliamentary other than 
a constitutional, democratic and social Monarchy; the expansion of the 
areas of competence of the Legislative Power from the 9 listed in the 
previous text to the 29 listed in the new one;  the simplification of the 
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requirements for proposing a motion of censure over the government by 
part of the Parliament. 
Remarkably, after the adoption of the new constitution in July 2011, the 
parliamentary elections held in November 2011 saw the affirmation of the 
moderate Islamist PJD as the first political force at the national level  (gaining 
the largest parliamentary representation, although not a majority), making his 
leader Benkirane the new Prime Minister, and representing a striking turning 
point in Morocco’s history. 
Though, despite such a truly comprehensive set of reforms, Morocco’s 
political landscape still appears to be flawed by serious and quite structural 
faults, which makes its democratic profile fairly defective in the following 
points:  
? Concentration of power in the hands of the Monarchy  
Despite a reduction in its powers, the King is still granted an absolutely 
unique position in the political system and keeps maintaining extremely 
extensive prerogatives:  he is the Commander of the Faithful, Guarantor of 
the respect of Islam and of the free exercise of beliefs, and Chair of the 
Superior Council of the Ulemas; he is Head and Supreme Representative of 
the State, Symbol of National Unity, Supreme Arbiter between the 
Institutions, and Guarantor of the Constitution as well as of the rights and 
freedoms of the citizens and social groups; his constitutional rights are 
hereditary; his person is inviolable; he appoints the Head of Government 
and, upon this latter’s recommendation, the others Cabinet members 
(whose services he can terminate upon his own initiative, after consulting 
with the Head of Government); he traditionally holds complete autonomy 
over the choice of the five Sovereignty Ministers (Justice, Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Islamic Affairs); he is the Commander-in-chief of the 
Royal Armed Forces, with the right to make civil and military 
appointments and presides over the Superior Council of Security; he can 
accredit ambassadors to foreign nations and international organisations 
and sign and ratify treaties; he presides over the Supreme Council of the 
Judicial Power and approves the appointment of magistrates by part of 
this latter; he can exercise the right of pardon; any law adopted by the 
Parliament, in order to take effect, has to be promulgated by Royal Decree 
within 30 days following its receipt by the Government, and he can 
request a second (and due) reading by the two Houses of any draft bill or 
proposed law; thanks to a non-restrictive interpretation of former art. 29 
(“the King shall, by Royal Decrees, exercise the statutory powers explicitly 
conferred upon him by the Constitution”), he has traditionally been 
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allowed to legislate in any area he deemed appropriate - a situation which 
is unlikely to be changed by the new spelling of the now art. 42 (stating 
that “the King exercises these missions by Dahirs by virtue of the power 
that are expressly devolved to him by the Constitution”); he can dissolve 
one or both of the Houses of Parliament, after consulting with the 
Presidents of the two Houses and the Chair of the Constitutional Council; 
he can declare the State of Emergency by royal decree in case of threats to 
the integrity of the national territory or to the regular course of action of 
the constitutional institutions (though, not entailing the dissolution of the 
legislature). Furthermore, besides being formally empowered by the 
constitution of such extensive powers, he has also traditionally being 
informally ruling the country through the shadow governance structure of 
the Makhzen, the Moroccan traditional governing elite loyal to him, which 
dictate the main lines of policy and act as a gatekeeper for any kind of 
political reform. 
? Absence of a credible system of check and balances 
As a result of the above-mentioned faults, a true and credible system of 
check and balances is missing both as concerns the Parliamentary control 
over the Executive and the Judiciary’s control over the system as a whole. 
Indeed, the King supervises the work of the cabinet, the legislature and 
the judiciary; the executive power is utterly biased towards the King, with 
the powerful Sovereign Ministries being accountable directly to him. The 
Title VI of the Constitution, regulating the relations between the 
Parliament and the King and between the Parliament and the Executive, 
allows for a wide control power of the King over the Parliament against a 
restricted space for supervisory checks of the Parliament over the 
Executive. The judiciary lacks sufficient capacity to fully perform its 
functions and also lacks independence from the other branches, as well as 
from the King, due to his role as the Chair of the Supreme Council of 
Magistracy (the body responsible for the appointment, discipline and 
promotion of judges). 
? Lack of meaningful elite change 
Despite some changes in the composition of the politically relevant elite 
witnessed under Mohamed VI, major changes in elites’ attitude and 
behaviour apparently failed to occur. Indeed, if a general broadening of the 
relevant elites did occur - with the inclusion of new actors from civil 
society and political parties, such as Islamists, entrepreneurs, 
businesspeople, and especially bureaucrats and technocrats – what 
appears to have totally remained unchanged is the mode of elite 
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recruitment and advancement, which has traditionally been relying solely 
on the King’s discretionary willing. Further, when considering the circles 
which are most close to the King, even the extent of the access of new 
actors appears to be fairly limited, connoting such changes rather as an 
“elite recycling” process than as an “elite renewal” - with the informal 
system of personal and clientelistic network based on the Makhzen being 
left almost completely unchanged. 
? Corruption and nepotism. 
Corruption - both financial and misuse of authority and power - is a major 
problem in Morocco, recognised by foreign as well as domestic analyses, 
and particularly by Moroccan citizens, as testified by the extremely bad 
public perceptions upon corruption and upon government’s remedial 
actions which are reported in national opinion surveys. Corruption and 
nepotism in the country Morocco are present in virtually all sectors and 
particularly in the political sphere, likely being favoured by a series of 
factors such as, among others: the elite-driven and clientelistic way the 
power is exercised; the existence of a large informal sector; the huge 
failures of the justice system; the significant presence of drug trafficking in 
the North. Domestic media and civil society have long been strongly 
publicising the issue and calling for a government action toward it. As a 
result, several public anti-corruption initiatives were taken under 
Mohamed VI; though, both the prosecutions against officials and the other 
anti-corruption measures taken have been accused of targeting only petty 
corruption, whereby high profile cases and cases where involving the 
government's style of governance have been promptly closed down in 
order to avoid political embarrassment. 
? Low turnout and popular depoliticization 
Figures on turnout in Morocco’s legislative elections have been 
traditionally strikingly low already since the 1997 elections (58%), but has 
had a remarkable downward trend plunging down to 51% in 2002 before 
reaching a worrying historical low of  37% in 2007. The increase to 45% in 
the official figure of the 2011 elections – although several doubts have 
been raised on its validity – is most likely to be ascribed to the 
exceptionality of the moment than to a trend’s reversal. Indeed, voter’s 
dissatisfaction testified by the above-mentioned figures is probably not 
simply related to the choice of parties and candidates running in the 
elections, but it most probably regards the broader political system – most 
likely being the sign of a diffuse popular apathy, disenchantment, and lack 
of enthusiasm, due to the widespread perception of the elections 
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meaningfulness. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the lowest turnout 
rates were registered not among the rural, poor and uneducated segments 
of the populations, but rather among the urban middle-class, mostly 
comprised of educated and unemployed young people, a fact which could 
suggest that abstensionism was more an act of passive protest intended to 
penalize the regime than just simply a passive act of renounce and apathy. 
? Weakness of political parties and co-optation of political opposition by 
part of the Monarchy.  
Despite the long tradition of multi-partitism in Morocco - formally 
introduced in the aftermath of its independence in 1962 - domestic 
political parties (both secular and Islamist ones) have generally always 
been fragile and weak, traditionally playing a rather marginal role in the 
country’s political decision-making. Such a weakness most likely comes 
out from their extremely high fragmentation (there are currently over 30 
registered parties in the country), which has always offered the King an 
easy possibility to play a divide-et-impera game at his own only advantage. 
On the one hand, the historical opposition parties (USFP, Istiqlal) do have 
solid bases of support and well established party structures, but they also 
have very generic and similar political platforms (unemployment’s 
reduction, development) and, while asking for  constitutional reforms to 
enhance parliament’s powers and judiciary’s independence, they 
nonetheless never challenge the monarch’s authority. On the other hand, 
Islamist parties and organizations are less fragmented and more tightly 
organized than secular ones, as well as more ideological, more vigorous 
and often younger;  but they are also untried, having being banned for 
years (the PJD has been for long the only legally recognized political party 
in the country). In addition to them, there is the large panoply of non-
violent Islamist movements and organizations (including the Movement 
for Unity and Reform and openly anti-monarchist and socially 
revolutionary Justice and Charity) still not recognized as political parties. 
Indeed, Islamist parties and organizations are likely to constitute the only 
potential serious challenge to the Monarchy, which has indeed provided 
to strictly restrain such risk, either by imposing severe requirements for 
obtaining official recognition and by co-optation the already registered 
parties. 
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6.2. Civil Rights and Freedoms and Civil Society  
 
As concerns the sphere of civil rights and freedoms and civil society, 
evidence suggests that despite the undoubted progress and improvements 
achieved in particular under Mohammed VI, several and remarkable flaws still 
persist – partly on the legal side but mostly on the implementation side. 
Major shortcomings in this sense can be highlighted in the following areas: 
? Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association in Morocco is granted by art. 29 of the 
Constitution, regulated by the Law on Association (Royal Dahir 1-58-376) 
and further asserted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). In theory, the law provides for a declarative instead than a 
prior-authorization regime, meaning that in order to be legal, associations 
have just to declare their creation to authorities, with no need of any prior 
authorization. The only restrictions to this freedom allowed by the law is 
in case “its cause or objective is illegal, contrary to good morals, harmful 
to the Islamic religion, the integrity of national territory or the monarchical 
regime, or calls for discrimination”. Though, practically, this regime fails 
to be put in place as many associations often face a “legal harassment” by 
part of the local authorities responsible for handling the declarations: 
these latter indeed,  do routinely disregard the legal procedures, opposing 
an administrative obstruction to the declaration process - either by refusing 
to receive the association’s founding documents, or by accepting these 
documents but refusing to issue the provisional receipt confirming the place 
and date of their submission. As a result, these associations are left in a 
sort of legal limbo whereby they are not entitled to the set of prerogatives 
that the law grants to those legally recognized. 
? Freedom of Assembly 
Freedom of Assembly is also granted by art. 29 of the Constitution, 
regulated by the Law on Public Gatherings (Dhahir No. 1-58-377) and 
further protected by the ICCPR, which excludes any restrictions other than 
those imposed in conformity with the law for the same reasons stated for 
the right of association (i.e. the safeguard of national security, public 
safety or public order, the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others). Indeed, the margins 
allowed by Moroccan law to authorities to restrict this freedom are pretty 
large: only legal political parties, trade unions, and professional 
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associations are entitled to hold public demonstrations, and although no 
prior authorization is required, authorities need to receive notification of 
the planned event 3 days in advance and may forbid it if deemed likely to 
disturb public order. Truly, public gatherings and demonstrations are 
normally tolerated by the regime (with the notable exception of the 
Saharawis’ ones), although the recent protests spread out since February 
2011 saw several cases of harsh attacks and beatings by part of the police, 
with hundreds of protesters being detained - most of which being 
released, but many others being tried and sentenced to prison. 
? Freedom of Movement 
Freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation are granted by art. 24 of the Constitution and is generally 
respected, despite some sporadic exceptions (i.e. cases have been reported 
of  restrictions to travel outside the country imposed by the Interior 
Ministry to civil servants, mostly teachers and military personnel, as well 
as cases of illegal immigrants expelled into the desert bordering Algeria 
with no food and water or any kind of assistance). 
? Freedom of the Media and Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of thought, opinion and expression as well as press freedom are 
formally granted by the Constitution (art. 25 and art. 28), along with  the 
right of access to information held by public administrations/services and 
elected institutions, although this latter can be restricted by the law in 
order to assure the protection of national defence or internal and external 
security, as well as citizens’ private life, freedoms and rights (art. 27). 
Indeed, precise red lines exist which include questioning the integrity of 
the Monarchy, the state officials, Islam and national territory. Several 
forms of speech and expression are criminalized under Moroccan law well 
beyond the limits allowed from international law, conducting in many 
cases to arrests, condemns and imprisonment of journalists. According to 
many international observers, critical journalism and critical expression in 
the country result to be widely harassed by government authorities 
through various means, such as legal prosecutions against journalists or 
activists (with huge fines or prison condemns), revoking of licenses, 
suspension/confiscation of publications, financial boycott, and 
occasionally also direct physical attacks. Indeed, Freedom House reports a 
gradually deteriorating Press Freedom Index for Morocco in the last decade, 
stating the country’s media as passing from a “Partly Free” status in 2000 
to a “Not Free” status in 2011. 
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? Freedom of Religion 
Although Islam is recognized as the country’s state religion, freedom of 
religion is nonetheless granted to all Moroccans by the Constitution 
(Preamble, art. 3 and art. 41), other than by art. 18 of the ICCP. Though, 
the law envisages and the government put in place several restrictions on 
this right and various forms of discrimination between the different 
religious minorities are often operated. Among the most relevant pitfalls: 
the teaching of the approved Islamic doctrine and the prevention of 
extremist rhetoric is ensured by the close monitoring and guidance of the 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA) over the Friday 
mosque sermons and the Koranic schools; any expression of opinion 
alleged to offend Islam can be legally prosecuted; while Sunni Muslims 
are allowed to proselytize others, the law explicitly prohibits others to 
proselytize Sunni Muslims; Judaism enjoys a protected status vis-à-vis 
other religions and non-majority forms of Islam; the distribution of non-
Muslim religious materials is forbidden; the Shia Muslims’ and Christians’ 
small communities are closely monitored by the authorities and the police; 
the government is entitled to summarily expel, without due process, any 
foreign resident alleged to be "a threat to public order”. 
? Women rights 
Among Arab Muslim countries, Morocco stands remarkably progressive 
in terms of women rights. The new constitution formally guarantees 
equality between man and women (art. 19) and in 2004 major progressive 
reforms have been brought to the Family Code (Moudawana) improving 
women’s rights in marriage, divorce and child custody. Major reforms 
enshrined in the new Moudawana include: rising of the minimum age for 
marriage from 15 to 18; abolishment of the marital tutor as a pre-condition 
of marriage for women; limits to polygamy; right to divorce recognized to 
both man and women; joint responsibility of both spouses on family. 
Though, despite these positive achievements, the new code still preserves 
discriminatory provisions regarding inheritance rights and the right of 
husbands to unilaterally repudiate their wives. But the most worrying 
concerns reside in its implementation, which is problematic as it largely 
depends on the judiciary’s willingness to enforce it and the content and 
intents of the new code remain controversial and not widely agreed. 
Finally, a worrying pitfall is the still on-going absence of a specific 
legislation addressing or criminalizing violence against women,  so that 
real women conditions are still lacking concrete protection and safeguard. 
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? Human rights violations 
Despite substantial improvements in the recent years, human rights 
protection in Morocco still remains an issue of major concern, particularly 
with regard to two main areas: (a)  Illegal detentions, mistreatments and 
torture under Counter-terrorism Law; and (b) Human rights abuses in 
Western Sahara and on Saharawi Activists. 
As concerns point (a): numerous allegations have recently been reported 
of illegal detentions, mistreatment and torture perpetrated by the security 
forces against persons suspected of links to terrorism; this was largely 
prompted by the excessively broad scope of the 2003 Counter-terrorism 
Law, adopted immediately after the 2003 Casablanca bombings, which 
gave the government an almost unlimited legal margin to limit human 
rights and basic civil liberties of Moroccans. This law stands in sharp 
contrast with the remarkable steps recently undertaken by the country to 
commit itself towards torture’s and ill-treatment’s prevention, namely: 
ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1993; amendment of the Penal Code 
in 2006 by prohibiting torture and bringing the code’s definition of torture 
closer to the one in the UN Convention; lifting of reservations to art. 20 
and art. 22 of the UN Convention, thereby recognizing the competence of 
the Committee against Torture to open investigations; new articles in the 
2011 Constitution expressly prohibiting torture (art. 22) and arbitrary or 
secret detention and forced disappearances (art. 23); establishment in 1990 
of the Moroccan Human Rights Advisory Council (CCDH) then replaced 
in 2011 by the National Human Rights Council (CNDH); establishment of 
the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) in 2004, as the first equity 
commission in the Arab world,  tasked with addressing human rights 
abuses perpetrated by Moroccan authorities during 1956-1999 and 
providing victims with reparations. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2003 
bombings, over 1,500 suspected Islamists extremists were arrested with 
the charge of “belonging to a terrorist network”, and since then several 
allegations of security forces abuses and mistreatments have been 
reported, especially cases of “disappearances”. Among the most common 
abuses: arrests carried on by agents in plainclothes producing no warrant 
and no ID; lack of prompt notification of the arrest to the families; agents 
searching homes of the suspects and confiscating item with no 
authorization; arrested being held in pre-charge, incommunicado 
detention for longer than the 12-day maximum period allowed by 
Moroccan law; secret detention being carried out in secret facilities (i.e. 
allegedly, the Témara centre); physical abuses and tortures. Although 
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many domestic and international NGOs have raised these cases to 
Moroccan authorities, so far no concrete action has been taken and these 
allegations have largely failed to be investigated by courts. 
As concerns point (b): although Morocco’s repression in Western Sahara 
has being strongly easing over time since the 1970s and 1980s, serious 
rights violations continue, and Saharawis remain subject to severe 
restrictions by part of Moroccan authorities on almost all of the most basic 
freedoms. Remarkable violations which are continuously reported 
include: unfair trials; arbitrary arrests, violence and torture by the security 
forces; restrictions to the freedom of assembly through prohibition or 
repression of Saharawi demonstrations; restrictions to the freedom of 
association for human rights organizations, mainly through legal 
administrative obstruction; restrictions on foreign journalists and 
observers; restrictions to press freedom. Similarly worrying is the situation 
of human rights in the POLISARIO administered Tindouf Refugee camps, 
located in a desert region of Algeria bordering with Morocco, which hosts 
around 125,000 persons living in tents or modest huts without running 
water. Despite the POLISARIO’s professions of openness to monitoring 
and the presence of many foreign humanitarian organizations, refugees’ 
conditions remain vulnerable due to the camps’ isolation, the lack of 
regular on-the-ground monitoring and the legal limbo in which the camp 
exists. Major violations reported include restrictions to the freedom of 
speech and to the freedom of movement and allegations of slavery. 
? Civil society 
If compared to other countries in the Maghreb region Morocco stands out 
as having a well-developed and relatively free civil society, consisting of a 
variegated network of organisations (around 30,000 legally declared), 
most of which flourished during the last 20 years as a consequence of the 
1990s political opening. Faced to such a flourishing of associations, the 
State’s attitude towards them has notably varied in the last two decades: 
tolerating but closely monitoring their work, before the 1990s; adopting a 
more liberal stand (favouring especially the development of associations 
providing social services), since the 1990s; and finally re-assuming a 
supervisory and control attitude over the associational movement, mainly 
through (i) co-optation of its cadres and their promotion to higher levels of 
the public apparatus, diverting them from political action; (ii) incentives 
for new NGOs completely loyal to the State; (iii) tight control and limits 
over associations’ assets and resources. The whole Moroccan civil society 
landscape can roughly be grouped around two groups: (a) Professional 
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Associations (Business Associations and Trade Unions); and (b) Non-
Governmental Organizations. 
As concerns the Business Associations and Trade Unions, there’s a general 
lack of institutionalized mechanisms of consultations and of a structural 
framework for their involvement in decision making processes, resulting 
in an influence power which is sporadic and largely dependent on 
lobbying capacities. Indeed, remarkable differences exists: while the 
General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM) do have some 
concrete power, by regularly interfering in social negotiations and offering 
expertise and technical advice to government and parliament over the 
elaboration of policies and laws pertaining the social domain, the workers’ 
unions on the contrary only contribute marginally and indirectly to the 
elaboration of laws, often limiting themselves to demand or denounce, 
with a pressure strength mainly exerted through blockage powers and a 
domain of action limited to the social realm. 
As concerns the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), a major part 
of which operate in the field of human rights protection, government's 
attitude toward them (either domestic and international ones) varies 
depending on the sensitivity of the issues, but is generally cooperative. 
Indeed, the recent booming proliferation NGOs strongly supported by the 
state has been interpreted and criticised by many analysts as part of a 
conscious state strategy, aimed at establishing bridges with different social 
sectors, side-lining the political parties, and promoting internationally the 
image of Morocco as a democratizing country. 
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6.3. The Economic Sphere and Socio-economic Development 
 
As concerns the economic sphere and socio-economic development, 
Morocco did experience significant social and economic challenges during the 
last two decades, which pushed the government to take a strong stand on 
development issues, by formulating and embracing a new development 
strategy able to address in a comprehensive way all these interconnected defies. 
Overall, the country managed to achieve a general positive economic 
performance especially since the 2000s - with sustained high GDP growth, 
falling unemployment, rising investment and low inflation – and significant 
improvements in poverty reduction and social indicators levels.  
Though,  despite this generally positive growth/development experience, 
several significant challenges – mainly due to structural constraints - still need 
to be addressed, in order to allow the country to reach its full growth and 
developmental potential. Such defies are indeed at the heart of the 
government’s substantial development effort, enshrined in the comprehensive 
Social and Economic Development Program 2008-2012, launched in 2007 and 
centred around three key objectives: (a) improve social outcomes (especially in 
education, health, and social protection; (b) enhance growth, export potential 
and investments (focusing on key productive sectors, infrastructure sectors and 
transversal strategies; (c) implement cross-cutting reforms (i.e. governance 
improvement, public administration and judiciary reforms, decentralization). 
Overall, these major challenges and shortcomings can be summarized in the 
following points, grouped around three broad areas: 
1)     Acceleration of growth and job creation   
? Overall low levels of educations still constitute a major problem, fostering 
a  vicious circle of low quality human capital/low productivity/low wages; 
thus, the urgent need to improve human capital quality, job productivity 
and the quality of growth. 
? Structural unemployment problems still persist: though considerably 
decreased in recent years, unemployment is still at high levels, mostly 
concerning urban areas, the youth and people with higher levels of 
education. Further, it still fails to guarantee protection from poverty: with 
an absolute majority of the poor being employed, that of the “working 
poor” remains a major concern. 
? Need to further advance the consolidation of public finances and the 
overall public sector management reform. 
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? Need to readdress the anti-export, low value-added, insufficient 
diversification of the trade regime, as well as to advance the intra-
Maghreb/MENA integration 
? Need to address agriculture’s structural problems: low productivity; low 
valued-adding; low quality and little diversification of products; weak 
investment incentives; dualistic structure with a predominant traditional 
rain-fed sub-sector and a smaller, more competitive, export-oriented 
irrigated one; deficient rural transport infrastructure; weak land rights 
tenure systems. 
? Need to further improve the business environment: despite the wide 
range of reforms implemented over the past decade, the structural 
transformation of the private sector into a competitive and technologically 
sophisticated sector is still hindered  by the persistence of substantial 
constraints to business and to the emergence of new industrial players 
(namely: difficult access to land; high tax rates; credit constraints; poor 
transparency in administrative procedures; corruption; poor property 
rights enforcement; competition from the informal sector; dominant 
position of few large incumbents). 
?  Need to enhance financial market reforms and to engage in second 
generation ICT reforms 
2)     Reduction of social disparities  
? The remarkable progress in poverty reduction achieved since the 2000s 
were not accompanied by a similar trend in inequality: substantial 
regional disparities and the rural/urban gap still remain a major problem, 
as well as the lagging conditions of women. 
? Need to foster equity-enhancing growth and inclusiveness. 
? Poor quality and poor access to key social services, especially health and 
education, is still a major problem to be addressed. 
3)     Ensuring sustainability  
? Need to reduce the country’s vulnerability to climate changes (mainly 
droughts), which is still very high due to its large reliance on agriculture – 
and especially irrigated agriculture,  which overuses increasingly scarce 
water resources – and the lack of effective risk management instruments. 
? Need to consolidate the on-going reform of the water sector, which is 
plagued by several factors: water scarcity; weak sector governance and 
institutions; inefficient water use in agriculture; inadequate access to water 
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supply and sanitation services. Thus, the consequent need for more 
efficient water allocation and planning; better interagency coordination; 
better groundwater and pollution control; introduction of subsidies for 
technologies such as micro-irrigation. 
? Need to consolidate the on-going reform of the energy sector, focusing on: 
reducing the heavy dependency on energy imports; diversifying the 
energy mix (dominated by coal and oil); developing  indigenous energy 
resources (i.e. solar and wind); enhancing energy use efficiency; 
reinforcing regional integration in the Mediterranean electricity market. 
In addition to this, some concerns can also be highlighted concerning the 
most relevant social initiative endorsed by the government so far, the National 
Initiative for Human Development, namely: 
? Its project-based approach could run the risk to fail to generate an 
endogenous, integrated and sustainable development process. 
? Its exclusive focus on social impact and social indicators – rather than on 
social development as a structural component of endogenous economic 
growth – could eventually led to a “development without growth” policy. 
? Its contribution to the democracy-building process is extremely doubtful 
consolidating an already on-going process of administrative 
decentralisation without political devolution. 
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6.4. Pressures and Influences of External Actors on Domestic 
Dynamics 
 
As concerns the pressures and influences on domestic dynamics exerted by 
external actors, the most notable ones come from the European Union, the 
United States and various International Organizations (mainly the International 
Financial Organizations – the IMF and the WB – and several Non-government 
Organizations). In all cases, pressures to embark in some kind of 
“democratization efforts” have variously been exerted, though with different 
degrees in demanding and different responses as well. 
In the case of the European Union, bilateral-relations with Morocco started 
in 1969 with a first bilateral Association Agreement, and followed a path of 
increasing closeness and dialogue thought a series of subsequent agreements: a 
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1976, within the framework of the Global 
Mediterranean Policy; the Euro-Maghreb Partnership endorsed by the 1992 Lisbon 
Summit; the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA), adopted in 1996 
within the framework of the newborn Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 
launched by the 1995 Barcelona Conference; the ENP Action Plan, signed in 
2005 within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
launched in 2004; the Union for the Mediterranean launched in 2008; and finally 
the Joint Document for Morocco’s Advanced Status, recognized in October 2008. 
Overall, although the issues of democratization, political dialogue and human 
rights’ protection were in theory present in all such agreements, they were 
actually for the most neglected and left to the background behind other 
priorities, mainly security and economic issues. This holds true especially for 
the EMP process - which ended up focusing almost exclusively on the 
economic sphere (markets’ liberalization and opening to international trade) - 
and for the ENP process. Indeed, the ENP Action Plan, in its section “political 
dialogue and reforms”, did include a broad set of objectives, but failed to 
specify timeframes, actors, implementation and evaluation mechanisms 
defining how and when the envisaged objectives were to be achieved; 
moreover, it failed to include some key structural reforms linked to the 
fundamental shortcomings highlighted by the EU Commission in its 2004 
Country Report assessment, namely: lack of respect of the separation of 
powers, limited powers of parliament and government, lack of judiciary’ s 
independence, weakness of political parties, limited influence of civil society on 
major political decisions. Similarly, also the Advanced Status Joint Document  
keeps failing to establish any binding framework for political dialogue. Lastly,  
a major shortcoming is the EU’s failure to directly engage with the domestic 
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moderate Islamist political movements/organizations and to incorporate them 
in their development assistance and policy initiatives. 
As concerns relations between Morocco and the United States, they have 
always been very good: thanks to Morocco’s standing as a comparatively 
moderate Arab Muslim nation, the US have always seen in the country a major 
ally and key partner in promoting security and stability ad to sustain its pro-
active involvement in the  Middle East and North African region, thus generally 
seeking sustained engagement with it through trade policy, security cooperation 
and direct democracy assistance, through various channels and initiatives, either 
multilateral or  bilateral. Though, the bulk of the Morocco-US relationship truly 
resides in the cooperation on trade policy (via a Free Trade Agreement signed in 
2004 within the framework of the Middle East Free Trade Area initiative) and on 
security matters (particularly strengthened in recent years, after September 11, by 
counter-terrorism cooperation). Indeed, democracy assistance is concretely given 
less importance and is generally plagued by an overall tendency to be fairly 
vague, all-encompassing, with a top-down approach, and often concretely mainly 
focused on economic issues. This holds true both for the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa (BMENA) initiative - the general multilateral framework for US 
democracy assistance launched in 2004, mirroring the EU’s Euro-Med Partnership 
in its agenda and structure and supposed to act complementarily with it – and for 
the funds channelled through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the 
funds administered by the USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). 
As regards the influences coming from International Financial 
Organizations, namely the IMF and the World Bank, they have clearly been 
channelled via the bilateral partnerships they have been engaging on with 
Morocco, and they appear to have evolved during time: while at the time of the 
adoption of the Structural Adjustment Plan in 1982 – which fostered Morocco to 
introduce a wide range of neo-liberal economic –both the IMF and the WB were 
not very concerned with the political changes deemed to accompany economic 
reforms, and largely refrained from intervening in the political sphere, more 
recently (since the 1990s) they have indeed started to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach in their assessments/evaluations of the country’s 
economic progresses, by largely including concerns/recommendations 
regarding important structural political and social reforms. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
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To conclude, all these measures of political opening, economic 
liberalization, and advances in civil/political and human rights protection that 
the country is variously and to various degrees  being experiencing, are the two 
sides of the same coin: on the one part they undoubtedly testify of a 
democratization pattern being occurring in the country in the political, social 
and economic spheres; on the other part, they do constitute in primis the 
strategic tools through which the Monarchy is actually managing the 
restructuring of its powers and the reorganization of its power relations, in 
order to maintain its privileged and absolutely unique leading position at the 
core of Morocco’s broad institutional system.        
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Tab. 6.1 Various Democracy Indices for Morocco  
Variable 
Measured 
Name and Year 
of 
Report/Dataset 
Institution Index 
Points, Ranking 
and 
Classification 
Political 
Rights and 
Freedoms 
Freedom House 
Report 
 2010 
Freedom 
House 
PR: Political Rights 
CL: Civil Liberties 
(Scale of 1= Free to 7= 
Not Free) 
PR: 5   CL: 4 
Classification: 
Partly Free 
Consolidation 
of 
Authoritarian 
and 
Democratic 
Institutions 
Polity IV 
Dataset 
2010 
Centre for 
Systemic 
Peace and 
Centre for 
Global Policy 
(George 
Mason 
University) 
Democ: Consolidation 
of Democratic 
Institutions 
Autoc:  Authoritarian 
Consolidation 
Polity: Synthesis of Both 
(Scale of +10= Very 
Democratic to -10= Very 
Authoritarian) 
Democ: 0 
Autoc: 6 
Polity: -6 
Classification: 
Average 
Authoritarian 
Consolidation 
Perception of 
Corruption 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
2011 
Transparency 
International 
TCPI: Transparency 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
(Scale of 1= Highly 
Corrupt to 10= Very 
Clean) 
TCPI: 3.4 
Ranking: 80th out 
of 183 Countries 
Democracy, 
including 
Press Status 
and 
Corruption 
World 
Democracy 
Audit 
2011 
 
World Audit World Democracy Rank 
Ranking: 100th 
out on 150 
Countries 
Management 
of Political 
and Economic 
Change 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation 
Index 
2012 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
MI: Management Index, 
Quality of 
Transformation 
Management 
MI: 4.20 
Classification: 
Moderate 
Success 
Ranking: 89th out 
of 128 Countries 
Sources: www.freedomhouse.org;  
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy; 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results 
http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm  
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Note: all the acronyms for Morocco’s domestic institutions/programmes refer to the 
French version, while using the English version for the full names. Acronyms for non-
domestic/international institutions, programmes and documents are normally used in 
their English version.  
 
AfDB African Development Bank 
AMDF  Moroccan Association for Women Rights (Association Marocaine 
pour les Droits des Femmes) 
AMDH Moroccan Association of Human Rights (Association Marocaine 
des Droits de l’Homme) 
AMU  Arab Maghreb Union 
ANDCM  Moroccan National Association of Unemployed University 
Graduates (Association Nationale des Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc)  
BMENA Broader Middle East and North Africa  
CCDH  Moroccan Human Rights Advisory Council (Conseil Consultatif 
des Droits de l'Homme) 
CDT Democratic Confederation of Labour (Confédération Démocratique 
du Travail) 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
CEN-SAD  Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
CGEM General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (Confédération 
Générale des Entreprises du Maroc) 
COSEF Royal Commission on Education Reform (Commission Spécial 
d’Education-Formation) 
CORCAS Royal Advisory Council for Sahara Affairs (Conseil Royal 
Consultatif des Affaires Sahariennes)  
CNDH  National Human Rights Council (Conseil National des Droits de 
l’Homme) 
DGST  General Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory 
(Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire)  
DPL Development Policy Loan 
EC European Community 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
EP European Parliament  
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FAO Food and Agricultural Organization 
FMVJ  Forum for Truth and Justice (Forum Marocain pour la Vérité et la 
Justice)  
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GAFTA  Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GII Gender Inequality Index 
GMP Global Mediterranean Policy 
JC Justice and Charity (Justice et Charité) 
HACA High Authority of Audio-visual Communication (Haute Autorité 
pour la Communication Audio-visuelle) 
HCP High Planning Commission (Haute Commissariat au Plan) 
HDI Human Development Index 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICPC Central Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (Instance 
Central pour la Prévention de la Corruption) 
IER Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance d’Equité et de 
Réconciliation) 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INDH National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative Nationale 
pour le Développement Humain) 
INPBPM  National Commission for the Protection of Public Property in 
Morocco (l’Instance Nationale pour la Protection des Biens Publics au 
Maroc) 
LSMS  Living Standards Measurement Survey 
MEFTA Middle East Free Trade Area  
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative 
MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(Mission des Nations Unies pour l'organisation d'un Référendum au 
Sahara Occidental) 
MP  Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire) 
MUR Movement for Unity and Reform (Mouvement pour l’Unité et la 
Reforme)  
OIC  Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
OMDH Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (Organisation 
Marocaine pour les Droits de l’Homme) 
PAM Authenticity and Modernity Party (Parti Authenticité et 
Modernité) 
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PCM Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste Marocaine) 
PDI Democratic Independence Party (Parti Démocratique de 
l’Independence) 
PI Independence Party (Parti de l’Independence) 
PJD Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du 
Développement)  
PND National Democratic Party (Parti National-Démocrate) 
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de 
Oro (Spanish acronym, Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el 
Hamra y Río de Oro) 
PPS Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme)  
RMP Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
RNI National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement National des 
Indépendants) 
SADR  Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic  
SIL  Specific Investment Loan 
TIFA  Trade and Investments Framework Agreement 
TSCTP  Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership  
UC  Constitutional Union (Union Constitutionnelle) 
UGTM General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Générale des 
Travailleurs Marocains) 
UMT Moroccan Workers Union (Union Marocaine du Travail) 
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
UNESCO United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund  
UNFP National Union of Social Forces (Union Nationale des Forces 
Socialistes) 
USAID  United States’ Agency for International Development  
USFP Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces 
Populaires) 
WB  World Bank
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